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The purpose of this book is to provide the reader with vital communication concepts and tools to assist in 
preparing for and responding to a severe influenza pandemic in the United States. The focus of the book 
is on the possibility of a severe pandemic. Although the concepts do apply to less intense public health 
challenges, they may not need to be executed at the same level of intensity. 
This book is intended to be used as an addition to the CDC Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 
coursebook (Reynolds, Galdo, Sokler, 2002) and the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication: By 
Leaders for Leaders coursebook (Reynolds, 2004). The concepts in this book do not replace, but, instead, 
build on the first two books. This book shares foundational concepts that will support your communication 
work and should be relevant even as the circumstances surrounding a severe pandemic may change. 
Nonetheless, the information in this book is current as of October 2007. As major events occur, especially 
related to countermeasures such as pandemic vaccine development, some assumptions may change. 
Importantly, this book explains in more depth the communication challenges to be expected in a severe 
influenza pandemic. This is not a primer on pandemic influenza and is not the place to turn to for up-to-date 
message maps, communication tools, and pandemic preparedness and planning information. The “go-to” 
place for evolving information is the U. S. Government Pandemic Flu website at http://www.pandemicflu. 
gov. At www.pandemicflu.gov you will find resource materials for creating communication products, as well 
as additional guidance on planning. HHS and CDC are engaged in a number of research and development 
projects related to pandemic communication. Check the website regularly for updates. 
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1. The possibility of suffering a harmful event. 
2. A factor or course involving uncertain danger. 
Crisis and emergency risk communication is a vital component of 
public health emergency response. The initial objectives for public 
information releases from response authorities early in a crisis are: 1) to 
prevent further illness, injury, or death; 2) to restore or maintain calm; 
and 3) to engender confidence in the operational response (National 
Response Plan, 2005). Because emergencies are chaotic, planning 
should be directed at simplifying roles and responsibilities to achieve 
the greatest good for the greatest number while maintaining enough 
resources to reach those few who can’t help themselves (Clarke, 2003; 
Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). 
Mitroff said about preparing for crises, “We must improve dramatically 
our abilities to ‘think about the unthinkable’’’ (2004, p. 11). Among 
these crises, the one most likely to directly involve the greatest number 
of persons in the United States is a major respiratory-transmitted 
infectious disease outbreak such as pandemic influenza. In this 
widespread emergency, public health response officials would need 
to communicate messages to the public asking them to take particular 
actions and refrain from other actions (e.g., engage in cough etiquette 
and refrain from gathering in groups). An influenza pandemic of a 
highly pathogenic strain that occurs in our technologically advanced 
society—where instant horizontal communication takes place around 
the clock—will severely tax the ability of public health crisis response 
officials to provide accurate, timely, consistent, and credible information 
to the U.S. population (Reynolds et al., 2002). Emergency messages 
will need to be communicated to a highly diverse U.S. population and to 
cultures around the world. 
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Fast Facts 





Zanamivir are approved 
by the FDA for the 
treatment and/or 
prevention of influenza. 
All four antiviral 
medications usually 
work against influenza 
A viruses. However, the 
drugs may not always 
work, because influenza 
virus strains can become 
resistant to one or more 
of these medications. 
The influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses identified in 
humans in Asia in 2004 




Monitoring of avian 
viruses for resistance 
to influenza antiviral 
medications continues. 
(www.pandemicflu.gov) 
According to the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (2005), a 
pandemic may come and go in waves, each of which can last for six to 
eight weeks. An especially severe influenza pandemic could lead to high 
levels of illness, death, social disruption, and economic loss. Everyday 
life would be disrupted because so many people in so many places 
could become seriously ill at the same time. Impacts can range from 
school and business closings to the interruption of basic services such as 
public transportation and food delivery. A substantial percentage of the 
world’s population will require some form of medical care. Health care 
facilities could be overwhelmed, creating a shortage of hospital staff, 
beds, ventilators and other supplies. Surge capacity at non-traditional 
sites such as schools may need to be created to cope with demand. The 
need for vaccine is likely to outstrip supply and the supply of antiviral 
drugs is also likely to be inadequate early in a pandemic. Difficult 
decisions will need to be made regarding who gets antiviral drugs and 
vaccines. 
Death rates are determined by four factors: the number of people 
who become infected; the virulence of the virus; the underlying 
characteristics and vulnerability of affected populations; and the 
availability and effectiveness of preventive measures. In the United 
States alone, estimates of deaths during a pandemic range from 
approximately 200,000 to 2 million (HHS, 2005). However, the effects 
of a pandemic can be lessened if preparations are made ahead of time. 
The following are assumptions that have been made by subject matter 
experts to assist in planning for the next pandemic: 
•	 Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal. 
•	 Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an 
imminent pandemic. 
•	 The clinical disease attack rate will likely be 30% or higher 
in the overall population during the pandemic. Illness rates 
will be highest among school-aged children (about 40%) and 
decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20% will 
become ill during a community outbreak. 
•	 Some persons will become infected but not develop clinically 
significant symptoms. Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic 
individuals can transmit infection and develop immunity to 
subsequent infection. 
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•	 Due to the availability of effective antiviral drugs for treatment, 
the proportion of sick people seeking outpatient care may be 
higher. 
•	 The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on 
the virulence of the pandemic virus. Estimates differ ten-fold 
between more and less severe scenarios. Two scenarios are 
presented based on extrapolation of past pandemic experience 
(Table 1). Planning should include the more severe scenario. 
•	 Risk groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted 
with certainty but are likely to include infants, the elderly, 
pregnant women, and persons with chronic medical conditions. 
•	 Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the 
pandemic. 
•	 In a severe pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the 
need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection may 
reach 40% during the peak weeks of a community outbreak, 
with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before and 
after the peak. 
•	 Certain public health measures (dismissing students from 
school, quarantining household contacts of infected individuals, 
“snow days”) are likely to increase rates of absenteeism. 
•	 The typical incubation period (interval between infection and 
onset of symptoms) for influenza is approximately 2 days. 
•	 Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit 
infection for up to one day before the onset of illness. Viral 
shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the 
first 2 days of illness. Children usually shed the greatest amount 
of virus and therefore are likely to pose the greatest risk for 
transmission. 
•	 On average, infected persons will transmit infection to 
approximately two other people. 
•	 In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak will last about 6 
to 8 weeks. 
•	 Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks 
occur across the country) of illness could occur with each wave 
lasting 2-3 months. 
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• Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and 
winter, but the seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted 
with certainty. 
Table 1. Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and 
Death Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza 
Scenarios* 
Characteristic Moderate (1958/68-like) Severe (1918-like) 
Illness 





90 million (30%) 





90 million (30%) 





* Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note that 
these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available dur-
ing the 20th century pandemics. 
Source: United States Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza 
Plan 
Disasters are inherently different from routine daily emergencies and 
the difference is more than just one of magnitude. Chaos theory related 
to crises emphasized that disasters that take a toll on human life are 
inherently characterized by change, high levels of uncertainty, and 
interactive complexity (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003).  
The possibilities of harmful human behaviors, combined with bad 
communication practices, can lead to overwhelming negative public 
health outcomes during the crisis response (Reynolds, Galdo, & Sokler, 
2002; Seeger et al., 2003). However, many of the expected harmful 
individual and community behaviors can be mitigated with effective 
crisis and emergency risk communication. Strategic communications 
activities based on scientifically derived risk communications principles 
are an integral part of a comprehensive public health response before, 
during, and after an influenza pandemic.  Effective communication can 
guide the public, the news media, healthcare providers, and other groups 
in responding appropriately to outbreak situations and complying with 
public health measures (HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan). 
Communications preparedness for an influenza pandemic should follow 
key risk communications concepts. 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 4 
Introduction 
•	 When health risks are uncertain, as likely will be the case during 
an influenza pandemic, people need information about what is 
known and unknown, as well as interim guidance to formulate 
decisions to help protect their health and the health of others. 
•	 Coordination of message development and release of 
information among federal, state, and local health officials is 
critical to help avoid confusion that can undermine public trust, 
raise fear and anxiety, and impede response measures. 
•	 Guidance to community members about how to protect 
themselves and their family members and colleagues is an 
essential component of crisis management. 
•	 Information provided to the public should be technically correct 
and succinct without seeming patronizing. 
•	 Information presented during an influenza pandemic should 
minimize speculation and avoid over-interpretation of data and 
avoid overly confident assessments of investigations and control 
measures. 
•	 An influenza pandemic will generate immediate, intense, and 
sustained demand for information from the public, healthcare 
providers, policy makers, and news media.  Healthcare workers 
and public health staff are likely to be involved in media 
relations and public health communications. 
•	 Timely and transparent dissemination of accurate, science-based 
information about pandemic influenza and the progress of the 
response can build public trust and confidence. 
To avoid confusion early in a crisis, accurate, relevant, simple, fast 
and consistent messages are best (Reynolds et al., 2002; Seeger et al., 
2003). Communication expertise that supports the needs of public 
health professionals responding to a public health emergency or crisis 
will borrow from many areas of communication study. This special 
combination is called “crisis and emergency risk communication.” 
Crisis and emergency risk communication encompasses the urgency 
of disaster communication with the need to communicate risks and 
benefits to stakeholders and the public (Reynolds et al., 2002; Reynolds 
& Seeger, 2005). Crisis and emergency risk communication differs 
from crisis communication in that the communicator is not perceived 
as a participant in the crisis or disaster, except as an agent to resolve 
the crisis or emergency. Crisis and emergency risk communication is 
To avoid confusion, 
accurate, relevant, 
simple, fast, and 
consistent messages 
are best. 
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Crisis and emergency 
risk communication is 
the effort by experts to 
provide information to 
help people make the 
best possible decisions 
about their well-being 
within nearly impossible 
time constraints and 
ultimately to accept 
the imperfect nature of 
choices during the crisis. 
the effort by experts to provide information to allow an individual, 
stakeholder, or an entire community to make the best possible decisions 
about their well-being within nearly impossible time constraints and 
help people ultimately to accept the imperfect nature of choices during 
the crisis. This is the communication that goes on in emergency rooms, 
not doctors’ offices. 
Crisis and emergency risk communication also differs from risk 
communication in that a decision must be made within a narrow time 
constraint, the decision may be irreversible, the outcome of the decision 
may be uncertain, and the decision may need to be made with imperfect 
or incomplete information. Crisis and emergency risk communication 
represents an expert opinion provided in the hope that it benefits its 
receivers and advances a behavior or an action that allows for rapid and 
efficient recovery from the event. 
Crisis Communication Lifecycle 
Understanding the communication pattern of a crisis can help 
professionals anticipate problems and respond effectively. For 
communication professionals, it’s vital to know that every emergency, 
disaster, or crisis evolves in phases and that the communication must 
evolve in tandem (Reynolds et al., 2002). By dividing the crisis into 
phases, the communicator can anticipate the information needs of the 
media, stakeholders, and the general public. Each phase has unique 
informational requirements and the movement through each of the 
phases will vary according to the triggering event (Figure 1). Not all 
crises are created equally (Mitroff, 2004). The degree or intensity and 
longevity of a crisis will impact required resources and staff needed to 
provide risk information. 
Pre-crisis phase 
The pre-crisis phase is where all of the planning and most of the work 
should be done. In this phase, organizations should consider the types 
of disasters that they may need to address. Reasonable questions 
can be anticipated, and preliminary answers can be sought. Initial 
communication can be drafted with blanks to be filled in later. Alliances 
and partnerships can be fostered to ensure that experts are speaking with 
one voice. 
Initial phase 
In the initial phase of a crisis or emergency, people want information. 
They want timely and accurate facts about what happened, and 
where, and what is being done, and they want it now. They will 
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question the magnitude of the crisis, the immediacy of the threat to 
them, the duration of the threat, and who is going to fix the problem. 
Communicators should be prepared to answer these questions as 
quickly, accurately, and fully as possible. 
Simplicity, credibility, verifiability, consistency, and speed count when 
communicating in the initial phases of an emergency. The initial phase 
of a crisis is characterized by confusion and intense media interest. 
Information is usually incomplete, and facts are dispersed. It’s important 
to recognize that information from the media, other organizations, 
and even within one’s own organization may not be accurate. In the 
initial phase of a crisis, there is no second chance to get it right. An 
organization’s reputation depends on what it does and does not say. 
Crisis maintenance 
As the crisis evolves, one can anticipate sustained media interest and 
scrutiny. Unexpected developments, rumors, or misinformation may 
place further media demands on organization communicators. Experts, 
professionals, and others not associated with the organization will 
comment publicly on the issue and sometimes contradict or misinterpret 
messages. Processes for tracking communication activities become 
increasingly important as the workload increases. 
Resolution 
As the crisis resolves, there is a return to stasis, with increased 
understanding about the crisis as complete recovery systems are put in 
place. This phase is characterized by a reduction in public and media 
interest. Once the crisis is resolved, a response organization may need 
to respond to intense media scrutiny about how the event was handled. 
In this phase, there is an opportunity to reinforce public health messages 
while the issue is still current. 
During the Interpandemic Period, national, state, and local health 
communications professionals should focus on preparedness planning 
and on building flexible, sustainable communications networks. During 
the Pandemic Period, they should focus on well coordinated health 
communications to support public health interventions designed to help 
limit influenza-associated morbidity and mortality. 
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However, it is important to note that individuals will tend to simplify 
complex information, attempt to force new information into previous 
constructs, and cling to current beliefs (Brehm et al., 2005; Novac, 
2001). Therefore, if the emergency message requires asking people 
to do something that seems counterintuitive they may hesitate to act. 
Because people tend not to seek out contrary evidence and are adept at 
maintaining their beliefs, conflicting or contrary information may be 
misconstrued to conform to established beliefs (Andreasen, 1995). 
Uncertainty and communication 
Uncertainty exists as an extension of a situation or in the limitations of 
the information and knowledge shared about that situation (Brashers, 
2001). For example, as the world enters the influenza pandemic alert 
period the situation itself is ambiguous, unpredictable, and complex. 
Public health experts monitoring the global situation can not know 
with certainty whether a potential pandemic virus strain will become 
more easily transmitted between humans. They can not predict when 
a pandemic strain will reach their region, and the decision about 
who should be vaccinated first is complicated by which virus strain 
ultimately infects the population. However, uncertainty can also be 
caused by existing information that is not available or is inconsistent. 
Uncertainty is better or worse tolerated depending on the relevance of 
the situation to the person. What is at stake? 
Perception of risk 
The perception of risk is also vitally important in emergency 
communication. Not all risks are created equally. A wide body of 
research exists on issues surrounding risk communication (Bond & 
Smith, 1996; Brehm et al., 2005; Cohen, 2001), but the following 
emphasizes that some risks are more accepted than others. 
•	 Voluntary versus involuntary: Voluntary risks are more readily 
accepted than imposed risks. 
•	 Personally controlled versus controlled by others: Risks 
controlled by the individual or community are more readily 
accepted than risks outside the individual’s or community’s 
control. 
•	 Familiar versus exotic: Familiar risks are more readily 
accepted than unfamiliar risks. Risks perceived as relatively 
unknown are perceived to be greater than risks that are well 
understood. 
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• Natural origin versus manmade: Risks generated by nature 
are better tolerated than risks generated by man or institution. 
Risks caused by human action are less well tolerated than risks 
generated by nature. 
•	 Reversible versus permanent: Reversible risk is better 
tolerated than risk perceived to be irreversible. 
•	 Statistical versus anecdotal: Statistical risks for populations 
are better tolerated than risks represented by individuals. An 
anecdote presented to a person or community can be more 
damaging than a statistical risk of one in 10,000 presented as a 
number. 
• Endemic versus epidemic (catastrophic): Illnesses, injuries, 
and deaths spread over time at a predictable rate are better 
tolerated than illnesses, injuries, and deaths grouped by time and 
location (e.g., U.S. car crash deaths versus airplane crashes). 
•	 Fairly distributed versus unfairly distributed: Risks that 
do not single out a group, population, or individual are better 
tolerated than risks that are perceived to be targeted. 
•	 Generated by trusted institution versus mistrusted 
institution: Risks generated by a trusted institution are better 
tolerated than risks that are generated by a mistrusted institution. 
Risks generated by a mistrusted institution will be perceived as 
greater than risks generated by a trusted institution. 
• Adults versus children: Risks that affect adults are better 
tolerated than risks that affect children. 
• Understood benefit versus questionable benefit: Risks with 
well-understood potential benefit and the reduction of well-
understood harm are better tolerated than risks with little or no 
perceived benefit or reduction of harm. 
The principles of risk communication are vital when developing 
messages during an emergency. Most disaster response planners 
gauge the severity of a crisis on two factors: the physical impact on 
people (numbers ill, injured and dead) and property damage (dollars 
and geographic areas). However, the other measure of a crisis is its 
emotional toll on the people affected by the crisis. If it’s the first 
emergency of its type—manmade, imposed, or catastrophic—the 
communication challenges increase. 
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How the Public Judges Messages in a Crisis 
Expect the public to immediately judge the content of an official 
emergency message in the following way: “Was it timely? Can I trust 
this source?” and “Are they being honest?” Research shows that there 
are four basic elements to establishing trust and credibility: expressing 
empathy and caring; showing competence and expertise; remaining 
honest and open; and being committed. Empathy and caring should 
be expressed early in messages and repeated. Being perceived as 
empathetic and caring provides greater opportunity for your message to 
be received and acted upon (Sandman, 2002). In a crisis, the message 
should acknowledge the fear, pain, suffering, and uncertainty being 
experienced. For most public health professionals, being honest means 
not being paternalistic in communication but, instead, participatory— 
giving people choices and enough information to make appropriate 
decisions. It means allowing the public to observe the process while 
reminding them that this process is what drives the quality of the 
emergency response. 
Empathy 
The concept of empathy is critical to communicating in a crisis. Every 
person has the innate ability to feel empathy. Have you ever seen a 
nursery in a hospital where one baby starts to cry and within a minute 
all of them are crying—that’s human empathy. We have the ability 
to understand what our fellow humans are feeling even if we are not. 
The challenge for a response official is to believe it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that pain, after all we are taught to be stoic in our roles. 
We must recognize that the people we want to help need us to put into 
words that we understand the emotions they are feeling at the worst 
moments of their lives. If we put into words what they are feeling they 
will know we “get it” and they will trust us more to help them. They 
may calm down enough to hear what we have to say. And then they will 
be more likely to listen to our guidance. 
Never say “I know how you feel” and think you have expressed 
empathy. To express empathy means to put into words the actual 
emotion that someone is feeling. So, if someone said the words “I know 
how you feel” I would be left wondering, do you really? If the person 
said, “I understand how anxious you must feel waiting for an answer 
about your loved one” – then I can be certain the other person has 
insight about what I’m feeling because I am feeling anxious! 
A national leader recently said, “Well, we want to express empathy to 
the victims and their families.” That doesn’t work either. Yes, you want 
Fast Facts 
A pandemic may come and 
go in waves, each of which 
can last for 6 to 8 weeks 
at a time. If an influenza 
pandemic occurs, the virus 
will spread easily from 
person to person. 
While vaccines and antiviral 
medications are part of 
overall pandemic response 
planning, simple hygiene 
habits will also be important. 
Simple steps can help to 
limit the spread of germs. 
Parents should model these 
steps and teach them to their 
children: 
•	 Wash hands frequently 
with soap and water (use 
an alcohol-based hand 
cleaner if soap and water 
are unavailable); 
•	 Use a tissue to cover 
your mouth and nose 
when you cough or 
sneeze; 
•	 Use your upper sleeve if 
you don’t have a tissue; 
and 
•	 Stay at home if you are 
sick. 
(www.pandemicflu.gov) 




•	 The importance of strengthening community hardiness and 
personal resilience to provide the optimum opportunity for 
recovery from a crisis. 
•	 How to incorporate loss, grief and mourning rituals in 
communication to the community while respecting cultural 
differences. 
•	 Distinguish which populations will be unable to receive general 
public health emergency messages related to pandemic influenza 
through mass communication channels during the beginning of 
an influenza pandemic. 
• Recognize the National Incident Management System and the 
intricacies of the Joint Information Center 
• How information technology and the new media influence 
communication decisions and pandemic preparedness. 
Well-planned and well-executed crisis and emergency risk 
communication, fully integrated into every stage of the pandemic 
influenza planning and response, can give the organization the 
critical boost necessary to ensure that limited resources are efficiently 
directed where truly needed. A severe influenza pandemic will take a 
physical, emotional, and societal toll on the U.S. population. Crisis and 
emergency risk communication principles will ameliorate some of the 
expected negative outcomes. 
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Checklist: Basic Tenets of Emergency Risk Communication 
o Don’t over reassure. The objective is not to placate, but to engender, calm concern. 
o Acknowledge uncertainty.  Offer what you know versus what you don’t know.  Show your distress and acknowledge your 
audience’s distress regarding the uncertainty of the situation.  
“It must be awful to hear we can’t answer that question right now . . .” 
o Express that a process is in place to learn more. “We have a system (plan, process) to help us respond (find answers, etc).” 
o Give anticipatory guidance.  If you are aware of future negative outcomes, let people know what to expect. Example: side effects 
of antibiotics. If it’s going to be bad, tell them. 
o Be regretful, not defensive. Say “we are sorry . . .” Or “we feel terrible that . . .” when acknowledging misdeeds or failures from 
the agency.  Don’t use “regret,” which sounds like you’re preparing for a lawsuit. 
o Acknowledge people’s fears. Don’t tell people they shouldn’t be afraid.  They are and they have a right to their fears. Don’t tell 
them they are idiots for their misplaced fear, acknowledge that it’s normal, human to be frightened.  They aren’t experts. 
o Acknowledge the shared misery. Some people will be less frightened than they are miserable, feeling hopeless and defeated. 
Acknowledge the misery of a catastrophic event and then help move them toward hope for the future through the actions of your 
agency and actions they too can take. 
o Express wishes.  “I wish we knew more.” “I wish our answers were more definitive.” 
o Stop trying to allay panic. Panic is less common than imagined. Panic doesn’t come from bad news, but from mixed messages.  
If the public is faced with conflicting recommendations and expert advice, they are left with no credible source to turn to for help. 
That level of abandonment opens the door to charlatans and mass poor judgment. Candor protects your credibility and reduces the 
possibility of panic, because your messages will ring true. 
o At some point, be willing to address the “what if” questions. These are the questions every person is thinking about and wants 
to hear answers from experts. It’s often impractical to fuel “what ifs” when the crisis is contained and not likely to affect wide 
numbers of people; it is reasonable to answer “what ifs” if the “what if” could happen and people need to be emotionally prepared 
for it. However, if you do not answer the “what if” questions, someone with much less at risk regarding the outcome of the 
response will answer them for you. If you are not prepared to address “what ifs,” you lose credibility and the opportunity to frame 
the “what if” questions with reason and valid recommendations. 
o Give people things to do. In an emergency, some actions communicated are directed at victims, persons exposed or persons 
who have the potential to be exposed. However, those who do not need to take immediate action will be engaging in “vicarious 
rehearsal” regarding those recommendations and may need substitute actions of their own to ensure they do not prematurely act 
on recommendations not meant for them. Simple actions in an emergency will give people back a sense of control and will help 
to keep them motivated to stay tuned to what is happening (versus denial, where they refuse to acknowledge the possible danger to 
themselves and others) and prepare them to take action when directed to do so. When giving them something to do, give them a 
choice of actions matched to their level of concern. Give a range of responses, a minimum response, a maximum response, and a 
recommended middle response 
o Ask more of people.  Perhaps the most important role of the spokesperson is to ask people to bear the risk with you. People can 
tolerate considerable risk, especially voluntary risk. If you acknowledge the risk, its severity, complexity and legitimate people’s 
fears, you can then ask the best of them, to bear the risk during the emergency and work toward solutions.  As a spokesperson, 
especially one who is on the ground and at some self risk, you can model the appropriate behavior, not false bonhomie, but true 
willingness to go on with life as much as possible, to make reasonable choices for yourself and your family.  Don’t be glib, but 
be stalwart. Your determination to see it through will help others who are looking for role models to help them face the risk too.  
Americans have great heart, a sense of selflessness, and a natural competitiveness. Sparking those inherent attributes will help 
people cope with uncertainty, fear and misery. 
	 Empathy,	expertise,	dedication	and	follow-through	are	the	elements	that	build	trust.		As	a	spokesperson,	you	need	to	quickly	 
build	trust	and	credibility	if	you	hope	to	have	your	public	health	recommendations	acted	on	by	the	public.		 
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Checklist: Scientific Risk Communication for the Public 
Success depends on the interaction of the following factors: pre-existing trust and credibility of the presenting 
organization; level of foreknowledge in the target audience; message development and spokesperson’s presentation; 
seriousness or relevance of the information to the target audience; competing points of view (adversaries); and follow-up. 
Organization’s Reputation 
o	 Different publics trust different information sources 
o	 48% of Americans trust CDC as a source for reliable information 
o	 Perceived competence is a key factor in public’s trust to official responses 
o	 Equitable treatment despite ethnicity or income is vital 
o	 American’s trust their own doctor most for health information (77%) but also trust local health dept. (61%) and 
local hospital (53%) 
o	 High-profile events of the past are most likely to form public’s opinion of the organization 
Target Audience Expertise/Psychology 
o	 People act on the information they have, even if it is incorrect 
o	 People take more precautions when they feel threatened or are concerned 
o	 People act rationally to protect themselves, families, and pets 
o	 Beware of stigmatization against products, animals, population groups, and nations 
o	 Find out what the audience knows now and what level of information they want (long-term health issues require 
more information; short-term crisis health issues require less information and more definitive conclusions) 
o	 Denial is alive and well (threat must be real, imminent, and actionable) 
o	 Understand audience by age/culture/level of experience or familiarity with the subject/language/geographic 
location 
Message Development 
o	 “Alarm” of the day? Be judicious in attempting to educate about risk 
o	 Controversial decisions based on technical data/science must be explained 
o	 Action by public should be voluntary with police power a last resort 
o	 Use third-party validations when possible (consistent message from multiple sources) 
o	 Association, causation, risk factors, adverse risk, relative risk, theoretical risk, etc., all mean something different 
to scientists but do not to the media/public 
o	 Messages that challenge audience beliefs will be resisted 
o	 Theoretical risks are more distressing than risks stated in whole numbers 
o	 Statistics perceived as manipulated or convoluted will not be trusted 
o	 Anecdotes, scenarios and examples are best ways to teach about risk 
o	 Be careful about risk comparisons whose attributes are not similar (e.g., number of vehicle crashes in three weeks 
in D.C. versus number of sniper shootings). 
o	 Present: short, concise, focused messages, then repeat the message consistently, and give positive action steps 
whenever possible 
o	 Eliminate jargon 
o	 Eliminate scientific terms unless they are absolutely vital and can be defined at a level of understanding of a 
young adolescent. 
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Spokesperson (Working through the media) 
o	 The scientist’s language and the public/media’s language are different 
o	 Scientists use qualifiers—media (public) want bottomline (in or out, dangerous or safe). 
o	 Scientists want full explanation—media want highlights and conclusions 
o	 Scientists attempt to avoid controversy—media want controversy and will focus on negative 
o	 Scientists want data to be released when it’s “seasoned”—the media/public want fresh data NOW. 
o	 Spokespersons are judged on message and delivery 
o	 Spokespersons build credibility with empathy, competence (ability to share expert knowledge), honesty, openness, 
and commitment 
o	 Tell the truth, always 
All Risks Are Not Equal 
o	 The public hates uncertainty 
o	 The public hates not being in control of their well-being and that of their family, and pets. 
o	 Socio-economic impacts can skew public reaction (e.g., my livelihood depends on the recreational park remaining 
open so Eastern Equine Encephalitis in the community may not be a reason to close operations to conduct control 
measures like aerial spraying for mosquitoes.) 
o	 Types of risks more and less tolerated by the public: 
o	 Voluntary versus involuntary 
o	 Controlled by self or controlled by others 
o	 Familiar or exotic? (flu verusus SARS) 
o	 Natural origin or manmade (Earthquake versus business or criminal) 
o	 Reversible or permanent (Broken leg versus severed leg) 
o	 Statistical or anecdotal (1 in 10,000 die from anesthesia versus Aunt Mae died from anesthesia) 
o	 Endemic (spread over time) or epidemic (catastrophic) (car crashes versus plane crash) 
o	 Fairly distributed or unfairly distributed (tornado deaths versus terrorist bombing) 
o	 Generated by trusted institution or mistrusted institution 
Media Advocacy Groups or Competitors 
o	 Is litigation a possibility? Then, public reactions may not be consistent with the official assessment of the risk 
o	 Is it opinion or scientifically based information being provided? 
o	 Be careful to correct message but not disparage the source if the source is accepted by target audience 
o	 Don’t expect logic and reason arguments to outweigh emotional or common sense messages 
Follow-up: Monitoring, Adjusting, and Commitment 
o	 Environmental scanning needed to quickly find out if public is: misunderstanding, believing rumors, or spreading 
myths (Internet is hotbed for these). 
o	 Media and public hotline calls should be assessed for trends 
o	 New concerns should be addressed quickly 
o	 Public access to additional information and personal consultation is best 
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What is Different 




˘ ˘dif•fer•ent (dif´ r- nt, dif´r nt) 
adj. 
1. Unlike in form, quality, amount, or nature; dissimilar: took different approaches to the problem. 
2. Distinct or separate: That’s a different issue altogether. 
3. Various or assorted: interviewed different members of the community. 
4. Differing from all other; unusual: a different point of view. 
Which killed more people, World War I or the 1918 influenza 
pandemic? World War I claimed an estimated 16 million lives. The 
influenza pandemic that swept the world in 1918 killed an estimated 
50 million people. One fifth of the world’s population was attacked 
by this deadly virus. Within months, it had killed more people than 
any other illness in recorded history. 
The [outbreak] emerged in two phases. In late spring of 1918, 
the first phase, known as the “three-day fever,” appeared without 
warning. Few deaths were reported. Victims recovered after a few 
days. When the disease surfaced again that fall, it was far more 
severe. Scientists, doctors, and health officials could not identify 
this disease which was striking so fast and so viciously, eluding 
treatment and defying control. Some victims died within hours of 
their first symptoms. Others succumbed after a few days; their 
lungs filled with fluid and they suffocated to death. 
The [virus] did not discriminate. It was rampant in urban and rural 
areas, from the densely populated East coast to the remotest 
parts of Alaska. Young adults, usually unaffected by these types of 
infectious diseases, were among the hardest hit groups along with 
the elderly and young children. The flu afflicted over 25 percent of 
the U.S. population. In one year, the average life expectancy in the 
United States dropped by 12 `years. It is an oddity of history that 
the influenza epidemic of 1918 has been overlooked in the teaching 
of American history. 
(National Archives:  Online Exhibit: The Deadly Virus: The Influenza 
Epidemic of 1918. Available from http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/ 
influenza-epidemic/index.html.) 
. 
We are the descendants of the survivors of the 1918 influenza pandemic. 
Historians, like those at the National Archives, believe it’s an oddity 
that so little has been written about this worldwide killer. Only since 
the re-emergence of the avian influenza H5N1 virus in this decade has 
Objectives:

•	 Appraise the range of 
challenges presented 
by a severe influenza 
pandemic and the 
communication steps 
that could be taken. 
•	 Formulate 
communication 
priorities based on a 
full exploration of the 




required to fulfill severe 
influenza pandemic 
response goals of fewer 
disease cases, spread 
over a longer timeframe 
with fewer deaths. 
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so much attention been paid to that enormous public health tragedy. 
It was the very voraciousness of this virus that condemned it to the 
dusty archives in the first place. It swept the globe and crowded the 
graveyards. The world, post-1918, had no need to give witness to 
this affront to the human race. After all, it was an absolute, shared 
experience. Who didn’t know about “the 1918 plague?”  It has taken 
nearly a century and a new influenza threat to emerge to make us now 
look both backward and forward with renewed interest. The public 
health question is: “In a severe influenza pandemic what is different?” 
A pandemic is a global disease outbreak. Influenza pandemics occur 
when a new influenza A virus emerges for which there is little or no 
immunity in the human population, begins to cause serious illness and 
then spreads easily from person-to-person worldwide. This makes it 
a dreaded disease, even in this era of advanced medical technology. 
Historically, the 20th century saw 3 pandemics of influenza: 
•	 The 1918 influenza pandemic caused at least 675,000 U.S. 
deaths and up to 50 million deaths worldwide 
•	 The 1957 influenza pandemic caused at least 70,000 U.S. deaths 
and 1-2 million deaths worldwide 
•	 The 1968 influenza pandemic caused about 34,000 U.S. deaths 
and 700,000 deaths worldwide. 
Influenza viruses do not respect distinctions of race, sex, age, profession 
or nationality, and are not constrained by geographic boundaries. 
The next influenza pandemic is likely to come in waves, each lasting 
months, and pass through communities of all sizes across the nation 
and world. While a pandemic will not damage power lines, banks or 
computer networks, it will ultimately threaten all critical infrastructure 
by felling ill essential personnel from the workplace for weeks or 
months. 
This makes a pandemic a unique circumstance necessitating a strategy 
that extends well beyond health and medical boundaries, to include 
sustaining critical infrastructures, private business in all sectors, the 
movement of goods and services across the nation and the globe, 
and economic and security considerations. The National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza (White House, 2005) guides our preparedness and 
response to an influenza pandemic, with the goal of: 
1) stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic 
to the United States; 
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2) limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigating 
disease, suffering and death; and 
3) sustaining infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy 
and the functioning of society. 
A pandemic will require planning, preparedness, and action on the 
part of many individuals, institutions, and industries not accustomed 
to responding to health crises. The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Secretary, Mike Leavitt, stated that “communication 
is the heart of our planning” for a pandemic (www.pandemicflu.gov, 
2006). We must work to ensure there is clear, effective and coordinated 
risk communication, domestically and internationally, before and 
during a pandemic. This includes identifying credible spokespersons 
at all levels of government to effectively coordinate and communicate 
helpful, informative messages in a timely manner. We must also 
communicate to individuals, in the pre-pandemic period, infection 
control behaviors and the specific actions they will need to take during 
a pandemic, such as self-isolation and protection of others if they— 
themselves contract influenza. 
Understanding what an influenza pandemic is, what needs to be done 
at all levels to prepare for a pandemic, and what could happen during a 
pandemic, helps us make informed decisions, both as individuals and as 
a nation. Should a pandemic occur, the public must be able to depend on 
its government to provide scientifically sound public health information 
quickly, openly and consistently. 
While the basic tenets of Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 
(CERC) fully apply to pandemic influenza (Reynolds, Galdo, Sokler, 
2002; Reynolds, 2004; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005), the very magnitude 
of this impending challenge requires communication professionals to 
delve deeper. What will be different in a severe pandemic and what 
specific CERC activities should be intensified? 
Challenges from a severe influenza pandemic will wreak havoc on us, 
our communities, nation, and the world at the biological, psychological/ 
spiritual, and sociological levels. Communication professionals must 
begin to meet these challenges, where they can, with available tools 
and research. Biological, psychological and sociological challenges 
will not affect all individuals or communities equally and may become 
more or less critical in time as preparedness strides are made (e.g., 
breakthroughs in vaccine development). However, our communication 
planning and activities should consider each of these challenges. For 
the purposes of this communication planning, the assumption is that we 
must prepare to respond to a severe pandemic. To prepare for anything 
less would be folly. 
Challenges from a 
severe influenza 
pandemic will wreak 
havoc on us at the 
biological, psychological 
and sociological levels. 
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Few other natural risks 
so equally threaten the 
entire world. 
Biological Challenges 
Little or no immunity worldwide 
When a pandemic influenza virus emerges, its global spread is 
considered inevitable. Death rates for a severe pandemic will be 
high and largely determined by four factors: the number of people 
who become infected; the virulence of the virus; the underlying 
characteristics and vulnerability of affected populations; and the 
effectiveness of preventive measures. 
Preparedness activities should assume that the entire world population 
is susceptible. Most people alive today have not lived through a threat 
similar to that posed by severe influenza pandemic. Humans are adept 
at engaging their psychological defense mechanisms to avoid thinking 
about risks. They do so when they speed down the interstate to work 
or indulge in a banana split though they have high cholesterol and 
diabetes. Denial allows us to continue to function in a risky world. Even 
so, few other natural risks so equally threaten the entire human race 
with the stark possibility of widespread death within a few short weeks 
as does a severe influenza pandemic. Countries might, through measures 
such as border closures and travel restrictions, delay arrival of the virus, 
but they cannot stop it. Therefore, we must take steps to prepare as 
individuals, as families, as communities, and as a nation. 
When a threat is not seriously looming, however, only a quarter of the 
U.S. population will engage in efforts to prepare for an emergency 
(American Red Cross, unpublished data, 2005). People ready to prepare 
expect guidance from responsible organizations now. We must make 
every effort to reach those interested citizens with the best, most 
accurate, and useful information to help them prepare. They will expect 
clear action items. 
A modest portion of the 75% of the population not engaged in 
preparedness efforts will be interested in information about the threat, 
but will not take any action to prepare early. The majority of the 
population will have little interest—that is, until the threat seems real. 
Threats become real to different people at different times. Unfortunately 
for some, the threat will not become real until it is too late. For the 
“just-in-time” preparers, it will be important that they know where to 
get life-saving information quickly. Much of the early preparedness 
public outreach should build awareness about who can give them 
credible information when they want it and where. The government 
website, PandemicFlu.gov (available day and night around the world 
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and updated regularly), is an example of such a tool. The national 
website, supplemented by local sources of information, should be 
widely advertised and reinforced in all messaging. 
Ideally disaster response officials would prefer to have everyone well 
prepared in advance of a pandemic. Despite our best efforts, that is 
not likely to happen. Instead, we must engage the “early preparers” 
and ask them to help when the “just-in-time” preparers feel the threat 
is real. The “early preparers” may be the neighborhood leaders, or 
the first person to bring a preparedness checklist to their workplace, 
their church, or their children’s schools. Research following Hurricane 
Katrina reinforces that women are more likely to prepare for disasters 
than men (Seeger, 2006). Accordingly, women should be a focus of 
preparedness communication outreach. 
More persons are high risk 
More than 90 million people in the United States live with chronic 
illness. More than 36 million people in the United States are 65 years 
of age or older. People with chronic illness, suppressed immune 
systems, older adults, pregnant women and young children are at 
greater risk of serious illness, complications, and death from seasonal 
influenza, and will presumably be so from a pandemic influenza virus 
as well. Although no one can be certain which subpopulations will be 
hardest hit, those who are already vulnerable because of current health 
conditions or age may feel emotionally vulnerable. They may need 
special guidance on how they can protect themselves. 
Communication activities before a pandemic should include outreach 
to these populations through health associations and in health-care 
settings. Concerned family members or caregivers should also be 
alerted to any special concerns for these populations and directed to 
guiding information. People who are traditionally targeted to receive 
seasonal influenza vaccine may not understand and may even feel 
abandoned if they do not receive the vaccine early in the pandemic. The 
potential for mixed messages that confuse the public is high if seasonal 
influenza occurs at the same time the nation is being urged to prepare 
for pandemic influenza. Messages must be delivered scrupulously to 
always make the distinction between seasonal and pandemic influenza. 
Populations at higher risk from seasonal influenza must continue 
to be the focus of outreach because of their potential and perceived 
vulnerability to pandemic influenza. 
Disaster response 
officials would prefer to 
have everyone to be well 
prepared in advance of 
a pandemic. Despite our 
best efforts, that is not 
likely to happen. 
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It is very different to tell 
a grandmother and her 
grandchildren that she 
is not getting the early 
vaccine for pandemic flu. 
When a pandemic influenza vaccine becomes available, communicators 
should take time to explain who will receive the earliest doses of 
vaccine, especially if these groups differ from those who are typically 
recommended to receive seasonal flu vaccine earliest. It is logical to 
determine that older persons, for example, should not be first in line 
for the earliest vaccine during a flu pandemic, in order to vaccinate law 
enforcement and health care workers so that they can stay on the job. 
However, it is very difficult to tell a grandmother and her grandchildren 
that she is not getting the early vaccine for pandemic flu as she does 
during seasonal influenza outbreaks. 
Communication messages will have to make both logical and 
emotional appeals for understanding. Societal-level decisions that put 
the greater good for the greater number first can still be a hard pill 
to swallow. Community role models (i.e., well-known people with 
similar characteristics to those who do not receive the vaccine earlier) 
could publicly express their willingness to step back, at some risk to 
themselves, so the community will fare better. Any personal sacrifice 
made by people adhering to public health recommendations should be 
acknowledged and reinforced through expressions of thanks. Anything 
less will engender resentment, a sense of privilege for some, and 
possible non-adherence to further public health and infection control 
guidelines for pandemic influenza. 
Evolves in waves 
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of pandemic influenza is that it 
will likely occur in two or three waves of 6 to 8 weeks duration in a 
community over about an 18-month timeframe. Until the pandemic 
unfolds, one can not predict which wave could be most severe, strictly 
from the biological nature of the virus, or how it does or does not 
mutate between waves. Facing the virus during the first wave will be a 
traumatic experience for a community. Knowing that it will be cycling 
around a second or third time could be severly demoralizing. 
Although it may seen counterintuitive, people should be given even 
the very worst news about what they are facing as quickly as possible 
without softening the news. Soft-pedaling what could be the worst event 
of their lives won’t increase the credibility of response organizations 
in the long run. Most people will use the information to adapt their 
environments and engage coping strategies. The fact that the virus 
will burn through a community more than once should be made clear 
before the pandemic begins. Information should focus on community 
cooperation and personal resilience. As the pandemic begins, continued 
emphasis on the importance of community measures before, during, 
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and after each wave may mitigate the impact of the first and subsequent 
waves. Acknowledge shared misery and point people in the direction of 
things they can do to control their situation. 
Psychological/Spiritual Challenges 
Uncertainty 
Planning for a severe pandemic is fraught with uncertainty: when will 
it happen, where will it begin, who will be at greatest risk of death, will 
vaccines work, will they get to us in time, will antivirals work, will 
there be enough, how will I care for my kids if schools close, what if 
we put effort into this and the threat from H5N1 fades, what would I do 
if I couldn’t drive my taxi or open my restaurant, will people help each 
other or take advantage of each other, are we emotionally prepared for 
death at this magnitude? 
Uncertainty exists as an extension of a situation or in the limitations of 
information and knowledge shared about that situation (Brashers, 2001). 
As the world remains in the third stage of the influenza pandemic alert 
period, the situation is ambiguous, unpredictable, and complex. Public 
health experts monitoring the global situation can not and do not know 
with certainty whether, or if, the H5N1 influenza strain will become 
more easily transmitted between humans, or which influenza A strain 
has the potential to become a pandemic virus strain. The development of 
a pandemic influenza vaccine, as well as decisions regarding who gets 
the vaccine and when, is dependent on which strain of the virus adapts 
to fit pandemic qualifications. Neither can public health experts predict 
when a pandemic strain will reach the United States. Uncertainty can 
also be caused by inconsistent information or information not available 
to individuals. Therefore, health officials should rapidly share what they 
know when they know it to reduce the anxiety of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can be related to the probability of something occurring: 
uncertainty is at its highest when all outcomes are equally likely. 
Uncertainty, however, is not only a function of assessing probabilities; 
uncertainty management occurs within a context of self-efficacy, value 
judgments, and assessments of intention. Uncertainty is better or worse 
tolerated, depending on the relevance of the situation to the person, and 
how one determines what is at stake. 
Uncertainty can increase anxiety if there is a perception of danger or 
threat (Brashers, 2001). To reduce anxiety, people engage in information 
gathering and processing to look for options and confirm or disconfirm 
their beliefs. The information used in this process does not have to be 
accurate. To improve coherence and reduce anxiety, persons may be 
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Individuals can manage 
stress at a level that will 
reduce hopelessness 
and helplessness. 
selective about the information they attune to in attempting to reduce 
uncertainty. They may discount information that is distressing or 
overwhelming. People who seek information to reduce anxiety from 
dangerous uncertainty may choose a familiar source of information over 
a less familiar source, regardless of accuracy, and may be more attentive 
to behaviors and language styles of persons in power (Brashers, 2001). 
Persons less certain of their ability to process information involving 
complex situations may choose an advocate to collect and interpret 
information for them. 
Response organizations and communication professionals should 
attempt to reduce uncertainty when and where they can. A fair message 
in the earlier phases of pandemic alert is to simply acknowledge the 
uncertainty. One must also be prepared to answer “What if” questions. 
This is how people begin to manage their anxiety. Asking “what if all 
the caskets are used up in town?” is a legitimate question for someone 
who is processing the threat on a community or personal level. Any 
reply to that question that discounts this type of thinking or laughs at the 
questioner will quash personal preparedness efforts. 
The greatest uncertainty for communities and individuals occur in the 
earliest phases of a pandemic. At that time, messages should include 
their questions, explain why the answer is not available and commit to 
a process to try and answer their questions. If response officials do not, 
someone else will answer the question and it may be someone who is 
not invested in a positive outcome for the community. 
Community hardiness and personal resilience 
The public must feel empowered to take action in the event of a crisis to 
reduce the likelihood of extreme stress, victimization and fear (Tierney, 
2003). Physical and mental preparation will relieve anxiety despite 
the expectation of potential injury or death. An “action message” can 
imbue people with the feeling that they can improve a situation and not 
become passive victims of threat. By giving persons who are stressed 
a restored sense of control, individuals can manage stress at a level 
that will reduce hopelessness and helplessness. Altering self-talk and 
offering helping tasks can be important during the recovery phase of a 
severe pandemic. 
Community hardiness depends on community cohesion. Nonetheless, 
conflict is inevitable in a group (Zastrow, 2001). The degree of task 
conflict and relationship conflict in a group depends on the level of 
trust among group members. Task conflict (e.g., disagreement about 
how to determine which social events should be cancelled) can add to 
cohesiveness and improve the performance of the group. In contrast, 
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relationship conflict (e.g., the mayor acts disdainfully toward the 
community activist who may join the mayoral race against him next 
year) is disruptive to group achievement. Relationship conflict in a 
low-trust group causes biased information processing, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, and personal attacks. As trust grows, relationship conflicts 
are moderated and tasks can be accomplished. Conflict in a group can 
be addressed through role reversal, empathy, inquiry, “I”-statements, 
disarming, positive reinforcement, and mediation (Zastrow, 2001). 
However, these communication strategies for handling intragroup 
conflict are appropriate only when time is not a factor. When time for 
settling group conflict is constrained, such as in the beginning of a 
pandemic influenza wave, prosocial behaviors such as helping others 
and expressing empathy increase community or group cohesiveness. 
Communication messages surrounding preparedness and response to a 
severe pandemic should acknowledge different emotions that may arise 
among the community in addition to stressing the importance of helping 
others. Likewise, refocusing individuals and groups on the task to be 
accomplished can reduce harmful conflict. 
Number of deaths out of time 
About 2.5 million people die in the United States each year. In a severe 
pandemic, an estimated 2 million people in the Unites States could die 
from influenza and its complications, in a span of 18 months (HHS, 
2006). This 2 million is in addition to the annual rate. If children 
and young adults die in high numbers during a severe pandemic, the 
challenge to grief recovery will be great. These “deaths out of time” 
are unnatural, hence, the grief process will be challenging. If accepted 
bereavement rituals are ignored or cut short through necessity, (i.e. due 
to recommendations limiting social interaction) the emotional toll could 
be even greater. 
Communication activities before a pandemic should focus on 
understanding community bereavement norms to ensure that messages 
during the pandemic are respectful of those norms. No message can 
prepare a community for the magnitude of deaths over a short period. 
However, messages being developed now, that discuss the course of 
the disease and proper handling of bodies, should be sensitive in tone. 
What is now an intellectual exercise will not be when people are dying, 
especially people in your own community. A clinical tone is appropriate, 
but be sensitive to how people will react to what they are reading and 
avoid sensational descriptions. 
If children and young 
adults die in high 
numbers during a severe 
pandemic, the challenge 
to grief recovery will be 
great. 
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When deaths occur, acknowledge loss and help redirect people to 
coping tasks—give people things to do to contribute to the community 
and family well-being. Encourage symbols of mourning, but remember, 
community memorial services should be held only once the outbreak is 
over. 
Sociological Challenges 
Behaviors of others impact infection rates 
When an infectious disease is transmitted easily from person to person, 
the behaviors of others can either protect or threaten your health. When 
people are dependent on each other’s behavior for their very lives, the 
potential for conflict is present. Established public health messages 
related to infectious disease prevention may diffuse disagreement 
regarding preventive measures, as they already stress handwashing, 
cough etiquette, and staying home from work or school if ill. 
During a severe pandemic, public health measures to reduce the spread 
of disease may also include well household members staying home 
when any member of the family is ill with influenza, school or business 
closings, or limiting group gatherings. As the cost (e.g., loss of social 
contact or esteem, pay and profit) of a behavior increases, it may be 
more difficult for people to take recommended actions, even at the risk 
of severe illness or death. Some people will engage in denial (e.g., it 
won’t happen to me) and refuse to alter their behaviors. Individuals 
with high-risk, high-adventure personalities will also not alter their 
behaviors (e.g., sneezing on each other is Russian roulette). Some will 
expect the burden of the mitigation measures to be borne by others, not 
themselves, and will not alter their behaviors (e.g., somebody should do 
it to protect us, but I’m too busy/important to be bothered). Some will 
be very concerned about the risk but will believe that they can’t alter 
their behaviors (e.g., if I don’t get in my taxi even though I’m sick, I 
won’t be able to put food on the table). While community mitigation 
activities to slow the spread of pandemic influenza will not need 100% 
cooperation, communication messages must be directed at everyone. 
Social and community norms may be challenged. People in the United 
States have a strong work ethic, with a concomitant belief that one 
should “tough it out” and come to work when ill. In a severe pandemic, 
that might be true if you sprained your ankle rollerblading over the 
weekend, but not true if you have fever, muscle aches, and the start 
of a cough. People will need permission to go against societal norms 
that could hurt them during a pandemic; they will need to hear from 
people who influence them that they are taking the right step by staying 
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home. Formal and informal messaging, including public service 
announcements, should reinforce this. Of course, barriers to adherence 
generated by something other than cultural dissonance could prevent 
people from taking a life-saving action. These must also be addressed 
and communicated (e.g., adjustments to sick-leave policies). 
Communication messages before a pandemic must help people 
understand disease transmission and the reasonableness of 
recommended actions, and stress personal responsibility. These 
messages should also acknowledge the “cost” to the individual or 
industry. Community pressure to conform to life-saving behaviors can 
also be effective. When a pandemic strikes and community mitigation 
activities begin, communicators must praise adherence and pass along 
solutions to people who want to comply but believe they can not. 
Early inadequate vaccines/antivirals 
For the majority of the population, a severe pandemic will be met with 
no or little vaccine, especially during the first wave. The same will be 
true for antivirals. There is no communication task more difficult than 
telling people that there’s a “fix” to a problem but they will not receive 
it now nor possibly ever. This prospect is so daunting that any misstep 
in communication and execution could create an atmosphere necessary 
for chaos. 
There are, however, some primary steps that should be taken to avoid 
this possibility: 
• Involve community members in discussing realities of a severe 
flu pandemic. However, what sounds fair in early pandemic alert 
phases, absent a threat, may not sound so fair when the threat 
presents itself. Be aware that points of view can and will change. 
•	 Ensure that early messages stress the realities of limited 
resources. However, do not refer to persons who receive 
antivirals/vaccines first as “priority or essential groups.” (In 
early formative research efforts, these were “loaded” words 
among the public.) 
•	 Be transparent. Before being asked, ensure that the criteria used 
for deciding who will need the first supplies are available to 
the public. Explain that some people are at greater risk because 
they are caring for sick persons or critical to the socioeconomic 
infrastructure of the community because they keep the city 
water pumping. Show the value of the allocation criteria to the 
community as a whole. 
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•	 Account for vaccines and antivirals publicly – tell the 

community who is receiving them.

•	 Do not change established vaccine or antiviral allocation 
guidelines without first telling the community that you are 
adjusting the supplies based on new information/criteria. 
•	 Be certain to avoid any hint of privilege or favoritism related to 
allocation. (Be prepared to be accused of both—respond with 
empathy and facts.) 
•	 Help people who won’t be getting vaccine by telling them 
interim steps they can take to avoid illness. 
Openness, empathy, and consistency will be critical.  Tell people all you 
know as soon as possible, acknowledge fear, anxiety, and helplessness, 
and don’t alter messages unnecessarily. Appeal to individuals’ sense of 
fairness and contribution to the greater good. Never promise what is 
outside your control to achieve, and keep promises. 
Situational awareness difficult/new media 
Expect communication chaos and conflicting information. Be prepared 
to communicate provisional information and acknowledge that the 
information could change as the pandemic evolves and more is learned. 
This is especially important when first learning of pandemic cases in 
the community. Beware the “numbers.” The public and the media will 
expect to hear reports of numbers of flu cases or deaths in the initial 
period of a pandemic event, until the numbers are overwhelming and, 
therefore, less meaningful. During the resolution phase, numbers will 
become important again. Provide official reports of numbers of clinical 
cases and deaths only once a day. Use the established reporting systems 
and stick to them, despite the availability of information from multiple 
sources and challenges to official numbers by media. Explain the 
reporting system and the need for precise, official records, even in the 
face of lags in reporting. 
During Hurricane Katrina, the CDC reported the number of persons 
who became ill and died from Vibrio spp. The pathogens are of great 
threat to persons with weakened immune systems, persons with chronic 
liver disease, and the elderly. When the official reporting system 
(established through the emergency operation center) was bypassed and 
unofficial lab results were released publicly, the public received mixed 
messages. Although information, especially that which helps inform 
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health decisions, should be shared quickly, total numbers of cases and 
deaths do not fall into this category and therefore, official channels 
should be created and upheld. 
The ability to be flexible is important during the response to a severe 
pandemic. Flexibility should also be coupled with some level of 
skepticism about first reports of information, which are typically wrong. 
Recent information and communication technologies further complicate 
the struggle for situational awareness. Instant messaging, text 
messaging, web searches, weblogs, and camera phones may provide 
access to valuable situational information reports from across the world 
but may also provide erroneous or harmful information. Media literacy, 
identification of trusted information sources, and media and rumor 
monitoring will be critical in launching and maintaining a successful 
communications campaign during an influenza pandemic. 
Response organizations must work before a pandemic to establish 
their credibility, answer relevant questions quickly, adapt to new 
technologies, and admit mistakes. During a pandemic, this increased 
credibility could make the difference between life and death. 
Health/Medical Disruptions 
A substantial percentage of the world’s population will require some 
form of medical care during a flu pandemic. Nations are unlikely to 
have the staff, facilities, and equipment needed to cope with large 
numbers of people who suddenly fall ill. The need for vaccine is likely 
to outstrip supply. The need for antiviral drugs is also likely to be 
inadequate early in a pandemic. A pandemic can create a shortage of 
hospital beds, ventilators, and other supplies. Surge capacity treatment 
centers at non-traditional sites, such as schools, may be created to cope 
with demand. 
A severe pandemic may strain the health care system in hundreds of 
communities at the same time, making redistribution of health care 
resources difficult. Community planning to expand medical surge 
capacity (e.g., health care personnel and intact supply chains for 
medical supplies) should be ongoing and is a critical preparedness step. 
Individuals and populations who traditionally have limited access to 
health care will be that much more vulnerable during a pandemic. In 
addition, efforts to distribute vaccines and antivirals in such populations 
may be hampered by the scarcity of customary sources of medical care. 
Individuals and 
populations who 
traditionally have limited 
access to health care 
will be that much more 
vulnerable during a 
pandemic. 
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Unfamiliarity with isolation and quarantine 
While countermeasures such as vaccines and antivirals are optimal 
ways to control the spread of a pandemic influenza virus, we must plan 
for the possibility that vaccines will not be available during the first 
wave of a pandemic and supplies will be limited in subsequent stages. 
Some early models demonstrate a layered approach, with a number of 
mitigating measures including school closures, workers remaining home 
if ill, voluntary household quarantine (if one member is ill, household 
members stay home for at least two incubation periods), and targeted 
prophylaxis with antivirals, significantly reduce or slow disease attack 
rates in a community (WHO, 2006). Models showed success within the 
following conditions: 
• Severe pandemic 
• At least 30% of the community undertaking measures (not 
all members must take all measures for the approach to be 
effective) 
• Measures are initiated early in the community outbreak 
The federal government is conducting validating research for these 
models and is working to identify potential unintended consequences 
of these approaches (i.e., risk versus benefit). They are considering 
the emotional and fiscal impact on a community taking any or all of 
the measures, and segments of a community most impacted by the 
measures. 
Voluntary quarantine, (i.e. exposed persons removing themselves from 
contact with well, unexposed persons) at the level of families and 
individuals is a legitimate public health intervention. It was successful 
in the public health response to the SARS outbreak. Because influenza 
infection can be transmitted by infected people who do not show 
symptoms of illness, and because viral shedding occurs before the 
onset of symptoms of illness, quarantine may be a useful measure in a 
influenza pandemic as well. 
The communication challenge is in re-introducing the concept of 
quarantine, saddled as it is with outdated connotations due to disuse. 
How do communications officials promote quarantine in today’s society 
and convince the public that this intervention is worthwhile? People 
will need to understand the difference between isolation (of someone 
who is sick) and quarantine (of someone who is not sick but could be 
due to contact with a sick person). Communicators must manage rumors 
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related to “imposed” quarantine. People will need clear and concise 
information to help them learn and understand the concepts related to 
virus transmission, infectious disease controls, clinical symptoms versus 
pre-clinical viral shedding, and incubation periods. 
Stigmatization 
Stigmatization can affect a product, an animal, a place, and an 
identifiable group of people. One is stigmatized by an infectious 
disease when the risk is not present in the minority population but 
people associate the risk with that population group. There are two 
ways to eliminate stigma in a severe pandemic: raise awareness and 
understanding among the dominant group about stigmatization or wait 
for the pandemic to become so pervasive in the dominant group that 
it eliminates the distinctions of race, ethnicity, profession, or other 
identifiable characteristics. Even if the dominant group is swept up by 
the pandemic and stigmatization lessens, stigma is still there and may 
return in the resolution phases of a pandemic. As misery and anger 
turns to fault-finding and blame, the perceived “progenitors” of the 
pandemic could be stigmatized once again. Therefore, communication 
professionals must intercede. 
If a population group becomes stigmatized, members of this group 
may experience emotional pain from the stress and anxiety of social 
avoidance and rejection. Stigmatized persons also have been subject 
to limited access to health care, education, housing, and employment 
(Heatherton et al., 2000) and may even be victims of physical violence. 
Communication professionals must help counter potential stigmatization 
during a pandemic. They must be cautious about images they share 
repeatedly and understand that constant portrayal of a segment of the 
population in images may contribute to eventual stigmatization. If 
stigmatizing statements or behaviors appear, public health officials must 
offset this with accurate risk information that people can understand, 
and speak out against the negative behavior.  
Seasonal versus avian versus pandemic 
• Seasonal (or common) flu is a respiratory illness that can be 
transmitted from person-to-person. Most people have some 
immunity, and a vaccine is available. 
•	 Avian (or bird) flu is caused by influenza viruses that occur 
naturally among wild birds. The H5N1 variant that is currently 
circulating Asia and parts of Europe and Africa is deadly to 
domestic fowl and can be transmitted from birds to humans. 
Humans have no immunity and no vaccine is available. 
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During the 1918 
influenza pandemic, 
home remedies were as 
prevalent as they were 
ineffective. Nebraska’s 
Hastings Tribune 
recorded that some 
Nebraskans wore garlic 
amulets. Vick’s VapoRub 
was recommended. 
So were Vacona, a 
medicated salve, and 
something called Dr. 
Pierce’s Golden Medical 
Discovery. 
—The Great Influenza Pandemic 
of 1918: State by state, 
PandemicFlu.gov 
•	 Pandemic flu is virulent form of a flu virus that causes a global 
outbreak, or pandemic, of serious illness in humans. There is no 
immunity, but unlike the current H5N1 strain, a defining feature 
of pandemic flu is that the disease spreads easily and quickly 
from person to person. H5N1 has the potential to become a 
pandemic strain but it is not certain that it will do so any more 
than another novel influenza A virus. What is certain is that 
influenza pandemics occur in the course of humanity. At some 
point we will experience a flu pandemic. Less certain is when. 
Currently, there is no pandemic flu and no pandemic flu vaccine. 
Seems simple enough? Messages around these three different viruses 
can be and are confused. For example, some people incorrectly believed 
that their seasonal flu shot would fully protect them from pandemic flu. 
Others don’t understand why the medical and public health communities 
insist on splitting hairs about avian versus pandemic flu. Avian influenza 
H5N1 has the potential to mutate into a pandemic strain. It could also 
mutate to become nothing more serious than it is now, or even mutate 
to a less harmful influenza virus than it is now. Unfortunately, incorrect 
assumptions regarding avian influenza virus mutating into a pandemic 
strain are sometimes perpetuated in the media and to the public through 
the continued use of these terms interchangeably. The tougher concept, 
and part of the reason behind the interchangeability, is the difficulty in 
accepting that an influenza virus strain that we have not yet identified 
could be our next pandemic strain. 
Despite annual vaccination programs and advanced medical 
technologies, an estimated 36,000 seasonal influenza deaths and 
226,000 hospitalizations occur each year in the United States (HHS, 
n.d.). Communication professionals must counter misperceptions 
if we want the public to act. The Department of Health and Human 
Services is launching a series of communication activities to help 
people understand the current risks of seasonal influenza and to avoid 
confusion with avian and pandemic influenza. 
Home remedies—fraud 
Today, potential remedies range from nutritional supplements to 
air filters. What works and what doesn’t must be assessed quickly 
and shared with the public. While some alternatives may be worth 
consideration, the potential for widespread fraud for monetary gain 
is high. When people are confronted with an uncertain threat and 
known countermeasures are in short supply, they will search for 
alternatives. In early 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) issued warning letters to nine companies marketing bogus flu 
products who claimed their products, of which eight purported to be 
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dietary supplements, could be effective against preventing avian flu 
or other forms of influenza. Examples of the unproven claims cited 
in the Warning Letters include: “prevents avian flu,” “a natural virus 
shield,” “kills the virus,” and “treats the avian flu.” These alternative 
therapies are promoted as “natural” or “safer” treatments that can be 
used in place of an approved treatment or preventive medical product. 
FDA was not aware of any scientific evidence that demonstrated the 
safety or effectiveness of these products for treating or preventing 
avian flu. The agency issued the warning letters to the firms marketing 
the products due to concern that the use of these products could harm 
consumers or interfere with conventional treatments. There are currently 
initiatives in place to deter counterfeiters and sellers of fraudulent or 
phony products that claim to prevent or treat avian flu. After all, the use 
of unproven flu cures and treatments increases the risk of catching and 
spreading disease rather than lessening it because people assume they 
are protected and safe when they are not. 
Communications professionals should widely distribute messages about 
the FDA’s initiatives and its ruling regarding fraudulent flu products. 
Individuals have a strong desire to learn and adopt personal protective 
actions—actions people can take to protect themselves and their 
families during a pandemic. We must offer credible information when 
individuals want it or risk them finding dubious advice elsewhere with 
potentially negative outcomes. 
Conclusion 
What is different in a pandemic? That question might be answered 
with, “What is not?” A severe influenza pandemic may be one of the 
most complex communication challenges we face. Communication 
professionals ultimately will want to help people help themselves and 
their communities during a severe pandemic. For those ready for these 
messages now, make sure information is widely available by posting 
and publicizing the government website, fact sheets, brochures, and 
recommendations. 
For others, interest in preparedness will likely begin late in pandemic 
alert stage 4 and peak late pandemic alert phase 5. However, the 
distinctions among WHO pandemic alert phases 4, 5, and 6 will be lost 
on most of the public. Therefore, the bulk of communication work must 
be done now, in advance of phases 4, 5, and 6 to be most effective. 
During phases 4 and 5, the communication response will depend on the 
speed with which subject matter experts can answer novel situational 
questions not anticipated now. Therefore, communication professionals 
must be integrated into all areas of planning and response. 
Individuals have a 
strong desire to learn 
and adopt personal 
protective actions— 
actions people can take 
to protect themselves 
and their families during 
a pandemic. 
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Your public message in a 













Before, during, and following a pandemic, messages must be sensitive 
to individuals’ perceptions of honesty and equity. Most people carry a 
“just world” view and believe their institutions and neighbors should 
be fair and equitable in their behavior toward them. Beware of trying 
to protect people from hard facts. When sugar-coated, the awful truth 
feels more like a lie. Express empathy in messages early and often, give 
people things to do, and be respectful. To do less invites confusion, 
mistrust, and anger. 
Compelling questions that can’t be ignored by communication 
professionals are “What will be our indicator of performance success in 
a pandemic influenza communication response? What can be expected 
of and what is outside the control of communication professionals?” 
Our objective is to communicate messages that will reduce illness, 
save lives, and maintain societal structures. The right message at the 
right time through the right channel (e.g., spokesperson) can do that. 
Communication needs to be at the heart of pandemic planning. It will 
also have to be at the heart of response. We, like all pandemic response 
professionals, must be prepared to declare our success indicators in 
advance and be clear-eyed enough to hold ourselves to those standards 
during post-pandemic evaluations. Good communication will not save 
a bad response operation; however, poor communication can damage 
a good response operation. Individuals, families, neighborhoods, 
communities, religious institutions, businesses, industries, and nations 
will be engaged in the pandemic response. Who will or will not survive 
a severe pandemic will depend on all of us. 
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Communication Triggers 
At the time of this writing, in the current context of H5N1 as a potential 
pandemic strain, communication professionals should consider the 
following triggering events and how they will respond: 
Triggering events for increased pandemic communication efforts in the 
United States: 
1.	 First case of H5N1 (highly pathogenic) or other potential 
pandemic virus in a migratory bird in the Western Hemisphere. 
2.	 First case of H5N1 (highly pathogenic) or other potential 

pandemic virus in a migratory bird in the United States.

3.	 First case of H5N1 highly pathogenic or other avian potential 
pandemic virus in the poultry industry/zoo birds/community 
petting zoos/pet stores/etc. in the United States. 
4.	 First human case of H5N1 or other avian potential pandemic 
virus identified in someone in the United States, acquired 
internationally. 
5.	 First human case of H5N1 or other avian potential pandemic 
virus identified in a United States resident, acquired 
domestically from a bird, with no secondary transmission. 
6.	 First human case of H5N1 or other potential pandemic virus in 
the United States, acquired domestically, from another human. 
7.	 Sustained human-to-human transmission of H5N1 or other 
potential pandemic virus occurring somewhere other than the 
Western Hemisphere. 
8.	 First cluster of human H5N1 or other potential pandemic 
influenza virus transmitted person to person in the United States. 
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Hardiness and Personal Resilience 






1. The ability to recover quickly form illness, change, or misfortune; buoyancy. 
2. The property of a material that enables it to resume its original shape or position after being bent, 





•	 Widespread illness occurring in most communities concurrently 
requires community resourcefulness. 
•	 Outbreaks will occur in waves with two to three waves expected. 
•	 Countermeasures will be limited and will require targeted 
distribution. 
Crises, emergencies and disasters happen. Disasters are inherently 
different from routine daily emergencies and the difference is more than 
just one of magnitude. Chaos theory related to crises emphasizes that 
disasters that take a toll on human life are inherently characterized by 
change, high levels of uncertainty, and interactive complexity (Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003).  The majority of people in the United States 
will experience at least one traumatic event “outside the range of normal 
human experience” (Bonanno, 2004, p. 24), sometime within their lives. 
How well we cope with those traumatic events will depend, in great 
part, on our community’s hardiness and our own personal resilience. 
Consider two scenarios. Westpark is a heterogeneous community with 
a range of ethnic groups, income levels, and professions and industries. 
Eastpark is a homogenous community that is not diverse by ethnicity, 
income level, or profession and industry. Which community would one 
expect to be able to pull together and support each other during the first 
wave of a severe pandemic? It depends! Which community is currently 
managing their challenges through civic interaction? Which community 
has developed strong volunteer emergency response groups? Which 
Objectives:

•	 Recognize the positive 
role of community 
hardiness and personal 
resilience. 
•	 Compare and contrast 
expected community 
outcomes based on 
hardiness or lack of 
hardiness. 
•	 Predict the community’s 
level of hardiness now 
and identify ways to 
build, restore, and 
strengthen hardiness 
before and during 




•	 Acknowledge the role 
of leaders in building 
community hardiness 
before and during a 
pandemic. 
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community recognizes problems early and intervenes to prevent the 
problem from growing? Which community expects their problems to be 
solved by others? Which community feels a sense of “ownership” and 
wishes to exercise control over their neighborhoods? Which community 
believes that “fate, luck, or preference” will secure what they need? 
Which community has experienced a major trauma in the recent past? 
Measuring community hardiness 
The measure of a community’s hardiness will come from several 
domains, including its socioeconomic status (e.g., income levels, 
unemployment rates, education levels, and health-related behaviors), 
community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
neighborhood associations, places of worship, and its political and 
governmental structures. Pre-disaster community cohesion is important 
to community hardiness. In contrast, existing social stressors such as 
ongoing racial, economic or political strife that weakens cohesion can 
bode ill for a community’s ability to cope with the impact of a severe 
influenza pandemic. Importantly, pre-existing social strains such as 
community poverty, individual poverty, low perceptions of risk, poor 
preparedness, and limited access to mitigation, response, and recovery 
resources are associated with bleaker outcomes for a community 
(Schultz, Espinel, Galea, & Reissman, 2006). 
For individuals, families, neighborhoods, communities, and nations 
to fare well in the next severe influenza pandemic several factors 
will need to be in place. Some of these factors can be influenced by 
communication messages before and during the pandemic and should 
originate both from response organizations and from response and 
community leaders. Communication professionals should consider 
the psychological components of community hardiness and personal 
resilience and reinforce the positive aspects of both in their messaging. 
This is not an attempt at mass mental therapy. It is an attempt to take 
every available advantage and apply it to what may be the biggest 
public health challenge of our careers. 
Cognitive, affective, and physical human 
responses in a crisis 
In a dire emergency such as a severe influenza pandemic, threatened 
people or groups may exaggerate their responses as they revert to 
more rudimentary or instinctual fight or flight reasoning (DiGiovanni, 
1999). However, Clarke (2003) negates some myths about how 
people react in a crisis, including: people automatically follow their 
leaders; people need only one spokesperson with one message; people 
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given multiple warnings will not believe officials and will succumb to 
“cry wolf” syndrome; and people panic in high numbers. He defends 
these conclusions with historical examples. Regarding public panic, 
for example, he refers to multiple attacks by the Japanese against 
the Chinese, between 1932 and 1945, with biological agents such as 
bubonic plaque, cholera, and anthrax, in which there was very little 
evidence of panic. The same was true in New York City following 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack where officials credited the 
relatively low death toll, in part, to a public that generally responded 
well. Research also reveals that altruistic norms and positive social 
behaviors dominate responses by the public in disasters (Brehm, Kassin, 
& Fein, 2005). 
In a severe influenza pandemic, people will be affected to some extent 
emotionally, cognitively, physically, and interpersonally (DiGiovanni, 
1999; Norris, 2001; Novac, 2001). Emotional responses will range 
from terror and shock to blame, anger, and guilt. Cognitive effects will 
include impaired concentration, impaired decision-making, memory 
impairment, decreased self-esteem, worry, and dissociation. People 
will also be affected physically, experiencing fatigue, insomnia, hyper-
arousal, increased physical pain, reduced immune response, headaches, 
and vulnerability to illness (Brehm et al., 2005). Limited social 
interaction (as a means of infection control) could increase relational 
conflict, social withdrawal, distrust, and denial. 
Melvyn Yessenow’s research about the psychology of survival included 
looking for personality traits shared by those who survived in life-
threatening situations (Andresky, 1986). Yessenow found shared 
attributes among survivors, such as high self-esteem and the feeling that 
actions can change the world. Mental toughness was more important 
than physical ability for survival. Yessenow also found that having a 
sense of direction during the crisis increased survival because people 
who could focus on a goal or action such as “helping their family 
survive” gave the individual’s mind relief from thoughts of the threat 
(Andresky, 1986). Another predictor of a positive outcome for a disaster 
victim was experience. For less severe crises, prior experience with the 
type of disaster reduced anxiety, increased the likelihood the person had 
prepared for the hazard in advance, and indicated that the individual 
was more likely to follow directions from response officials such as 
evacuation orders (Norris, 2001). 
Personal resilience 
Personal resilience is a person’s ability to maintain their equilibrium 
in the face of trauma and loss. Resilience is often described as the 
protective factors that help humans thrive after extreme disasters and 
Yessenow found shared 
attributes among 
survivors, such as high 
self-esteem and the 
feeling that actions can 
change the world. 
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People’s fear, anxiety, 
and despondency can be 
reduced to manageable 
levels by reducing 
situational uncertainty 
foster positive outcomes (Bonanno, 2004). Bonanno found that persons 
who are resilient also may engage in repressive coping by suppressing 
unpleasant thoughts and emotions. The following psychological 
resources protect victims of disaster: coping efforts, self-efficacy, 
mastery, perceived control, self-esteem, hope, and optimism (Norris, 
2001). Attributes of self-efficacy, perceived control, hope, and optimism 
were positively associated with both short-term and long-term mental 
health (DiGiovanni, 1999; Norris). Social embeddedness, social support 
received, and perceived social support are important to well-being and 
recovery of disaster victims (Norris, 2001). Everyone involved in a 
disaster is affected; however, the people who are most exposed to the 
danger or threat are at risk for the greatest emotional impact (Brehm et 
al., 2005). Most survivors of a disaster exhibit normal stress reactions. 
A proportion of survivors may experience intense feelings. Some people 
may feel that the familiar normal world they knew is gone and feel a 
sense of dissociation. This may be mitigated with quick, firm directions 
for action, and by reconnecting these traumatized survivors with the 
world, remind them that the larger community shares societal values 
of altruism and goodness (Young, Ford, Ruzek, Friedman, & Gusman, 
n.d.). Interestingly, helping others can act as a substitute for self-esteem, 
in part because “being valued by others is likely to increase self-worth” 
(Crocker and Neur, 2004 p. 484). 
Social factors that predict adverse outcomes for disaster victims include 
the following: displacement, extensive loss of property, horror, life 
threat, bereavement, injury, and separation from family. Psychological 
impairment is more likely as the numbers of stressors increase (Norris, 
2001). People’s fear, anxiety, and despondency can be reduced to 
manageable levels by reducing situational uncertainty with information, 
by giving individuals or communities things to do, which restores a 
sense of control, and by modeling optimistic behavior (Brehm et al., 
2005; Reynolds, et al., 2002; Young, et al., n.d.). 
Social psychologist Albert Bandura understood that experiences 
contribute to one’s self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is simply one’s confidence 
in one’s ability to perform and predict consequences of that behavior. 
One acquires self-efficacy in four ways: physical and emotional states 
(e.g, well rested and not anxious), mastery experiences, vicarious 
experiences, and social persuasion. Mastery experience relates to past 
performance in that if an individual accomplishes a task in the past, 
his or her self-efficacy increases in relation to similar future tasks. 
However, if one fails at a past task, one’s self-efficacy decreases, 
especially if the person applied full effort to the task. Vicarious 
experiences could increase or decrease self-efficacy, depending on who 
is performing the observed behavior and his relationship to the observer 
(e.g., if a competitor does better than expected, one’s self-efficacy could 
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decrease). “Self-efficacy influences what people choose to do, their 
persistence in the face of difficulties, and how much effort they put 
forth” (Hoyt, Murphy, Halverson, & Watson, 2003, p. 260). Importantly, 
self-efficacy influences how people cope with aversive experiences, 
including the amount of time they can cope and with what effort. 
Bandura noted that strong emotion typically lowers performance, 
especially when people experience high levels of fear, anxiety or stress 
(Feist and Feist, 2002). Thinking alone can increase stress and fear and 
reduce self-efficacy. Both reasonable and unreasonable fears are based 
on one’s thoughts. More-intense-than necessary (or dysfunctional) 
anxiety, fear, worries, and self-doubts may be caused by the following: 
• Observing someone else who exhibits excessive fear and 
nervousness in the situation (e.g., the person ahead of you in line 
for a vaccination is nervous and fearful). 
• Distorting incoming perceptions or faulty perceptions (e.g., 
the line outside the clinic for vaccinations is long and you 
think there’s not enough vaccine, so you give up and go home 
unvaccinated). 
• Applying unreasonable expectations to the perceived situation 
that creates irrational thoughts (e.g., the person taking your 
health information at the mass vaccination clinic is abrupt 
and you believe they are so because they know you are HIV 
positive). 
• Acting on faulty conclusions (e.g., expecting a horrible outcome 
from an act and therefore never attempting it, such as there 
is a 1 in a million chance of a life-threatening reaction to the 
vaccination and you do not get vaccinated). 
Anxiety reduces self-efficacy, so reducing anxiety in a population 
during a severe pandemic may help individuals maintain the ability to 
act while facing a tough situation. Anxiety is a common condition of 
our modern society and is only exaggerated in the context of a severe 
pandemic. Physiological symptoms of anxiety include palpitations 
of the heart, insomnia, irritable outbursts, fatigue, nausea, diarrhea, 
urinary frequency, perspiration, suffocating sensations, dilated pupils, 
and rapid breathing (Hale, n.d.). Understandably these symptoms can 
occur because of other reasons, including normal stress or fear. They are 
described as symptoms of anxiety when they occur absent a physical 
problem and in situations handled with relative ease by others. Fear is 
considered adaptive and is limited in duration and specifically directed. 
Anxiety awakens the danger “alerting system” of our body’s fight or 
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Cohesion in a group is 
that aspect that makes 
disparate individuals 
wish to belong and 
behave as a group 
flight system when there is no fighting or fleeing to do. Anxiety actually 
hampers fight or flight (because the action can’t be taken) and inhibits 
positive fear reactions when needed. Simply, the anxiety over the 
possible “fearful event” exhausts the person’s fight or flight system and 
makes the person less prepared to protect themselves. 
Individual and group buffers to extreme stress include “being 
committed to finding meaningful purpose in life, the belief that one 
can influence one’s surroundings and the outcome of events, and the 
belief that one can learn and grow from both positive and negative life 
experiences” (Bonanno, 2004, p. 25). Communication messages should, 
again, stress self-efficacy (i.e., “you can protect yourself and others 
and what you do will directly influence the outcome of the pandemic 
for you and your neighbors”). During the resolution phase of a severe 
pandemic, messages should acknowledge the shared misery and 
celebrate the efforts taken to save lives and function as a community 
under extraordinary circumstances. The community that both mourns its 
dead and celebrates all of its successes will recover more quickly than a 
community that focuses only on their loss, responds with anger or guilt, 
and chooses to blame. 
Community Hardiness 
Issues of self-efficacy, cultural beliefs, and performance during stressful 
situations extend beyond the individual. Hecht, Allen, Klammer, and 
Kelly (2002) found that group potency (the amount of belief among 
the group that they can succeed) actually affects group performance. 
“It seems that a shared belief in the group’s ability to be effective is 
critically important for complex tasks that require the combined efforts 
of all group members” (Hecht et al., 2002, p. 149). This aspect of social 
interaction could be critical in a severe influenza pandemic, where a 
community’s well-being could directly depend on the group’s ability 
to comply with novel instructions from authoritative sources, such as 
being asked to create a community education plan if schools are closed, 
or how to ensure impoverished community members will be fed if under 
a voluntary household quarantine. 
Key factors that could contribute or detract from group success 
include leadership style, task definition and training, and level of 
cohesion (Brehm, Kassin, & Fein, 2005). In addition, roles, norms and 
cohesiveness interact to improve group potential. Cohesion in a group is 
that aspect that makes disparate individuals wish to belong and behave 
as a group (Losh, 2001). Group cohesion manifests in different ways 
depending on the type of group in consideration and the individual 
resources persons bring to the group. Two elements that increase 
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group cohesion are member similarity (e.g., demographics, shared 
experiences, shared threats, and values) and member attractiveness (e.g., 
prestige, acknowledged expertise, and relevance to the desired task) 
(Swenson, n.d.). Cohesion is strengthened by barriers to membership, 
frequent interaction among members, shared goals, physical isolation, 
and a common enemy or competition (Swenson). Holtz (2004) found 
that the cohesiveness of a group contributed to attitude agreement 
which, in turn, influenced opinion certainty. The tighter the group 
cohesion, the more likely attitudes would be in agreement and opinion-
certainty strong. Group cohesion may contribute to group resilience 
and, ultimately, group success. 
Important elements to keep a group together include defining and 
accepting roles and sets of behaviors for members, an accepted set of 
norms, and any forces that draw the group together, such as a short 
work deadline or competition from another group (Brehm et al. 2005). 
However, factors such as why the group was formed, whether it began 
as a leaderless group, the length of time the group exists, and the 
importance of the tasks to be accomplished also influence the steps 
taken to keep the group together. 
Group worldview 
Possible threats to community hardiness may depend on groups’ 
“worldview.”  If group members share an “injustice” worldview, the 
group’s persistent belief will be that they have significant and legitimate 
grievances against another group. Such a world view can be especially 
important in regard to distributions of scarce resources and the belief 
that other people receive resources because their powerful group 
“rigged the system.” Group worldviews that assign superiority and 
injustice and lead to feelings of helplessness, mistrust, or vulnerability 
can trigger either group mobilization or inter-group conflict. During 
extreme situations, these group worldviews can lead to different choices 
in coping behaviors (Novac, 2001). Task-oriented coping strategies 
focus on solving the problem and attempting to change the situation. 
In contrast, emotion-coping strategies focus on reducing stress through 
self-preoccupation and fantasy. Although individuals do exhibit 
coping preferences, situations can change coping styles. Groups with 
worldviews of helplessness and vulnerability may not believe they have 
the power to change the situation and take action, and will respond 
with emotional coping strategies. The extent to which group members 
believe they have control, they are more likely to act. 
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Fast Facts

Influenza pandemics involve 
the rapid spread of a novel 
(most people have no 
immunity against it) influenza 
virus across the world, 
resulting in an unusually 
high number of illnesses and 
deaths for approximately 2 
to 3 years. Such pandemics 
occurred in 1918, 1957, and 
1968. 
At times, false alarms 
do occur where a novel 
influenza virus emerges 
that causes a few human 
cases of severe illness or 
death, but never succeeds 
in causing widespread 
human illness. Scientists can 
monitor these viruses, but 
can’t predict the outcome. 
It is impossible to know 
whether the currently 
spreading influenza type A 
(H5N1) virus will cause a 
human pandemic. 
(www.pandemicflu.gov) 
Threats strengthen cultural conformity 
The threat of death impacts individuals and groups in significant ways, 
and: 
Concerns about human mortality affect a broad range of socially 
significant behaviors that are unrelated to the problem of death . . . 
in any logical way, including interpersonal evaluations, judgments 
of moral transgressors, stereotyping, in-group biases, aggression, 
social consensus estimates, and conformity to personal and cultural 
standards. (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon, 1999) 
To guard against fear and anxiety from thoughts of death, persons 
engage in thoughts and behaviors that boost self-esteem, including 
strongly holding onto cultural beliefs (Crocker & Neur, 2004). 
Importantly, when death looms, cultural beliefs will become more 
important and any rebuffs to those beliefs will be more likely to create 
conflict. For example, someone’s cultural belief related to funeral 
rituals may involve large, intimate social gatherings. In a pandemic, this 
ritual may be in conflict with recommendations for social distancing. 
This could be extremely upsetting for members of that cultural group 
and their reaction to the recommendation strong. Communication 
professionals must understand the dynamic of heightened awareness 
related to cultural differences in a severe pandemic and ensure that 
cultural norms are respected when at all possible. When cultural beliefs 
and public health recommendations are incompatible, acknowledge the 
cultural belief and explain why it is necessary to alter behavior related 
to that belief for a short time. 
To promote resilience and encourage recovery following each wave 
of the severe pandemic, communication activities must focus on the 
following: 
•	 Overcoming helplessness by strengthening self- and community 
efficacy (i.e., giving people things to do for themselves and 
others). 
•	 Overcoming risk by framing the risk and promoting protective 
actions. 
•	 Overcoming dread, fear and uncertainty by sharing information 
that is honest, realistic, and restores a sense of self-control 
amidst the chaos. 
•	 Overcoming despair, hopelessness, and victimization by 
engaging people in the response, and expecting more of people. 
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•	 Overcoming isolation and loss by reconnecting people to 
the larger community, including through new information 
technology. 
These efforts are known to help people cope with and recover from 
traumatic events, especially from ongoing threats such as repeated 
waves of a pandemic (Reissman, Watson, Klomp, Tanielian, & Prior, 
2006). 
Hecht et al. concluded that “those interested in designing interventions 
to improve group performance might . . . promote efficacy beliefs and 
[spend] less time trying to gain buy-in or commitment” (p. 150). In 
other words, a message that tells people they can help themselves and 
how to do so is a better pre-event message than simply attempting to 
persuade them that the official response requires their commitment and 
help. Focus the messages on the individual and the community and 
reinforce that they can care for themselves. Show them that people who 
are just like them are doing it. Tell them how to care for themselves. 
Tell them how caring for themselves can protect them, their families, 
and their neighbors. Stress the vital role each individual will play in 
the pandemic response. Give them things to do, for themselves and for 
others. Give them incremental steps to take that they can easily master.
 Leader’s Role in Building Hardiness 
Generally, leadership is described as the process of influencing others 
to achieve goals. Leaders may influence goal achievement by providing 
direction, through charisma, and by example (Seeger, et al., 2003; 
Yukl, 2002). Before, during, and after a severe influenza pandemic, 
community leaders will have tremendous potential to positively 
influence community outcomes. Leaders must understand their role in 
building, restoring, and strengthening community hardiness. 
How much power and influence a leader will have with followers during 
a severe influenza pandemic will depend on past interactions between 
the leader and followers. Past demonstrated competence and loyalty by 
the leader strongly influences expectations about the leader in the crisis 
and the “amount of status and power accorded a person is proportionate 
to the [population’s] evaluation of the person’s potential contribution 
relative to others” (Yukl, 2002, p. 154). In other words, the leader 
who gets the job done and has our best interest in mind will be able to 
influence community behavior. In obvious contrast, incompetence by 
the leader will result in a loss of status and loss of legitimate authority 
over the population. 
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During a severe pandemic, a leader may become a symbol of order 
and authority (Seeger et al., 2003). Therefore, a crisis leader may 
need to exercise power to engage members of the community or 
organization to behave as needed to mitigate further harm and to restore 
the community to a state of normalcy.  The leader’s power may be 
exhibited in numerous forms (Yukl, 2002), including legitimate power 
(e.g., members believe the leader has the right to ask and they have 
the obligation to comply, such as the police chief ordering a curfew); 
expert power (e.g., members comply because they believe the leader 
has specialized knowledge, such as tourists who accept the U.S. 
public health quarantine order for a cruise ship to stop the spread of a 
disease outbreak); and referent power (e.g., members comply because 
they admire the leader and want to gain approval, such as adhering 
to social distancing recommendations from an admired public health 
official). Leaders in a crisis can influence followers and exercise 
authority through a number of behaviors, including rational persuasion, 
inspirational appeals, collaboration, and coalition building (Northouse, 
2001;Yukl, 2002). 
Power and influence are not static conditions and can be acquired and 
lost. Therefore, leaders in a severe influenza pandemic must be aware 
of the types of power available to them and the best application of these 
powers. The best use of expert power by a leader in a pandemic requires 
the leader to act confidently and decisively, explain to the community 
the reason(s) and import behind the requested actions, provide 
evidence that the action will be successful, be careful and consistent in 
communicating with the group, represent the facts truthfully, and listen 
to others’ concerns (Yukl, 2002). 
Situational context of a pandemic 
The situational context of a severe influenza pandemic challenges 
leaders in specific ways. Certain character traits and leadership styles 
are better suited for crisis leadership situations than in normal operating 
circumstances. Limited research indicates that leaders with increased 
intelligence and greater experience are positively related to their group’s 
ability to produce creative ideas under normal conditions (Yukl, 2002). 
However, when the leader and group are in high-stress conditions, there 
is no advantage in the group’s ability to produce creative ideas based 
on the leader’s intelligence and experience. Some researchers observe 
that this loss of advantage from the leader’s intelligence and experience 
is because the highly intelligent leader tends to stifle group input by 
dominating the group activity in a high-stress situation. In so doing, the 
leader is not only less creative, but the group overall is less productive 
(Yukl, 2002). Simply put, the whole is not greater than the sum of its 
parts because the leader does not allow for all of the parts to contribute 
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to problem-solving. A community will strengthen its hardiness in the 
face of a severe influenza pandemic to the extent that its leader will call 
upon the talents and expertise of the community members. 
Once the pandemic virus arrives, tasks are more apt to be unstructured, 
relationships between leaders and followers strained, and authority 
confused (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). In addition, the time 
constraints in the midst of a severe pandemic will reduce the time 
for consultation, consensus building, and justifying decisions before 
taking action, which adds to the possibility that relations will be further 
strained and authority more confused. Nonetheless, those involved 
in a severe pandemic will look to the leader to provide information, 
reduce uncertainty, and clarify meaning. More importantly, how a leader 
behaves early in the crisis will significantly affect how others frame the 
crisis for themselves and for their community (Norris, 2001; Reynolds, 
et al., 2002; Seeger, et al., 2003). 
Therefore, broad community involvement is critical in finding the best 
solutions for anticipated challenges before a pandemic occurs. When 
the pandemic occurs, the leader must assume a greater role in decision-
making or risk a sense of chaos and uncertainty overwhelming the 
community, shaking its group-efficacy. Although democratic styles of 
leadership are preferred for most day-to-day operations, in contrast, 
authoritative leadership styles may be better suited for crisis situations 
(Seeger, et al., 2003).  Followers may be more willing to grant 
greater control to the leader in a severe pandemic. Leaders using an 
authoritative style typically give the appearance of decisiveness, which, 
in the unstructured and confusing times of a crisis, helps to reduce 
uncertainty and helps the organization or community regain a sense of 
control. 
Charismatic leadership—good and bad 
Some aspects of charismatic leadership style also may be beneficial 
in a crisis context (Mitroff, 2004; Reynolds, et al., 2002; Young, n.d.). 
Some traits and behaviors associated with charismatic leadership are 
expected from the crisis leader (Seeger, et al., 2003; Yukl, 2002). In 
fact, “charismatic leaders are more likely to emerge when there is a 
crisis” (Yukl, 2002, p. 243). Leaders who are decisive and confident, 
make self-sacrifices, share risks, offer persuasive appeals, and articulate 
an inspirational vision are often considered charismatic. Charismatic 
leaders also are typically strong, expressive communicators who can 
build group identification and empower followers (Yukl, 2002). Studies 
by Smircich and Stubbard (1985) (as reported in Seeger, et al., 2003) 
stressed that the leader’s interpretation of the crisis will compete with 
other interpretations. The leader’s interpretation must be compelling 
Those involved in a 
severe pandemic will 
look to the leader to 
provide information, 
reduce uncertainty, and 
clarify meaning. 
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Leaders can influence 
some aspects related 
to community recovery 
from a severe pandemic. 
if the leader is to win the competition for the “critical mass” needed 
for followers to act according to the leader’s beliefs. “The critical 
mass depends on persuasion and interpretation much more than on the 
objective facts,” (Seeger, et al., p. 247).  However, Yukl (2002) warns 
of the dark side of charismatic leadership: leaders may be too optimistic 
about the situation and not recognize strategic flaws, may begin to 
believe they are infallible, and some people will be antagonized by the 
leader’s strong convictions and become disillusioned. 
Stakeholder expectations 
The public and stakeholders want to accomplish the following five 
things with the information they get from their leaders during a severe 
pandemic: gain the wanted facts needed to protect them, their families 
and their pets from the dangers they are facing; make well-informed 
decisions using all available information; have an active, participatory 
role in the response and recovery; act as a “watch-guard” over resources, 
both public and donated; and, recover or preserve well-being and 
normalcy, including economic security (Reynolds, et al., 2002; Seeger, 
et al., 2003; Young, et al., n.d.). For any leader in a crisis, the challenge 
is to give the public and stakeholders what they demand within the fog 
of information overload or the absence of information and uncertainty. 
Employing some aspects of a charismatic and authoritative leadership 
style with the positive use of power and influence may help them 
accomplish their objectives. 
Among the central principles necessary to help survivors recover 
following a crisis, some can be accomplished through the communication 
of a crisis leader. Leaders can help people reduce fear, anxiety, and 
despondency to manageable levels by reducing situational uncertainty 
with information, by giving them things to do which restores a sense 
of control, and by modeling optimistic behavior (Reynolds, et al., 
2002; Young, et al., n.d.). Leaders can influence some aspects related 
to community recovery from a severe pandemic. Recommendations for 
leaders include the following: whenever possible, keep people in their 
natural groups if relocated; hold group meetings to allow community 
members to brainstorm about community rebuilding and to allow 
survivors to recognize the reality of loss; emphasize inclusiveness 
and reach out to people who may feel marginalized; and find ways to 
collectively express grief (Norris, 2001; Reynolds, et al., 2002). 
Following a severe pandemic, a responsible leader should: be 
accountable and offer explanations if needed; support investigations and 
studies for lessons learned; create a hopeful vision for the community; 
participate in symbolic acts and grieving ceremonies; begin renewed pre-
crisis planning; and teach lessons learned to others (Seeger, et al., 2003). 
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Successful Pandemic Communication 
In a crisis, individuals will immediately judge the content of official 
messages by the speed of communication and the trust and credibility 
of the messenger (Peters et al., 1997; Seeger, 2003). The speed with 
which information is shared with the public during a severe influenza 
pandemic will indicate to the public how prepared officials are to 
respond to the emergency, that there is a response system in place, 
and that needed action is being taken. If the public is not aware that 
a response is ongoing they may lose confidence in the organization’s 
ability to respond. 
Along with information about the response, empathy and caring should 
be expressed repeatedly in messages to community members (Peter, et 
al., 2003). Empathy is the ability to vicariously experience another’s 
emotions or the willingness to put oneself in another’s shoes. People 
with high empathy are found to be more aware of the environment that 
those with low empathy. Interestingly, the more anxious a person is the 
less empathetic they will be. According to research, being perceived as 
empathetic and caring provides greater opportunity for the message to 
be received and acted upon. Empathetic messages should acknowledge 
fear, pain, suffering, and uncertainty. 
Source competence is also important (Brehm et al., 2005). Education, 
position title, or organizational roles and missions are quick ways to 
indicate expertise. Previous experience and demonstrated abilities in 
the current situation enhance the perception of competence. Another 
useful tool to build trust is to have established a relationship with the 
audiences in advance of the emergency (Seeger et al., 2003). If that 
is not possible, a third party, who has the confidence of the audience, 
who expresses his or her confidence in the response organization and 
officials is useful. 
Honesty and openness in crisis communication means facing 
the realities of the situation and responding accordingly. 
It means not being paternalistic in communication but, 
instead, participatory—giving people choices and enough 
information to make appropriate decisions. In situations of 
great uncertainty, the public should be told why the information 
isn’t available for release at the time (Brashers, 2001). To build 
trust, the public should be allowed to observe the process while 
being reminded that this process is what drives the quality of 
the emergency response. 
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Conclusion

Personal resilience is more prevalent than often believed and adaptive 
coping strategies can be learned. Discussing personal resilience and 
allowing people to mentally rehearse how they believe they would 
respond under the stress of a pandemic outbreak in their community 
is worthwhile. This rehearsal will allow them to adjust their view 
about their mastery over the event and consider the consequences 
of the behavior before acting. While community cohesion can not 
independently improve community hardiness, cohesion can be 
strengthened before a pandemic, thus adding to potential community 
hardiness. Communities should assess their hardiness based on the 
domains of influence. The interdependence of the task, the leader’s 
style and community cohesion are all important elements in building 
community hardiness. Group cohesion improves as groups identify 
themselves as a collective and achieve success. Communication 
activities before and during a severe pandemic can increase personal 
resilience (e.g., building mastery skills) and community hardiness (e.g., 
use social persuasion to increase cohesion). 
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At Risk from Negative Thinking 
Selected ideas which create negative emotions and helplessness: 
1. When things do not go the way I wanted and planned, it is horrible and, of course, I am going to get very upset. 
2. When other people, this screwed-up society, or bad luck happens to me all the time, how could I be happy? I have no 
control over anything, so I can’t do anything about my miserable feelings. 
3. When the situation is frightening or going badly, I worry all the time. 
4. I avoid thinking about tense situations. It’s easier than facing the problem and taking responsibility for making things 
better. 
5. Things have been this way forever; I can’t do anything about these problems now. 
6. People who are evil should be punished severely (and I have the right to get very upset if they aren’t stopped and 
made to “pay the price”). 
Instead consider: 
1. Accept reality: Say to yourself, “That’s the way it is. I’ll change what I can and then make the best of it.” 
2. Learn lessons from the past and how to improve the future: “It didn’t go the way I wanted it to. So, now I’ll examine 
it to make things work out better next time.” 
3. Accept responsibility for your feelings: “No one can make me feel any way. But, I can change how I feel. “I” 
statements remind us that we alone are responsible for our feelings. 
Activities to Increase Personal Resilience 
Demand from yourself that you will counter every negative thought with an opposing positive through:Strong Thinking 
Negative: I can’t stay home with my kids during a pandemic—we’ll starve!  Positive: I wonder what other 
single Moms are doing. I’ll look for a website. Or maybe start one! 
Take a different perspective. She cut me off in traffic, what a bully. Or She cut me off in traffic, I wonder if 
she’s worried and preoccupied about a sick relative 
Imagine in your mind doing a complex task step-by-step with ease. Celebrate that success and practice it over 
and over. 
Express thoughts as positives. Stop negative words before they come out of your mouth 
A pattern of strong thinking will, literally, strengthen resilience building neural pathways—exercise your 
brain’s “optimistic” muscles 
Greater purpose: Attach a meaningful personal goal to motivate you during hard times: “I have to be here for 
my family” 
Help someone else knock out negative thinking 
Connect with your loved ones often 
Calm your mind by breathing deeplyStrong Mind 
Meditate to calm yourself

Take mini mental breaks and divert yourself from the complex task or the chaos around you. 

Send your mind on vacation—feel nature around you.

Seek out pleasant smells that invoke good memories

Strong Body You know what good food is—eat it and know you are doing something to protect yourself every day 
Exercise 
Drink lots of water

Take a sunshine break

Stick to a good sleep routine 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 63 
Hardiness and Personal Resilience 
Checklist: Communication for Personal Resilience 
Before 
o	 Connect people with similar interests through organizations, meetings, and websites to match skills with 
pandemic “chores.” 
o	 Give step-by-step directions to follow. 
During 
o	 Help people help others. 
o	 Focus people on a goal: “Keeping my family safe.” 
o	 Remind people that they have overcome past struggles (especially community specific struggles). 
o	 Remind people about core societal values: We value our independence. We value resourcefulness. 
o	 Show how people “just like me” are managing. 
o	 Challenge people to do their best. 
o	 Remind people of their individual value to the community. 
After 
o	 Acknowledge that negative life experiences have meaning and we can learn and grow. 
o	 Show respect by acknowledging losses in a personal way (e.g, the mini biographies published of those lost 
at the World Trade Center). 
o	 Acknowledge the shared misery and direct people to acts of hope. 
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Checklist: Communication for Community Hardiness 
Before 
o Do a community hardiness assessment. 
o Identify unifying symbols, shared history, that can be used to remind people they are part of a community. 
o Educate partners, media, and civic leaders about the role of community hardiness in better response 
and quicker recovery from catastrophes (mental health community leaders should lead this role; however 
communication professionals will be able to help magnify the actions mental-health leaders may believe are 
important). 
o Identify community influencers and engage them in community hardiness planning activities. 
o Consider community meetings to discuss the protective aspects that exist in the community and its 
vulnerabilities. 
During 
o Highlight success in the community as it shoulders the burden of the outbreak. 
o Provide a forum for community members to discuss problems that may arise during the outbreak (i.e., 
community meetings may not be feasible but a community blog could be.) 
o Recommend ways that the community can help safeguard its most vulnerable members (e.g., extra 
volunteers for the meals-on-wheels program). 
After 
o Document the community’s survival through memorials, collecting items to archive for their historical 
value, and collecting oral/visual accounts of the event. 
o Acknowledge the shared misery. 
o Try to recapture traditional community events as soon as possible to help the community return to a sense 
of the familiar (e.g., go forward with the annual picnic or note the long-standing rivalries between high school 
football teams) 
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Topline* Assessment of Community Hardiness by Selected Domains 
Community hardiness relates to its existing protective qualities and vulnerabilities that will determine the 
ability of the community to take deliberate, meaningful, and collective action against a public health emergency, 
including a severe influenza pandemic. 
Protective Qualities** Vulnerabilities*** 
Socioeconomic + Socioeconomic -
Few at or below poverty level Substantial number at or below poverty level 
High level of literacy High level of illiteracy 
Low number of people with disabilities High numbers of people with disabilities 
High education levels (high school diploma/college) Low education levels/less than high school 
High number of self-reliant adults who work -
Unemployment decreasing 
High number of unemployed, increasing 
Most are 2-parent families High # single-parent families 
Most speak English as first language High # speak little or no English 
Most live in single-family dwellings High # multi-family dwellings (more than one family 
in a home/apt. or more than 2 generations living 
together) 
Incomes have consistently been increasing High number of babies and children under 5 
Health/Access to Health Care + Health/Access to Health Care -
High proportion of hospitals, trauma centers, 
emergency rooms 
Limited hospital capacity, no trauma center, limited 
emergency rooms 
High proportion of physicians Low proportion of physicians 
High proportion insured High proportion uninsured 
Private health care dominates Public sector health care dominates 
Pharmacies abundant Few pharmacies, poorly spaced 
High quality of care typical Quality of care sporadic 
Population much lower than U.S. average for chronic 
illness/immunosuppressed 
Above U.S. average for chronic illness (e.g., high % 
of diabetes in population/ high % undergoing cancer 
chemotherapy) 
Population much lower than U.S. average heart 
disease, obesity 
Above U.S. average for heart disease, obesity 
Low number of frail aged High number of frail aged 
Low number rely on technology for life support Higher than average number require technology for 
life support 
Much higher than average vaccination rates (children 
and elderly) 
Well below average vaccination rates (children and 
elderly) 
Emergency Response Services + Emergency Response Services -
High % of EMS Below adequate EMS 
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Highly trained emergency response Poorly trained 
Highly experienced Less experienced than typical 
Conduct community drills/exercises Does not conduct drills/exercises at community level 
Emergency response volunteer organizations robust 
and experienced 
No emergency response volunteer organization or 
few with few resources 
Business/Industry + Business/Industry -
Major businesses belong to the community and share 
an altruistic perspective toward the community 
Little business or industry exists 
Small business owners are well organized and have 
contingency plans in place/insurance for emergencies 
and losses from shutdowns 
Small businesses are primarily “mom and pop” with 
little insurance and little likelihood of surviving 
extended shutdowns 
Civic/Faith-based Support + Civic/Faith-based Support -
Community events common and well attended Few or no community events 
Pride in identity (e.g., best cheese makers, best high 
school football team) 
Little pride or no community identity 
High number of civic organizations with active 
chapters 
Few civic organizations 
Neighborhood associations common Few or no neighborhood associations 
Volunteerism valued and expected Volunteerism is a luxury and not expected 
Community spirit includes competition with 
neighboring communities 
Community is socially isolated from neighboring 
communities 
Community has a well-known and invoked motto No community identity other than name/no motto 
Diversity celebrated as point of pride Racial/ethnic strife exists/easily incited 
Lower than average crime rates High crime rates 
Much lower than average drug/alcohol rates Much higher than average drug/alcohol rates 
A strong network of faith-based organizations exist in 
the community 
Places of worship are insulated from each other or 
mistrustful of each other 
Faith-based volunteers are well organized and trained 
for emergency response 
Faith based volunteers are few or poorly trained with 
little belief they should reach beyond membership 
Democracy and local representation + Democracy and local representation -
Community members believe they are represented by 
local government 
Community members believe they are not represented 
in local government 
High percentage of eligible voters vote Low percentage of eligible voters vote 
Community meetings well attended, especially when 
important topics covered 
Community meetings ignored unless a highly 
divisive issue arises and, then, discourse is only 
confrontational (them versus us) 
No “hot” issues divide the community from each other 
or other communities 
Community infighting over “hot” issues are ongoing 
or the community is fighting with other communities 
(e.g., local water rights) 
No pending legislation is dividing the community Pending or recently passed legislation is creating 
community strife 
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Civic/Political Leadership + Civic/Political Leadership -
Community leaders work together across jurisdictions Community leaders are distrustful of each other 
Community leaders have experience solving critically 
important and time-sensitive issues 
Leadership has little experience with problem solving 
in a critical situation or crisis 
Community has demonstrated that politics is set aside 
during crises 
Political infighting and grandstanding is common, 
regardless of urgent issues 
Political leaders held in some esteem and are sought 
out for advice 
Political leaders are ineffectual and mostly ignored by 
community 
Community leadership matches the community 
demographics well 
Leadership does not demographically match large 
portions of the community membership 
Media/Communication + Media/Communication -
Multiple media outlets—print and electronic No daily electronic or print media available to the 
community 
Local media highly trusted Local media not trusted to be right/fair 
Well above average Internet access Well below average Internet access 
Media literacy (ability to discern motives related to 
sources of information) is very high 
Media literacy is very low and messages are accepted 
at “face” value without skepticism 
Community “worldviews” + Community “worldviews” -
Justice will ultimately prevail Justice is for those with power 
We can help ourselves Help seldom arrives in time 
Being connected to each other is important My business is my business—no one else needs to 
know 
Endurance, self-reliance, humor, and innovation are 
shared attributes 
Suffering, victimization, resistance to change, and 
inability to visualize success are shared attitudes 
Guidelines and recommendations from authorities are 
based on the greatest good for the greatest number 
Directions from authorities will benefit the “in-group” 
and hurt those who do not belong. 
*	 A topline assessment is a starting point and the sum of the +/- signs from this assessment will not provide an estimate 
of community hardiness because each factor will weigh differently in a community. This assessment is meant to 
highlight features of a community that, if they exist, could be protective qualities or increase vulnerability.  Further 
analysis and community discussion is needed for more meaningful results. 
** Protective qualities: are characteristics of the community that add to its robustness (ability to withstand stress), 
redundancy (substitutable critical systems), resourcefulness (ability to identify problems, determine priorities, and 
achieve goals), and rapidity (ability to respond in a timely way to reduce harm to individuals and the community as a 
whole). 
*** Vulnerabilities: are characteristics of susceptibility related to the community’s ability to maintain its sense of 
community, give shelter, provide sustenance, maintain security, and grow as a society from the adversity. 
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A pandemic influenza strain vaccine can not be manufactured in 
pandemic quantities until the pandemic influenza strain emerges. Also, 
antivirals can not be stockpiled in pandemic quantities because some 
strains of influenza viruses are resistant to the antivirals. This leaves 
public health officials with the quandary of how to help protect people 
from the influenza virus during the early phase of a pandemic when 
vaccine and antivirals will be in extremely short supply. The answer at 
this time is the implementation of nonpharmaceutical interventions or 
NPIs. 
The NPIs currently under consideration require changes in individual 
and community behaviors. Genrally, the NPI behaviors are meant to 
limit the spread of the pandemic, reduce illness and deaths, and lessen 
the impact on societal infrastructures such as reducing workplace 
absenteeism and numbers of hospitalizations. Briefly, CDC has 
identified the following four pandemic mitigation interventions: 
isolation of ill people in their home or the hospital; voluntary home 
quarantine of non-ill family members for at least 4 days (i.e., two 
transmission periods) when a household member is presumed ill with 
pandemic influenza; dismissing students from school attendance and 
closing child care programs; and social distancing to reduce contact 
among adults (e.g., cancel large public gatherings and telecommute to 
work). Retrospective studies of behaviors by individuals and U.S. cities 
during the 1918 pandemic suggested that this approach would achieve 
the stated goals. For this strategy to be effective in a severe pandemic, 
individuals and communities would have to adopt these behaviors early 
once the virus arrived in their community and be willing to sustain them 
for as long as 12 weeks. 
Individuals, families, communities, schools, employers and other 
organizations who know what the community mitigation strategies 
are and believe themselves capable of carrying them out are more apt 
to plan to implement these strategies before a pandemic and actually 
implement them during a pandemic. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
collaborated with several federal agencies and public and private 
partners to form the interim pre-pandemic planning community 
mitigation strategy guidance (See http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/ 
community/commitigation.html). The ideal response remains a well-
matched pandemic strain vaccine, but likely that option will not be 
available early in the pandemic. Without these nonpharmaceutical 
mitigation measures, deaths and hospitalizations would likely 
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dramatically increase even during a less severe pandemic. In a severe 
pandemic, the disease burden would likely overwhelm health care 
services and community support organizations. These mitigation 
interventions can make the difference. 
There are three main goals of the community mitigation strategy: 1) 
slow the growth of cases in the community to buy time for production 
and distribution of a well-matched pandemic strain vaccine, 2) decrease 
the epidemic peak (i.e., fewer cases of disease at the same time in 
the community which could more quickly overload the health care 
systems), and 3) reduce the overall number of illnesses and deaths in 
the community. In fact, reshaping the demand for health care services 
through the use of mitigation strategies is a vital part of the overall 
strategy and data from the 1918 pandemic indicates this is indeed 
possible. 
For the strategy to be most effective, the interventions should be layered 
(use as many of them as feasible), they must be initiated early and, for 
severe pandemics, must be maintained consistently during the epidemic 
wave in the community. Communication professionals should fully 
understand the measures, their limitations, and plan to educate their 
communities about both. Time must be allowed for communities to 
consider these strategies within their own daily realities and to explore 
ways to overcome obstacles and build consensus. 
The four primary mitigation interventions are the following: 
1.	 Isolation and treatment (as appropriate) with influenza antiviral 
medications of all persons with confirmed or probable pandemic 
influenza.  Isolation may occur in the home or healthcare setting, 
depending on the severity of an individual’s illness and/or the 
current capacity of the healthcare infrastructure. 
2.	 Voluntary home quarantine of members of households with 
confirmed or probable influenza case(s) and consideration of 
combining this intervention with the prophylactic use of antiviral 
medications, providing sufficient quantities of effective medications 
exist and that a feasible means of distributing them is in place. 
3.	 Dismissal of students from school (including public and private 
schools as well as colleges and universities) and school-based 
activities and closure of childcare programs, coupled with protecting 
children and teenagers through social distancing in the community 




4.	 Use of social distancing measures to reduce contact between 
adults in the community and workplace, including, for example, 
cancellation of large public gatherings and alteration of workplace 
environments and schedules to decrease social density and preserve 
a healthy workplace to the greatest extent possible without 
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disrupting essential services.  Enable institution of workplace leave 
policies that align incentives and facilitate adherence with the 
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) outlined above. 
These measures are meant to be taken along with individual infection 
control measures (e.g., handwashing and cough etiquette). 
An important addition to the community mitigation strategies is the 
development of a Pandemic Severity Index to help individuals and 
communities determine which strategies to take and the length of 
time to engage them. Future pandemics will be assigned to one of 
five discrete categories of increasing severity that correspond with 
appropriate steps to take (Figure A/Table A). For example if the case-
fatality rate during a pandemic is less than 1 percent (with estimated 
deaths nationwide under 90,000), the pandemic would be considered 
a category 1 and the only recommended community measure would 
be voluntary isolation of ill persons. However, communities could 
choose to take additional measures. In contrast, a category 5 pandemic 
(i.e., case fatality rate of 2 percent or higher and estimated deaths 
nationwide of nearly 2 million) would warrant recommendation of all 
of the community mitigation strategies. Communication professionals 
must learn and be able to communicate the categories of the Pandemic 
Severity Index and their mitigation recommendations. In addition to 
the 1-5 categories of the index, triggers for the timing of interventions 
have also been developed. Communities should become comfortable 
with the concepts of Alert, Standby, and Activate. Importantly, because 
pandemics spread quickly, the time between these three modes may be 
short, therefore, preplanning in communities is vital so that everyone 
is aware of their role and responsibilities, including individuals in the 
community. 
Figure A.  Pandemic Severity Index 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 71 
Table A.  Summary of the Community Mitigation Strategy by Pandemic Severity 
Pandemic Severity Index 
Interventions by Setting 1 2 and 3 4 and 5 
Home 
Voluntary isolation of ill at home (adults and children); combine with use of Reommend Reommend Reommend 
antiviral treatment as available and indicated. 
Voluntary quarantine of household members in homes with ill persons (adults Generally not Consider Reommend 
and children), consider combining with antiviral prophylaxis if effective, recommended 
feasible, and quantities sufficient. 
School 
Child social distancing Generally not Consider Reommend 
dismissal of students from schools and school based activities, and closure of recommended < 4 weeks < 12 weeks 
child care programs. 
reduce out-of-school social contacts and community mixing. Generally not Consider Reommend 
recommended < 4 weeks < 12 weeks 
Workplace/Community 
Adult social distancing Generally not Consider Reommend 
decrease number of social contact (e.g., encourage teleconferences, recommended 
alternatives to face-to-face meetings) 
increase distance between persons (e.g., reduce density in public transit, Generally not Consider Reommend 
workplace) recommended 
modify, postpone, or cancel selected public gatherings to promote social Generally not Consider Reommend 
distance (e.g., stadium events, theater performances) recommended 
modify work place schedules and practices (e.g., telework, staggered shifts) Generally not Consider Reommend 
recommended 
Importantly, the duration of implementation, especially, during a severe 
pandemic must be communicated and carefully considered during planning. 
As long as susceptible individuals (e.g., persons have not become ill and 
have not been vaccinated with a pandemic strain vaccine) are present in 
large numbers, disease spread may continue. Stopping the interventions too 
soon could reduce the overall benefit to the community. In fact, research 
from the 1918 pandemic indicated that the duration of implementation was 
significantly associated with overall mortality rates (i.e., the longer the 
interventions were consistently maintained, the lower were the community’s 
mortality rates from the epidemic wave). 
The benefits of these strategies do come with challenges and costs. All 
segments of society and all levels of government should be involved in 
the planning to implement community mitigation strategies. Importantly, 
communities must consider which segments of their population will have 
the greatest difficulty implementing these strategies (e.g., elderly, people 
who are poor, homeless, and recent immigrants). Considering steps to build 
self- and group efficacy to improve individual resilience and community 
hardiness should be part of this process. After all, a well-coordinated 
implementation plan affords individuals, communities, and the greater 
society the best chance of securing the benefits this strategy provides. 
To learn more about community mitigation strategies, visit: 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/commitigation.html. 
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The Stigma of Pandemic Influenza

˘ ˘ ¯stig·ma·ti·za·tion (stig´m -ti-zash n) 
n. 





•	 The universal threat of a severe pandemic to all members of the 
society, both in-groups and out-groups equally. 
• The level of uncertainty may increase the use of alternative 
coping strategies to avoid illness or death. 
•	 Media technology will bring the outbreak into homes worldwide 
when it is still localized to a few communities. 
Throughout time, infectious diseases have been a menace for humans. 
Only since the late 1800s and the advent of the germ theory have 
modern people had to face the anxiety of a threat they cannot see, smell, 
or hear. When every object around an individual, including the very air 
they breathe, could carry the threat of death, there is ample opportunity 
for strong emotional reactions to infectious diseases. Are “germs” 
shameful? Ask the TB patient sent to a sanitarium in the early 1900s, 
ask the AIDS patient of the 1980s, or ask the child who is tagged with 
the “cooties” of a disliked playmate on the play yard. Just preceding, 
and early in an influenza pandemic, people who can be singled out and 
associated with the threat this virus will pose will be at risk of being 
stigmatized. Communication professionals must balance communicating 
the real risks that exist with needlessly associating an identifiable group 
of people with that risk. Communication professionals will also need 
to take an active role in dispelling misperceptions in their communities 




•	 Define stigmatization. 




•	 Evaluate how 
stigmatization may 
occur in the community. 
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The following are recent examples in public health where stigmatization 
occurred during an infectious disease outbreak. In March and April 
of 1997, CDC determined that strawberries from Mexico, processed 
by a company in southern California, were associated with a hepatitis 
A outbreak among school-age children in at least six states. The 
southern California processor had packed and frozen the strawberries 
in 30-pound containers for commercial use and then distributed the 
strawberries to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-sponsored 
school lunch programs. During that incident, the public health 
investigation clearly reported that the risk of hepatitis A was associated 
with specific lots of strawberries from Mexico that had been frozen. 
Nonetheless, sale of fresh strawberries sharply declined and the fruit 
growers associations had to wage a strong marketing campaign to help 
regain public confidence in a product (i.e., fresh strawberries) that did 
not pose the risk with which it was associated. 
In 1997, Hong Kong experienced the first reported human outbreak 
of avian influenza H5N1. The first death was a 3-year-old boy who 
attended a day care which allowed baby chicks to mingle with the 
children in the garden. During an intense month when cases increased 
in the city, the media reports took on a “worst-case,” sensational tone. 
During that time, any location associated with a case of “bird flu” was 
shunned by the community. This included day-care centers, apartment 
complexes, and hospitals. The lag between understanding how the virus 
was transmitted and how to protect oneself from the virus created a 
window of time to allow for this stigmatization to grow. The majority of 
cases occurred among guest workers who were hired for domestic help 
in Hong Kong homes. Some reports suggested that these workers were 
at fault for the outbreak and they were shunned. No reports confirmed 
that any workers lost their jobs. However, the parks and areas where 
these guest workers gathered on their days off were also associated with 
the H5N1 cases and were avoided. 
In 1999, the first cases of West Nile virus in the Western hemisphere 
were reported in New York City. Not long after, race horses in the state 
were hard hit by the disease. While the medical community and most 
of the public were aware that mosquitoes transmitted the virus, during 
the following year Europe banned New York’s race horses from being 
shipped to Europe for the racing season. In this case, an animal was 
stigmatized despite clear scientific evidence that they were not at risk 
for transmitting the virus. Also, West Nile virus is endemic in Europe 
and has been for sometime, although it was not known to be as virulent 
as what was being experienced in the United States in 1999 and 2000. 
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During the 2003 SARS outbreak, which appeared to originate in 
China, many Asian communities in the United States were likewise 
stigmatized. People were afraid to visit popular Asian neighborhoods 
to eat and shop. The situation was so disruptive in Honolulu that the 
Governor of the state visited and ate dinner in Honolulu’s Chinatown 
area with media in tow to demonstrate the lack of risk. In Oregon, 
reports showed that women were avoiding nail salons, managed 
primarily by Vietnamese women, because they feared SARS. The nail 
salon owners asked for help in dispelling a fear not based in science but 
on ethnicity, which for some became linked to the threat of SARS from 
China. 
Toronto’s severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak was 
confined to a few travelers, hospital workers and household contacts of 
hospital workers. Nonetheless, a precipitous drop in tourism occurred 
and it took the city months to recover their tourism trade. According to 
the Canadian Broadcasting Company in July 2003, the SARS outbreak 
was “taking a devastating toll on the tourism sector even before the 
World Health Organization released its advisory against non-essential 
travel to Toronto.” 
•	 Cancellations at Greater Toronto Area hotels led to an estimated 
$39 million in lost revenues during the month of April 2003 
alone. 
•	 Audiences at theatres dwindled. 
•	 Bus and tour companies were hit – more than 800 bus tours were 
cancelled, with an estimated economic loss of $5 million to $6 
million. 
•	 Fewer people were dining at restaurants – restaurant business 
was down between 20 and 30 percent. 
•	 Conventions were cancelled – the cancellation of one health-
care convention probably cost the region about $6 million. 
It took the Rolling Stones, in an outdoor concert in late July 2003, to 
make the point that Toronto was free from SARS and open for tourism. 
Stigmatization can affect a product, an animal, a place, and an 
identifiable group of people. One is stigmatized by an infectious disease 
when the risk is not present but the association of the risk with your 
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population group is. There are two routes to eliminating stigmatizations 
in a severe pandemic: raise awareness and understanding among 
the dominant group about stigmatization or wait for the pandemic 
to become so pervasive in the dominant group that it eliminates 
the distinctions by race, ethnicity, profession, or other identifiable 
characteristics. Even if the dominant group is swept up by the pandemic 
and stigmatization lessens, in the resolution phase of the pandemic the 
stigmatization is still there and may resurface. As misery and anger turn 
to fault finding, the perceived “progenitors” of the pandemic could be 
stigmatized once again. Therefore, communication professionals must 
intercede. 
The Psychological Roots 
of Stigmatization 
Stigmatization can be defined as a mark or sign of disgrace or discredit. 
There are four characteristics of stigmatization: 
First, there must be a problem which can cause a stigmatizing 
response that can somehow spare the stigmatizer from the problem 
or allow him to control it. Second, the party stigmatized must be 
distinguishable. Third, the stigma must be associated with the party 
stigmatized. Fourth, there must be a reaction which distances the 
stigmatized from the stigmatizer. (Constantinescu, 1999). 
Stigmatization occurs for several reasons; in a severe pandemic it will 
likely be for the perception of protection and social control. 
The concept of stigma involves the joining of deviance and prejudice. 
The group of people being stigmatized must deviate in some way from 
the dominant group who, ignorant or in denial about the actual risk 
posed by the stigmatized group, allows prejudice to guide their behavior 
and perceives the stigmatized group as a threat (Heatherton, Kleck, 
Hebl, & Hull, 2000). 
Peril gives rise to the type of stigmatization that could come about early 
in a severe influenza pandemic. If the stigmatizing condition associated 
with the person or group is dangerous or lethal to others, stigma 
arises. Naturally, the more dangerous the condition is, the stronger and 
swifter stigmatization will take hold. In addition to peril, the degree 
of stigma will depend on how visible it is (e.g., if based on ethnicity, 
it would depend on how easily the person can be identified with the 
stigmatized group), and the controllability of the origin of the stigma 
(i.e., if vaccines and antivirals were readily available early in a severe 
pandemic, the stigma may not be as great or as lasting). 
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Uncertainty is the big wild card for stigmatization in a severe pandemic. 
The less certain people are about how to protect themselves the more 
likely they will take steps that seem logical but have little basis in 
scientific fact. During the 1997 outbreak of hepatitis from the frozen 
strawberries, much of the media coverage centered on the limited 
supply of immunoglobulin to protect people from illness. People 
who were strongly risk averse took the extra step of avoiding fresh 
strawberries because they feared that treatment was not available. In 
another example, while scientists were trying to identify what was 
causing SARS and its origin, many people in China began to suspect 
their household pets put them at risk. Some reacted by abandoning and 
killing their pets. The psychological urge to protect oneself and one’s 
family from a threat is primal and may not easily be restrained with 
science’s obtuse logic or public health’s unanswered questions. 
The Function of Stigmatization 
What is the difference between stigma and simple prejudice? 
Stigmatization occurs when there is a perception of threat and it is 
accompanied by a social sharing of this perception by the dominant 
group. In other words, individuals in a severe pandemic may behave 
with prejudice but it takes a wider community for stigmatization to 
occur. With media technology today the “community” sharing the 
stigmatizing belief could be quickly expanded. 
Stigmatization is a psychological short cut or stereotype in that one 
uses a visible marker of the persons to infer something about them. For 
example, in the case of the nail salon owners during the SARS outbreak, 
the visible features of their ethnicity was used by some to infer that 
they were more closely associated with the origin of the SARS threat. 
Therefore they should be avoided even though they had not visited 
China or Toronto during this time or had friends or family from those 
areas. 
Stigmatization occurs in a social context and humans are susceptible 
to it. “Stigma is a powerful phenomenon, inextricably linked to the 
value placed on varying social identities” (Heatherton, 2000, p. 3). 
Stigmatization may transpire from a pervading anxiety that arises in 
others if they are around the stigmatized person or group. Consider, the 
world is at WHO Pandemic Alert 5 with pockets of sustained human-
to-human transmission occurring in a distant part of the world. An 
individual in the United States is bombarded with images of the threat 
and dreads the real possibility that in just days, weeks or months that 
threat will occur in his community. What if health professionals ban 
travel to and from those places? What if news reports vividly account 
Stigmatization occurs 
when there is a 
perception of threat 
and it is accompanied 
by a social sharing of 
this perception by the 
dominant group. 
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the horrible clinical course of the disease and the increasing spread? 
What if that person has the choice to interact or not with someone that 
is physically similar to the people he sees dying of the very thing he 
so dreads? What if he becomes more anxious around this person, who 
is different from him, because she reminds him of the threat and this 
increases his anxiety? What if he resents the feeling of vulnerability 
and impending mortality she invokes in him? Could he engage in social 
isolation and rejection, even if he would never have thought of himself 
as “that type of person”? 
In a severe influenza pandemic, one is more likely to see stigmatization 
come about because of emotional elements, at least initially. One’s 
emotions are more primitive, basic, and occur faster. In time, thinking 
about and acting out the stigmatizing behaviors could follow. For 
example, what if during the hepatitis A outbreak, the raspberry industry 
had marketed their product as the “safe alternative” fruit? Thought and 
behavior would be involved in the raspberry grower’s actions as they 
consciously chose to use the stigma to gain power, going much farther 
than an emotional response such as personally avoiding the fruit. While 
an unchecked emotional response or a slower thought out response 
are both serious, they do create different problems for the stigmatized 
group. 
Human groups create “reciprocity-based” bonds. One sees this in 
altruistic behaviors such as sharing food with others. There is strong in-
group preference in creating these reciprocity bonds. Although people 
may be strangers, if they both enjoy in-group membership the stranger 
in need is more likely to receive help or preferential treatment. When 
valuable resources are limited, stigmatization may ensure that in-group 
persons are given those resources first, especially if members of the out-
group are thought to pose a real threat to the in-group. As competition 
increases for a limited “pot,” the potential for stigmatization increases. 
In a severe pandemic, when resources are limited, any population 
associated with the threat and stigmatized may be at real risk of being 
either last in line or banned from the line. Response officials, policy 
makers, and communication professionals must guard against decisions 
based on this in-group and out-group thinking (if even subconsciously) 
and ensure that such perceptions, if not true, are countered in messaging 
early. After all, vulnerable members of the out-group will be sensitive 
to any slights and may obstruct response efforts in return. For example, 
during the hepatitis A-strawberry outbreak, the mayor of one city 
insisted that the kids in his community receive immune globulin despite 
the fact that the children had been exposed 28 days or more before 
and immune globulin would only work if the exposure was 14 days or 
less. He perceived that the in-group decision makers were deliberately 
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making choices to benefit other in-group members and not helping his 
community because they were out-group members. This controversy 
became national headlines despite the biological facts to the contrary. 
The Toll of Stigmatization 
If a population group becomes stigmatized, members of this group 
will experience emotional pain from the stress and anxiety of social 
avoidance and rejection. More frightening, research has shown that 
stigmatized persons were also hurt through limited access to health 
care, education, housing, and employment (Heatherton et al., 2000). 
Even worse, stigmatizers may react with physical violence against the 
stigmatized group. 
Cultural and stigma 
Cultural issues make a difference related to stigma, minority status, 
and self-esteem. The more the minority group fights against the 
stigma in organized macro-level ways, the less impact the stigma 
has on individual self-esteem. The research suggested that in-group 
comparisons were more important to self-esteem than out-group stigma. 
Generally, African Americans score higher for self-esteem than do 
Euro-Americans, and Euro-Americans score higher than do Hispanics, 
Asians, and American Indians, suggesting cultural relationships to 
individual self-esteem. In a severe pandemic, however, the population 
being stigmatized may not have prior personal psychological defenses 
or organized ways to quickly confront and fight against the stigma. The 
stigmatization may arise unexpectedly and may involve a group with 
less protective self-esteem. This is significant because self-esteem is 
associated with higher levels of survival in disasters, so any affront to 
a group’s or individual’s self-esteem during a severe pandemic could 
contribute to a loss of resilience in that group or person. 
Potential for group conflict 
In a multicultural world and nation, dissimilarities can lead to negative 
stereotypes and prejudices (Brehm et al., 2005). Group core beliefs or 
worldviews influence how group members interpret shared experiences. 
Culture is expressed through shared habits of response, unexamined 
assumptions, and shared thinking (R.J. Eidelson & J.I. Eidelson, 2003). 
These shared beliefs can be perceived by group members as basic truths 
and may be held with strong conviction. These strong convictions, 
however, can wreak havoc on intergroup relations. Within this 
framework, one or more of five cognitive domains are present in group 
conflict: helplessness, distrust, vulnerability, superiority, and injustice. 
A group-level ethnocentric worldview can lead to a sense of moral 
Fast Facts 
1918-19 pandemic, 
[influenza type A (H1N1)], 
caused the highest number 
of known influenza deaths. 
More than 500,000 people 
died in the United States, 
and up to 50 million people 
may have died worldwide. 
1957-58 pandemic, 
[influenza type A (H2N2)], 
caused about 70,000 deaths 
in the United States. First 
identified in China in late 
February 1957, the virus 
spread to the United States 
by June 1957. 
1968-69 pandemic, 
[influenza A (H3N2)], caused 
about 34,000 deaths in the 
United States. This virus was 
first detected in Hong Kong 
in early 1968 and spread to 
the United States later that 
year. 
Sometimes a novel strain of 
influenza virus emerges in 
humans, but unexpectedly 
causes relatively few cases 
of serious illness or death. 
The 1976 swine flu disease 
in this country was such an 
example. 
(www.pandemicflu.gov) 
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superiority and entitlement within the group and negative views of 
outgroup members as being immoral and inferior. “Chosenness appears 
to be an especially important component of this collective superiority 
worldview, and it is quite common among ethnically based identity 
groups” (R.J. Eidelson & J.I. Eidelson, p. 184). 
Conclusion 
With the ability of mass media to influence ideas of millions of 
people nearly instantaneously and the fact that the United States is 
a heterogeneous society, the potential for stigmatization in a severe 
influenza pandemic is high. Any triggering event early in the pandemic 
that lights the fuse could fire a cascade of hurtful and harmful behaviors 
toward a group. 
“Although the general message—that germs are dangerous and must be 
avoided is consistent. . . popular discourses about infectious diseases 
always contain many contradictory elements” (Tomes, 2000, p. 196). 
Scientists, traditional and new media, Hollywood and marketers will all 
give different meaning to the pandemic virus when it begins to threaten 
the United States population. Communication professionals involved 
in the public health response will face a communication landscape that 
will offer many different perspectives on a virus. How well we can 
discourage stigmatization may depend on the work that is done long 
before a virus arrives. 
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Checklist: Inhibiting and Countering Stigmatization 
Before 
o	 Remember: products, animals, places, and people can be stigmatized. 
o	 Avoid geographic mentions of past infectious disease outbreaks, instead substitute dates (e.g., Toronto 
SARS outbreak versus the 2003 SARS outbreak; the Spanish Influenza Pandemic versus the 1918 Influenza 
Pandemic) 
o	 Avoid constant use of visuals that portray only one ethnic group in briefing and education/outreach 
materials. (Media reports are different and set in time.) 
o	 Avoid typefaces and symbols that evoke a specific ethnic group (subconsciously you may think it’s relevant 
when it’s not)  For example:  (this typeface appears Asian-like and is readily 
available in basic MS Word) 
o	 Ask staff who share the ethnic background of persons experiencing the earliest outbreaks whether the 
proposed materials are offensive (if no staff share the ethnic background, reach out to trusted partners) 
o	 If a particular parasite, virus, bacteria, or toxin evokes an instant association with a particular ethnic/racial/ 
age/gender group—stigmatization is all ready occurring (e.g., When you read the next words “head lice” 
stop! Now who/what comes to mind?) 
o	 Teach response officials and communication staff as broadly as possible about the harm that results from 
stigmatization—people may literally hide their illness to avoid the stigma, which could hamper containment 
measures. 
o	 Share with media the concern about stigmatization and work together to create visuals that tell the story 
without targeting one group. 
o	 Address the issue in preplanning community checklists and guides. The more people are aware that this 
could occur, the more people can help guard against it. 
o	 Have a mechanism in place that allows people to seek the help of public health experts in determining real 
risks versus imaginary or theoretical risks. 
o	 Have a mechanism in place to allow people who are feeling stigmatized to express their concern and ask for 
help. 
During 
o	 All of the above continue to apply. 
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o Ensure the environmental scanning process being used is able to discern and alert communication staff to 
stigmatizing visuals, statements, or behaviors. 
o Monitor misperceptions in the community regarding real risks versus imagined or theoretical risks in 
relationship to products, animals, places, and people. 
o When stigmatization occurs in the community, counter it immediately with emotional appeals for fairness, 
justice and sound scientific facts. For example: When nail salon owners who were Vietnamese appealed for 
help from the health department during the SARS outbreak because women feared they would get SARS 
at the salons, the health department was able to allay public concern about increased risks and shorten the 
negative emotional and fiscal impact of the stigmatization). 
o Engage respected political and civic leaders in countering stigmatization (e.g., the governor of Hawaii 
visited Honolulu’s Chinatown during the SARS outbreak). 
After 
o Continue to do all the activities above. 
o Ensure that historical accounts of the event do not unfairly show any one ethnic group. The potential 
is high for historical accounts that cover the early part of the outbreak to unintentionally perpetuate the 
stigmatization. 
o If stigmatization does occur in the community, reach out to the stigmatized community to learn – believe 
me, they will know – when it started, what led to it, how it manifested, and how they coped or countered it 
themselves. Learn the lessons and engage them in the future for help. 
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Reaching Special Populations 

˘spe•cial (spesh´ l) 
adj. 
1. Surpassing what is common or usual; exceptional: a special occasion; a special treat. 
2. Distinct among others of a kind: a special tube of paint; a special medication for arthritis. 
Severe Pandemic: What is Different? 
•	 Everyone is at risk, the chronically ill, poor, and powerless more 
so than others. 
•	 The limited resources for prophylaxis or treatment (i.e., vaccine 
and antivirals) will be allocated using criteria that may not be 
easily accepted by some and could be perceived as unjust. 
•	 Voluntary or required isolation and quarantine has been used 
only rarely in our lifetimes and could be used during an 
influenza pandemic. 
While the very nature of a pandemic influenza virus strain involves 
nearly universal susceptibility to the virus, emergency planners are 
concerned that some portions of the U.S. population could be at greater 
risk of illness and death. From a biological perspective, people with 
suppressed immune systems and serious chronic health conditions 
could be at greater risk. From a societal perspective, people who are 
poor, disenfranchised and powerless could be at greater risk because 
of disparities in access to health care and inadequate support to take 
individual measures to reduce the opportunity for exposure to the 
virus (e.g., remaining home for extended periods). Every public 
health emergency has specific characteristics that will challenge the 
work of public information and health-risk education professionals. 
The obligation for communication professionals is to balance limited 
communication resources with the unique communication needs of 
special populations so that this segment of the community, in addition 
to the overall public, has reasonable and timely access to meaningful 
information to help protect themselves and their families. 
Objectives: 
•	 Employ consistent 
concepts regarding 
special populations to 
ensure that appropriate 
assessments are 
conducted, planning 
done, and resources 
appropriately allocated. 
•	 Distinguish which 
populations will be 







channels during the 
initial phase of a public 
health emergency. 
•	 Recognize that 
communication alone 
may not remove all 
barriers to preventing 
illness, injury, or death 
among population 
groups. 
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For which population during a crisis is a specialized message or 
communication product required, if any? Are cultural differences 
among non-dominant group members of the United States significant 
when attempting to communicate health and safety information 
during a public health emergency? Are communication messages from 
government authorities involved in the disaster response received 
differently by non-dominant groups? The answers to these questions 
should help inform crisis communication planning to ensure equitable 
support to all members of the community. 
If these questions are not answered, two extreme possible outcomes 
could occur: 1) persons belonging to some non-dominant group cultures 
or who are impaired would not receive emergency messages in a form 
or time-frame in which they could make use of the information, thereby 
increasing their risk of illness, injury, or death; or 2) the responding 
organizations could spend critical funds creating and disseminating 
targeted communication products that are unnecessary or confusing 
to populations (e.g., changes to basic messages could be conceived as 
“different” messages to populations groups, raising trust and credibility 
concerns — “Why are we being treated differently?”).  More likely, the 
influences of changing or not changing messages would be less extreme 
but could still be significant. 
Attempt to identify 
Before attempting to identify special populations, these assumptions 
about emergency communication should be considered: 
•	 The initial objectives for public information releases from 
response authorities early in a crisis are to: 1) prevent further 
illness, injury, or death; 2) restore or maintain calm; and 3) 
engender confidence in the operational response. 
•	 Emergencies are chaotic and planning should be directed at 
simplifying roles and responsibilities to achieve the greatest 
good for the greatest number while maintaining enough 
resources to reach those who can't help themselves. 
•	 To avoid confusion early in a crisis, accurate, relevant, simple, 
fast and consistent messages are best. 
•	 Nonetheless, "one size fits all" never fits all people equally well. 
•	 Public health resources for public information activities during a 
crisis will be limited and must be prioritized, especially early in 
the crisis. 
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• Individuals and communities must be empowered to help 
themselves and each other. 
Targeting messages and segmenting audiences on psychosocial, socio-
economic, and other demographic criteria are valid for almost all public 
health activities directed at behavior change. Early in a crisis, these 
activities must be truncated, but they may be employed or expanded as 
the incident evolves and during the recovery phase. 
Public information officers (PIOs) in public health agencies are 
responsible for only a portion of public information disseminated 
during most public safety emergencies. Messages related to general 
mental and physical well being and health risks are typically the 
responsibility of public health PIOs. However, the public information 
responsibility during the incident is also shared with other agencies 
at all jurisdictional levels. Therefore, public health PIOs must 
coordinate their public information and health-risk communication 
planning with jurisdictional partners to ensure consistency and reduce 
the misallocation of resources. This is particularly important when 
attempting to communicate with special populations. (Consult the U.S. 
National Response Plan ESF #8 and Publication Public Affairs Annex 
#15 for information regarding PIO responsibilities and your state or 
local emergency response plans.) 
Increasing government credibility 
A key function of language is that it allows information exchange 
within significantly larger interaction groups than is possible without 
language. Importantly, language allows people to learn without first-
hand experience. This is both positive and negative, especially related 
to communication among different groups and between individuals 
or groups with unequal power and authority. The potential for 
miscommunication or errors in understanding multiply, especially with 
greater physical and emotional distance between groups. 
Language evolves and is shaped by the situation in a number of ways: 
• The inherent nature of the audience and speaker or writer; 
• The relationship that exists between the two; 
• The purpose of the communication; 
• The nature of the topic; and 
• The channel being used. 
Importantly, language 
allows people to learn 
without first-hand 
experience. This is both 
positive and negative. 
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Relationships can be very individualized and may differ across societal 
roles and group identities. These elements are dynamic and change 
as the situation changes. Research tells us that public suspicions of 
scientific experts and government are increasing for a variety of reasons 
(Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997; Seeger et al., 2003; Tomes, 2000). 
These reasons include access to more sources of conflicting information 
and challenges to the accuracy of research studies, a reduction in the 
use of scientific reasoning in decision making, and political infighting. 
However, trust and credibility are essential elements of persuasive 
communication (Brehm et al., 2005). Confidence in government, 
traditional social institutions, and industry has severely eroded in the 
last 30 years. Peters et al. argued that “perceptions of commitment 
to a goal are . . . based on perceptions of objectivity, fairness, and 
information accuracy” (p. 43). Their research shows that the more 
respondents know about efforts to openly share accurate information, 
the more they trust the government or industry as the source. 
When power is shared, as in a democracy, two-way communication 
between the government and the people is more common than when 
power is not shared (Norris, 2002). For example, the early English 
monarchs between 1500 and 1800 typically engaged in “instructional” 
and one-way communication. As the English Crown lost power, 
between the reigns of Elizabeth 1 and George III, the instructional 
model of communication gave way to a more modern model, a two-way 
communication or give and take between the sender and receiver. Also, 
as more information became widely available (i.e., the printing press), 
the monarchy was increasingly required to consider the receiver’s point 
of view. George the III adhered to modern models of communication— 
“seeking to influence his citizens/subjects persuasively through the 
marketplace of print rather than instructing them in the meaning of the 
events” (Norris, p. 348). 
Because most institutions and government not only share power with 
their constituents, but hold a negative stereotype with the public, it is 
important for the government to defy their negative stereotypes (e.g., 
by providing accurate and balanced information in a timely way) 
to increase credibility and trust. Crisis messages from officials are 
judged based on the receiver’s perception of the trustworthiness of the 
communicating official or institution, by the speed of communication 
in response to a disaster or event (which implies competence), and 
the relevance of the message to the individual. The relevance of a 
message is directly related to the degree to which it answers important 
questions about actions to take and reduces uncertainty. Messages that 
are empathetic (take the emotional perspective of the audience), appear 
honest and open, and come from a trusted source are most effective in a 
crisis (Reynolds et al., 2002). When authority figures who are members 
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of the dominant cultural group communicate to persons in non-
dominant groups, the possibility for skepticism, wariness, and mistrust 
increases. 
Differences that Matter 
D.W. Sue and D. Sue (2003) present a model that encapsulates levels 
of similarity and differences among humans with the following three 
points: “all individuals are, in some respects, like no other individuals 
. . . all individuals are, in some respects, like some other individuals . . 
. [and] all individuals are, in some respects, like all other individuals” 
(p. 12). At a universal level, as Homo sapiens, people are alike in their: 
ability to use symbols, shared life experiences, self-awareness, and 
biological and physical similarities. At the group level similarities and 
differences begin to appear in the following areas: gender, race, sexual 
orientation, socio-economic status, age, geographic location, ethnicity, 
disability/ability, culture, religious preference, and marital status. For 
humans, uniqueness at the individual level occurs in terms of genetic 
endowment and non-shared experiences. 
Understanding the role of culture 
Specifically tailored messages for diverse populations may be more 
effective during the pre-event stage than during the initial phase of 
a crisis (Reynolds, 2004). Nonetheless, although specially tailored 
messages early in a crisis could cause confusion or mistrust, there 
may be times when it is appropriate to do so. One possible reason to 
alter emergency messages is cultural difference. Culture is defined 
in many ways, but is essentially the norms and shared history that 
help form group and group members’ attitudes, beliefs, values, and 
public behaviors (Bond & Smith, 1996; Brehm et al., 2005). Cultural 
systems vary widely. They are persistent, have tremendous influence on 
individuals and induce conformity. However, cultural influence related 
to basic emotions may be more superficial than previously understood. 
Soto, Levenson, and Ebling (2005) found that the people of Mexico 
and China, two very distinct cultures, each experience the same internal 
emotions but expressed their emotions differently due to cultural 
norms. Researchers have made strong claims that personality traits are 
universal across cultures (McCrae & Terracciano), even transcending 
age and gender. Despite differences in culture, language, history, 
and religion, persons accurately perceive others and their own traits. 
McCrae and Terracciano surveyed persons among 50 cultures including 
groups underrepresented in personality and cultural research, such as 
African and Arabic cultures. Their research supported that “features of 
personality are common to all human groups” (McCrae & Terracciano, 
p. 547). 
Messages that are 
empathetic (take the 
emotional perspective of 
the audience), appear 
honest and open, and 
come from a trusted 
source are most effective 
in a crisis. 
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Zaltman (2003) noted that culture does explain a large portion of 
behavior, but that cross-cultural research often focuses only on 
differences. He noted that a body of research from anthropology 
catalogs pages of traits that are common to all cultures, including the 
use of metaphors, feelings of empathy, use of figurative language, 
expressing emotions with their faces, and lying. Differences are 
more about the degree of expression of these traits than true internal 
differences. 
Collectivism and individualism 
Some cultural learning may influence group and individual behavior as 
it relates to preparedness and crisis survival. There are arguments for 
and against the importance and magnitude of cultural differences among 
humans (McCrae & Terrociano, 2000; D.W. Sue & D. Sue, 2003). 
Nonetheless, cultural differences in areas important to crisis response 
do exist. For example, high self-esteem, which differs across cultural 
groups, is recognized as contributing to increased disaster survival and 
well-being. In addition, strong, fearful thoughts about death influence 
groups by increasing within-group biases and conformity to cultural 
beliefs (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Cultures that are more individualistic 
tend to be more willing to help out-group members than are members of 
cultures that are more collectivist. 
Empathy was also important in effectively communicating to persons 
during a crisis (Norris, 2001). For persons from more collectivist 
cultures where threatening situations increase within-group bias, 
empathy expressed by out-group members may not be acknowledged or 
perceived as such. 
All cultures include persons who tend toward either collectivism or 
individualism in their thinking about self and others (Brehm et al., 
2005). However, some cultures do tend toward one identity structure 
which can lead to generalized differences between cultures. Asian 
and American Indian cultures are believed to be more collectivist 
than Euro-American and African American cultures. Persons who are 
more individualistic tend to score higher for self-esteem and to be less 
influenced by minority-group status stigmas (Twenge & Crocker, 2002). 
This can be an important factor in a pandemic because persons with 
high self-esteem are more likely to take steps to protect themselves. 
In addition, cultural differences in collectivism or individualism have 
direct bearing on issues of conformity among the individuals within 
the group (Bond & Smith, 1996). Bond and Smith found in their meta-
analysis of 133 studies involving 17 nations that conformity in groups 
is moderated by a number of variables in the group, including the size 
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of the majority, relation of the participant to the majority (the greater 
the similarity, the more likely the member conforms), anonymity of 
response, and stimulus materials. In a pandemic outbreak, persons who 
are more collectivist will more likely follow the accepted norms in their 
“in-group.” Pressure to conform will be high. This may be useful if the 
desired public health behavior is accepted by the group. If public health 
behavior goes against the cultural values or beliefs of the collectivist 
cultural group, the tipping point to change the behavior may be set 
much higher and may require persons from the “in-group” to persuade 
the rest of the members to change. 
Importantly, group conflicts can arise, in part, based on group core 
beliefs and shared interpretation of experiences (Brehm et al, 2005). 
When core beliefs across groups or cultures differ significantly and 
are perceived by the groups as “basic truths,” messages that conflict 
with those truths may be rejected (R.J. Eidelson & J.I. Eidelson, 2003). 
Social or cultural group identification may be protective in disaster 
situations (Norris, 2001), but may also increase in-group versus out-
group thinking, and affect coping strategies. 
Communicating in a crisis is different. People take in information, 
process it and respond to it differently during crisis situations, especially 
when they are under extreme stress (Clarke, 2003, DiGiovanni, 1999). 
In crisis situations people will attempt to simplify complex information, 
sometimes incorrectly, and cling to current beliefs, including cultural 
beliefs (Novac, 2001). At the same time, images become more 
important than words so that the face delivering the message may be 
more important than the message itself (Hill, 2002). 
Cultural differences in communication style 
Communication styles are “strongly correlated” with culture, race, 
ethnicity, and gender (Robinson & Howard-Hamilton, 2000). These 
differences include the following areas of nonverbal communication: 
paralanguage (vocal cues), proxemics (personal space), kinesics (bodily 
movements), and high-low context communication. 
Paralanguage involves verbal expressions, silences, volume, and 
intensity of speech. In Asian countries, voice volume of conversation 
is much lower than in the U.S., allowing for the possibility that 
Americans’ speech could be interpreted as aggressive. High-low context 
communication also differs by culture. A high-context culture relies 
less on message content and more on non-verbal cues. Low-context 
cultures interpret messages more explicitly. For example, “no” spoken 
by an American in a normal tone could be interpreted in some Arab 
and Asian cultures as a “yes.” In Filipino cultures, the mild “yes” is 
Importantly, group 
conflicts can arise, 
in part, based on 
group core beliefs and 
shared interpretation of 
experiences. 
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thought to be a “no.” Kinesics involves gestures and bodily movements 
which have different meanings in different cultures. Eye contact, for 
example, can be misinterpreted. Some cultures, including members of 
most tribal nations, may not make eye contact with an authority figure 
talking to them: This can be perceived as inattention to the conversation 
or noncompliance. In contrast African American males are often marked 
as hostile because of their prolonged eye contact when speaking and 
greater bodily movements. 
D.W. Sue and D. Sue (2003) summarized the following differences in 
nonverbal communication styles across races/ethnicity (p. 143): 
American Indians	 Speak softly/slower, indirect 
gaze when listening or speaking, 
interject less [and] seldom offer 
encouraging communication, 
delayed auditory (silence), manner 
of expression low-keyed indirect 
Asian-Americans and Hispanics	 Speak softly, avoidance of eye 
contact when listening or speaking 
to high-status persons, interject 
less (except the Japanese, who 
interject frequently), mild delayed 
auditory, low-keyed [and] indirect 
Caucasians	 Speak loud/fast to control listener, 
greater eye contact when listening, 
head nods/nonverbal markers, 
quick responding, objective, task 
oriented 
African Americans	 Speak with affect, direct eye 
contact (prolonged) when 
speaking but less when listening, 
interrupt (turn taking) when can, 
quicker responding, affective 
emotional, interpersonal 
Communication occurs when the sender’s message is received. 
Understanding multicultural differences in nonverbal communication 
styles, word choices, and sentence structure are important to 
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communication. While differences exist, they may be mitigated or 
exaggerated depending on an individual’s acculturation and role 
ambiguity (Nilsson & Anderson, 2004). The more dissimilar an 
individual’s culture is from the dominant culture, the more difficulty 
they may experience in receiving and interpreting communication. The 
more time spent in a culture, the greater the extent of acculturation. 
Europeans in the United States have a higher degree of acculturation 
than persons from Asia, South America, and Africa. Difficulties in 
communication in a multicultural context can affect self-efficacy 
(Nilsson & Anderson). Role ambiguity involves the level of 
understanding about what behaviors are expected in a given situation. 
The greater the ambiguity in cross-cultural communication settings, the 
more anxiety is experienced. 
Cultural beliefs may be more strongly held in a crisis than non-crisis 
situations; but, if the crisis message does not require a person to take 
actions inconsistent with their cultural beliefs, then the message should 
not be altered. In addition, trust and credibility are critical in the 
effectiveness of messages from authorities or institutions. If a cultural 
group had strong mistrust of the message’s originating source, the 
message may need to be altered, perhaps by including encouragement 
from a trusted member of that group. For example, if persons living in 
the United States without legal status needed to present identification to 
receive a vaccination against pandemic influenza, they may need to be 
reassured that their identification information would not be used for any 
other purpose. 
Although in some cultural contexts it seems important to tailor 
messages (e.g. when strong cultural beliefs may be challenged or when 
the cultural group has high mistrust for the message source), there 
is insufficient evidence that all messages in a crisis require cultural 
tailoring. Because messages may need to be developed swiftly, specific 
to an uncertain crisis situation, the effort to tailor messages could slow 
the information flow creating additional problems regarding credibility 
and trust. In addition, if messages were routinely culturally tailored in 
some crises, there may be potential for messages to be misinterpreted 
as “selective” or biased based on culture, which could increase 
mistrust or create a perception of stigmatization. For example, because 
most cases of H5N1 are occurring in Asia, if health officials tailored 
messages specific to Asian Americans it may be perceived by some 
in the population that the messages focused on their differences and 
separateness, making them feel stigmatized. 
Fast Facts 
Pandemic Planning 
Assumptions . . . 
Most, if not all, people will be 
susceptible to the pandemic 
influenza virus. 
The clinical disease attack 
rate will likely be 30% 
or higher in the overall 
population during the 
pandemic. Illness rates may 
be highest among school-
aged children and decline 
with age. Among working 
adults, an average of 20% 
will become ill during a 
community outbreak. 
Some persons will become 
infected but not develop 
clinically significant 
symptoms. Asymptomatic 
or minimally symptomatic 
individuals can transmit 
infection and develop 
immunity to subsequent 
infection. 
(www.pandemicflu.gov) 
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Defining Special Populations 
in Communication 
The term “special populations” has crept into public health emergency 
response planning documents without adequate definition. Special 
needs populations are defined within all emergency services professions 
according to the mission of the profession. Accordingly, confusion 
may occur when one professional group borrows the “list” of special 
populations from another professional group whose mission is 
different. For public information professionals, the definition of a 
special population must be based on the mission—to communicate 
public health information during an emergency, often using mass 
communication products. Our list of special needs populations may 
not match the lists of other segments of our organization because 
our objectives in a crisis are different. The American Red Cross 
would define a person as special needs if the individual could not 
be accommodated in a regular Red Cross shelter, such as a person 
requiring a mechanical ventilator. A mental health-care provider could 
identify a special needs individual as one who is suffering from pre-
existing psychiatric disorders at the time of a trauma, who therefore 
may not respond to routine disaster mental health counseling for 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For physicians planning to treat 
persons with antibiotics as a result of a disease outbreak, a special 
needs individual would be someone who is allergic to that particular 
antibiotic. Identifying a group of individuals as a “special population” 
depends on the task to be accomplished. Not all individuals have special 
needs in all types of emergencies and for all emergency activities. 
Consider: Shortly after arriving in South Korea for a 12-month 
assignment, an American was walking down the street in 
Seoul. She could not speak or read a single word of Hangul, 
the language of South Korea. Without warning, an air-raid type 
siren sounded. It was very loud. The buses and cars stopped 
in the road and riders jumped out. With only modest hurry, the 
pedestrians started to converge on specific places along the street 
and then disappeared down barely noticeable steps. The streets 
were emptying. She followed the people around her.  Some 
motioned for her to follow. She entered an underground space and 
stood with the others. After only a few minutes, a siren sounded 
and everyone began to empty back into the streets. She followed 
the group. At no time was she able to communicate in English 
with anyone. Not until the event had passed did she realize that 
she had participated in a civil defense drill. They occurr randomly 
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at about monthly intervals and are precautionary exercises to 
evacuate the streets in case of an attack by North Korea. In this 
situation, did the Seoul government need to worry about her 
or define her as a special population? Would she have been a 
special population if she had been in a hotel room and had no 
one to “motion” to her about what to do? Could a pictograph have 
explained it to her? 
The questions and the possibilities surrounding emergency response 
communication may seem endless. As communicators, we must let 
people who can help themselves, help themselves. Then we will be 
free to help the people who can’t help themselves without special 
communication messages directed toward them. 
For public health mass communication during an emergency: a special 
population is any group that cannot be reached effectively during the 
initial phases of a public safety emergency with general public health 
messages delivered through mass communication channels. Barriers 
may be related to the channels of communication or to the receiver of 
messages. In identifying special populations, one should account for 
all elements which could severely hamper the ability of these groups to 
receive and act on beneficial health/risk information such as: 
• Cognitive impairment (if a proxy/guardian is not present to 
receive the message); 
•	 Language barriers severe enough that the message could be 
incorrectly acted on (if a proxy/guardian is not present to receive 
the message); 
•	 Physical impairments (if compensating technology or human 
resources are not available); 
•	 Strong challenges to important cultural beliefs relevant to the 
event; 
•	 Environmental barriers (e.g., no TV, phone, or other typical 
communication channels); and 
•	 Pre-existing group psychological, social, or political/legal 
contexts (e.g., strong mistrust of the organization sending 
the message or fear of retribution if the receiver acts on the 
information) that could interfere with honest and respectful 
information exchange during emergency events. 
Identifying a group of 
individuals as a “special 
population” depends 
on the task to be 
accomplished. Not all 
individuals have special 
needs in all types of 
emergencies and for all 
emergency activities. 
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Belonging to a non-dominant group is not, in itself, a qualifier as a 
special population in this context. If basic emergency health messages 
can be communicated and received by non-dominant groups or 
otherwise identified special populations, then for communication 
purposes they would be part of the general population. Not all non-
dominant groups or identified special populations would need special 
communication outreach during all emergency events or for all 
emergency messages. If one was communicating about smallpox, an 
Amish population would not require special outreach unless the public 
health message was that they needed a vaccination. (Generally, Amish 
persons shun vaccinations.) However, for ethical reasons any potential 
barriers to the reception of messages in the crisis situation must be 
considered. 
Early in a crisis, communication resources will be limited and the 
potential for mixed messages that confuse the public will be great. 
The overwhelming evidence based on marketing and communication 
research is that, in an emergency, people tend to have more in common 
regarding their information needs than not. Therefore, a simple and 
consistent message would be best unless strong evidence supports 
it won’t be effectively received by an identifiable group that should 
receive the message in some other, more effective, form. 
Conclusion 
Remember, the above definition of special populations is related to 
public information and health-risk communication activities only. Also, 
as the public safety event evolves, cultural concerns and group beliefs 
may become more important to ensuring messages are received and 
acted on. There are several important limitations in this discussion 
regarding the need for culturally tailored messages during a crisis. 
Some populations may be unable to receive general public health 
emergency messages through mass communication channels during the 
initial phase of a public health emergency; however, communications 
professionals must consider that emergencies are chaotic and planning 
should be directed at simplifying roles and responsibilities to achieve 
the greatest good for the greatest number while maintaining enough 
resources to reach those few who can’t help themselves. In addition, 
to avoid confusion early in a crisis, accurate, relevant, simple, fast 
and consistent messages are best. Despite efforts to tailor emergency 
messages, response officials must also understand that communication 
alone may not remove all cognitive and affective barriers to preventing 
illness, injury, or death among population groups. 
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However, until more research is conducted, it appears that culturally 
tailoring messages during emergencies could have both risks and 
benefits which communications professional responsible for creating 
emergency health messages will have to weigh in their planning. With 
crises such as pandemic influenza looming, which will involve many 
culturally diverse groups, additional research on these issues seems 
urgent. 






Special Populations Assessment Tool

This special populations assessment sheet may help in identifying those groups of individuals who require differing messages from the 
general public information message or who can not be reached through mass communication channels. In conducting the assessment, 
consulting individuals within a population, or representative organizations, may be helpful in understanding how the population may 
receive information during emergencies. Allow the populations in question to have a say in whether they do or do not need special 
assistance, especially early in a crisis. Be realistic about what can be accomplished early in a crisis and, remember, never promise 
what you can’t deliver. 
After conducting your emergency public information assessment, some population groups: 
•	 May qualify as a special population for purposes related to public health's public information and health-risk communication 
activities; 
•	 May have status as a special population from an operational perspective but may not qualify as a special population for 
purposes related to public health's public information and health-risk communication, or 
•	 May qualify as a special population for purposes related to public health's public information and health-risk communication 
activities, including early in a crisis, but resources are not available within the PIO activity to meet their communication 
needs. Emergency management planners in the jurisdiction should be alerted to these groups to permit alternate planning. 
Assessment and Planning Worksheet: 
Identifying barriers to emergency mass communication 
1. Describe the population group (estimated number/percent in your jurisdiction) 
What is different? 
Primary understood language ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Degree of English comprehension? 
o	 None o Simple written understanding 
o	 Simple verbal understanding o Proxy/guardian NOT available to receive message 
Major Cultural/Religious Taboos (dietary, medical practices, human interaction) ___________________________________________ 
Unique lifestyle characteristics (tourist, homeless, isolationist, migrant, undocumented) _____________________________________ 
Mobility (physical, transportation, civil rights) ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Describe the emergency event and recovery actions for planning purposes: 
Would any aspect of the disaster, response, and recovery create a communication challenge for the population described above? 
Disease Outbreak 
o	 transmission from person to person, o transmission by animals, o transmission by environment 
o	 no transmission between persons, o transmission by insects, o unknown 
Natural Disaster 
o	 fire o flood o wind o earth (quake, mudslides) 





o Nuclear/Radiological Incident 
Infrastructure Collapse 
o cyber terrorism, o water/sewer plant contaminated, o medical resources unavailable 
o power outage, o food contaminated 
o Explosion

o Harmful Chemical release

Emergency event “action” recommendations:

o Shelter in place o	 Remove contaminated clothing in public setting 
o Evacuate o	 Receive immunization 
o Ingest specific food o	 Report to public place to receive treatment 
o Do not ingest specific food o	 Bring identification to authorities to receive treatment 
o Avoid specific animals, plants, insects, bodies of water o	 Remain at home to receive treatment 
o Turn in to authorities or destroy specific animals, o	 Stay “tuned” for updates 
plants, insects 




3. Describe barriers inherent in the message 
Will the content of the message in its present form-- if delivered--still not be received and acted on, based on assessment of the 
population described above? 
Language: ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Action recommendation is perceived as an affront to a major cultural/religious belief _______________________________________ 
Action recommendation is perceived as an egregious blow to economic security and/or civil rights not shared by all _______________ 
4. Describe barriers in the distribution channels for the population described above 
What breaks down in the mass communication delivery systems for an acceptable emergency action message? 
o No access to an electronic mass communication channel (TV, radio, Internet) 
o Power outage/communication infrastructure damaged or overwhelmed 
o No address at which to receive information by mail or automatic phone messages 
o Not served by specialized media (in understood language) 
5. Describe barriers inherent in the population, as described above 
What would prevent them from receiving an initial action recommendation from authorities during a public safety emergency? 
o Language (no English comprehension or proxy) 
o Cognitive impairment (can’t comprehend/remember message and no proxy) 








o	 Strongly held cultural/religious taboos (action interferes with it) 
o	 Fear of coming forward for help (outstanding warrants, child support defaults, runaways, undocumented workers/families) 
o	 Physical impairments without compensating technology/ human resource support 
o	 No way to identify where/how to reach the population with alternate messages or communication delivery systems (e.g., no 
geographic gathering place, no way to identify as “without mass communication access,” no way to know person is not under 
constant proxy/guardian care such as an individual who is blind and cognitively impaired and lives alone with only intermittent 
and un-invested outside care) 
o	 Phobias, relevant to event, that can’t be overcome through mass communication 
6. Describe the communication alternatives for populations that will not receive or take the action recommended and 
communicated to the general population 
Can you, with available resources: change the message, change the population characteristic, or change the delivery system to reach 
the population described above? 
o	 Message 
o	 Translate into understood language 
o	 Translate into pictographs 
o	 Change message to respect cultural taboos 
o	 Acknowledge cultural taboo and explain reason it is being superseded and what would happen if the offensive action was not 
taken (use validator) 
o	 Channels (that serve targeted population) 
o	 Flyers (for door to door distribution) 






Places of worship (church, hall, temple, mosque) ___________________________________________________________________ 
Retailers ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Government services agencies (post office, community health center) ____________________________________________________ 






Translators (contract or volunteers) _______________________________________________________________________________ 
Identified proxies or guardians (community leaders, family) ___________________________________________________________ 
7. Prioritize identified “special populations” for public health information and health risk communication activities during a 
public safety emergency 
Which populations can public health reach through its public information and health risk communication efforts? Which populations 
can’t be reached within public health’s public information capabilities and should be referred to the jurisdictional emergency 
operation planners? 
Percentage of the population in the jurisdiction _________% 
Messages can be altered during the pre-event stage 
o No 
o Yes 
Adequate resources can be identified, made available, and described in communication plans 
o No 
o Yes _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8. Identify the human resources needed to reach the population through the above selected alternate communication channels 
(#6) with initial messages during an intense public safety emergency 
Which people will act as a communication delivery system for messages to the population described above who cannot receive 
emergency messages intended for the general population through routine mass communication channels? 
Organizations engaged to provide human resources __________________________________________________________________ 
o Memorandums of understanding are in place 
o People are trained and can be notified during the emergency event if needed 
o Persons within the population group described above accept the alternate delivery systems and believe they are necessary and will 
work 
o Alternate delivery systems have participated in drills/exercises 
o Alternate delivery systems can be sustained, if needed, for days 
9. Provide jurisdictional Emergency Management Operations planners with information regarding populations you have 
identified who may have special communication needs, but who can not be served through public health’s public information 
and health risk communication channels 
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Best Practices:  Customer Communication at the POD 
Make Your Job Easier With These Steps: 
Reach out—Smile, touch forearms or shoulders, use names 
Expect anger—Anger is generated by fear and unwanted dependence on others 
Speak slowly—You have it all memorized, your customer does not 
Please is pleasant—Please remember to say please every time with direct eye contact 
Engage customers—Ask them to help you. Give them things to do to help others 
Consistency is vital—All should hear the same thing and be treated the same way (no favorites) 
Take time for yourself—Respect yourself and avoid burnout with rest breaks 
Understand Your Customers’ Feelings 
• Crises cause fear, confusion, dread, denial 
• Uncertainty is the greatest concern for most in a crisis 
• They are seeking restored self-control 
• Stress makes it harder to learn new tasks 
• Authority figures can be intimidating 
• Intimidated people say “yes” and may think “no” 
• Any useful information is empowering 
• Family members and pets are priorities 
R.E.S.P.E.C.T	and	Understanding	Helps	You	and	Me 
A positive POD Experience Can Help: 
• Increase resiliency in the community and speed recovery 
• Reduce feelings of hopelessness and helplessness 
• Improve individual therapy completion (compliance) 
• Allow customers to ask questions now, not later 
• Save lives and reduce illness 
• Validate your contribution to others’ well-being 
Top Tips: 
• Show empathy and caring 
• Be honest and open to all 
• Don’t over reassure 
• Express wishes (I wish I had answers) 
• Explain how to get answers 
• Acknowledge people’s fear 
• Give people things to do 
• Ask more of people—Ask for their support 
• Under promise and over deliver 
• Be flexible and tolerate differences 
Special Concerns: 
• Avoid jargon and acronyms 
• Give directions in the positive 
• Simple directions are best for all 
• Consider the hearing and visually impaired 
• Consider the cognitively impaired 
Your	Kindness	Today	Will	be	Rewarded 
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Deep mental anguish, as that arising from bereavement. 
Severe Pandemic: What is Different? 
•	 The sheer magnitude of predicted deaths for the United States 
and the world. 
•	 The certainty of deaths combined with greater uncertainty during 
planning regarding who is at risk because of nearly universal 
susceptibility to the virus and unknown virus characterizations. 
•	 The potential for key members of the society to die, leaving 
critical gaps in community infrastructures and social 
frameworks. 
During the next severe influenza pandemic, modeling estimates indicate 
that nearly 2 million people in the United States alone are expected 
to die if conditions remain as they are today (e.g., limited ability to 
produce vaccine early in the pandemic, limited supplies or efficacy 
of antivirals, and limited community mitigation measures taken) 
(HHS, 2006). In the last 35 years, during the world’s worst ten natural 
disasters, approximately 1.3 million people died (see Box 1). In fact, 
after 1959, the world’s thirteen worst natural disasters do not add up to 
the estimated 2 million deaths expected in the United States in the next 
severe pandemic. In addition, during a severe pandemic, deaths from 
influenza and its complications may affect a very different population 
than the one that bears the burden during seasonal influenza outbreaks. 
Objectives:

•	 Describe types 
of loss, grief, and 
bereavement concerns 
for individuals and 
communities during 
a severe influenza 
pandemic. 
•	 Recognize the 
cultural differences in 
bereavement rituals. 
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Table 1. Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, 
and Death Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influ-
enza Scenarios* 
Characteristic Moderate (1958/68-like) Severe (1918-like) 
Illness 90 million (30%) 90 million (30%) 
Outpatient medical care 45 million (50%) 45 million (50%) 
Hospitalization 865,000 9,900,000 
ICU care 128,750 1,485,000 
Mechanical ventilation 64,875 745,500 
Deaths 209,000 1,903,000 
* Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note 
that these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not avail-
able during the 20th century pandemics. 
Source: United States Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza 
Plan. 
During seasonal influenza epidemics, approximately 36,000 deaths 
occur, of which 95% occur among persons 65 years of age or older, 
usually from complications of secondary bacterial pneumonia. In a 
severe influenza pandemic that may not be the case. Communities 
and the nation will face what experts call “death out of time,” as large 
numbers of healthy adults and children also die from the disease. The 
death of someone who is not advanced in age or sickly (e.g., the death 
of an otherwise healthy child) can be much more difficult to cope with. 
People communicating with individuals or communities experiencing 
the extreme pain and grief that accompanies loss through death must be 
especially aware of how grief is suffered. 
Grief is experienced in a broad social context. The view of a particular 
society, culture, or subculture, with expectations of “appropriate 
grieving,” influences the experience of loss and the “performance” 
of grief for those in that society. Grief is a universal emotion, but no 
two people experience grief in exactly the same manner. The grieving 
process includes: 
• Bereavement – The state that results from a significant loss and 
encompasses a wide range of reactions, emotional, cognitive, 
spiritual, behavioral, and physical. Bereavement is a normal, 
natural experience, although it is traumatic and emotionally 
disruptive. 
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•	 Grief – The intrapsychic process of regaining equilibrium after 
a loss. Manifestation includes emotional catharsis and obsessive 
thoughts of the deceased. Re-evaluating spiritual issues and 
experiencing physical symptoms may also occur. 
•	 Mourning – The public expression or sharing of the feelings of 
grief. Such rituals as funeral services or the wearing of black are 
expressions of mourning. 
•	 Anticipatory grief – An experience that occurs before the 
expected death of a loved one and is a projection of emotional 
pain and the life change that the loss will bring. 
The outcome of the grief process is ultimately growth, but is affected 
by both the individual and the context of the death. Contexts that have 
influence on the grief process include: 
•	 The circumstances of the death 
•	 The nature of the relationship with the deceased 
•	 Prior loss experienced by the individual 
•	 Secondary losses accompanying death (e.g., no longer fits into 
social group, loss of dream). 
Growth in the grieving process is also facilitated by the burdens or 
tasks individuals or communities undertake in coming to terms with 
the reality of the loss, experiencing the pain of grief, adjusting to an 
environment without the deceased, and transferring emotional energy 
from the relationship with the deceased to new or existing relationships. 
In addition to the mental and emotional reactions to loss, possible 
physical reactions that may occur in the grieving process, include: 
•	 Numbness 
•	 Tightness in the throat or chest 
•	 Shortness of breath 
•	 Sensitivity to loud noises 
•	 Difficulty concentrating and forgetfulness 
•	 Restlessness and agitation. 
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The above variables determine whether a person experiences 
“normal” or uncomplicated grief, “abnormal” or complicated grief, or 
pathological grief. 
The Complexity of Loss and Grieving 
Although death is a natural human condition, it does represent a 
physical, emotional, and spiritual loss for individuals and for the 
community. The contexts in which death occurs are as influential and 
varied as are the internal aspects of the person left behind to grieve. 
Sudden, traumatic loss is an affront to a person’s sense of world order. 
Factors that may affect an individual’s grieving process include how one 
is related to the deceased; the perceived quality of that relationship; the 
type of death that occurred (e.g., sudden by accident, suicide, lingering 
illness); the age of the deceased; and the grieving person’s personality 
traits, earlier experiences with death, and historical approaches to 
grieving (Muller & Thompson, 2003). On a rating scale measuring the 
cumulative stress of 43 potential stressors, the death of a spouse ranked 
number one (Muller & Thompson, 2003). 
Societal influences on coping 
How one copes with the death of an individual will also be affected 
by societal influences such as general attitudes about death, about 
the dead person’s value to the community, and community cultural 
norms (e.g., funeral rites). During the early stage of a severe pandemic 
outbreak, there may be some stigma associated with the death for fear 
of contagion. This could complicate normal societal rituals. Persons 
may shun contact with the family when they would normally reach out 
to them. However, this complicating factor may diminish if the number 
of deaths in the community quickly increases. 
In a severe influenza pandemic, deaths will occur in families and 
communities in waves, mostly within the 6 to 8 weeks the community 
becomes exposed to the virus. The community’s grieving and 
bereavement rituals will likely evolve either through the sheer weight 
of the numbers of dead, which could truncate bereavement rituals, or 
through a kinship that will arise from the horrible equalizer of this 
shared experience. Response officials who are striving to prevent deaths 
may be inclined to ignore the bereavement process in their community 
or feel unprovoked guilt from the reality of the multiplying deaths. 
Public health and other response professionals must prepare themselves 
to confront the realities of these deaths and to assist the community in 
its bereavement process. In some communities, leaders may become 
“mourners-in-chief,” and will be expected to lead community mourning 
events along with clergy. 
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Compassionate communication 
Importantly, those who communicate about the number of deaths in 
their community should be cautious about the wording of their reports. 
They must show a level of sensitivity regarding the individuals who 
constitute the total number of deaths. As the first deaths occur, people 
will expect more information to characterize the deaths (e.g., age, role 
in the community, gender). They will be trying to assess their own 
risk according to the types of people who are dying. After all, there’s 
nothing like someone who is one’s age to die from a heart attack, to 
make one consider his or her own vulnerability. 
As the death toll increases, reports to the community should provide 
the total number, but should also continue to acknowledge the loss of 
vital members of the community in general statements. Communicators 
must be sensitive to the “look” of the report. If reports are posted 
to an Internet site, the page should be respectful of the human loss, 
ensuring that reports of human loss come before mention of economic 
loss; how one enters the site and gets to the official report should also 
be considered. The page should be less bureaucratic looking than a 
county’s tax adjustor numeric page. It will be important that nothing on 
or around the page is commercial or of light humor. Respecting the dead 
from a response organization’s perspective must include respecting that 
the number reported is more than a number, it represents community 
members. 
Understanding the grief and mourning process and the cultural realities 
of bereavement rituals will be critical to ensuring communication is 
empathetic and respectful. The reality is that the public health and 
response officials charged with supporting the community through the 
pandemic may also be experiencing loss in their family, workplace, or 
immediate community. 
Unexpected financial loss 
While it may seem odd, in developed nations economic loss must be 
considered within the grieving process. Persons who suffer severe 
economic loss, especially if the likelihood of recovery is slim (e.g., no 
business insurance), can experience emotional impact akin to losing a 
loved one (Norris, 2002). People grieving both the loss of a loved one 
and economic loss will need to begin to imagine a future life without 
a loved one and economic security. They will have to rebuild their life 
without the support of a loved one and their lost wealth. This further 
complicates a severe flu pandemic in which the U.S. government 
predicts the nation may suffer a decrease in gross domestic production 
by $600 billion. This figure is equivalent to the annual GDP of the 
While it may seem odd, 
in developed nations 
economic loss must be 
considered within the 
grieving process. 
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state of Florida (Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of 
Commerce, 2006). The economic impact from the terrorist attack on 
Sept. 11, 2001, was substantially less than $200 billion.  When public 
health and response officials consider the toll on their community they 
will have to calculate and acknowledge the loss of people and the loss 
of economic security. While it may be unseemly for a public official 
to talk about economic loss too soon after the community has suffered 
loss of life, at some point it will be necessary to acknowledge it. When 
the time is right, this communication should also be empathetic and 
respectful. 
Theories of Grief and Mourning 
Bereavement, mourning, and grief are culturally based. Although loss 
of a loved one in all cultures involves strong feelings of sadness, the 
emotions and activities surrounding that loss can be quite different. Loss 
is normal and most individuals resolve their grief without complications 
and with the aid of supportive families and social structures. However, 
definitions of complicated grief vary, as do the estimated numbers of 
persons who experience it. 
Stages approach to mourning 
Bowlby (1980, as reported in Broderick & Blewitt, 2003), mapped four 
phases in the grief process: shock, protest, despair, and reorganization. 
Although, therapists once expected the grieving process to occur in 
stages and conclude in 2.5 years, more recent research indicates that, 
depending on the type of death involved (e.g., especially traumatic or 
death out of time), grieving may persist for much longer. 
Dual process model of coping with bereavement 
Stroebe and Shut (2001) describe the competing forces that grieving 
individuals face: the need to get on with life and the desire to remain 
connected to the person who died. The Dual Process Model (DPM) 
focuses on the stressors the bereaved individual experiences, and 
maintains that adaptive coping with loss requires oscillation between 
loss-oriented versus restoration-oriented coping activities. Both 
inhibited and chronic complicated grief can be understood within these 
two processes. Interestingly, the researchers found that women may tend 
to cope in more “loss-oriented” ways and men in “restoration-oriented” 
ways. This model, for bereaved individuals, focuses on adapting to what 
is changing in oneself and reorganizing one’s environment to fit the new 
reality. This reorganization naturally occurs within familial, social, and 
cultural environments. 
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In a severe pandemic, the inclination may be to push grieving 
individuals and the community to move toward restoration and ignore 
the alternate process of loss-orientation. Public health and response 
officials should attend to both processes by engaging in symbolic 
gestures and ceremonies that acknowledge individual and community 
loss (when it is medically safe to do so). They should also bolster the 
reorientation process by helping find meaningful roles for community 
members who are grieving. Communication professionals, therefore, 
should provide dual messages to those suffering a loss—acknowledge 
that people want to continue to mourn their loss and offer them 
opportunities to refocus by encouraging them to help the community. 
Individuals who have lost a loved one may want to wear a black ribbon 
or other symbol of mourning. In the 1918 pandemic, black ribbons 
were tied on front doors so that community members could feel close to 
their loved one, share their loss with others, and continue to help in the 
response. In a future influenza pandemic new media like weblogs and 
personal web pages may offer individuals and communities alternative 
ways to acknowledge deaths. 
Integrative model of grief 
Most grief models are centered on the individual and ignore the role of 
family processes. Yet, families and their grief processes are inextricably 
linked to individual grief and recovery (Moos, 2001). Families are made 
up of interdependent members who are rule-governed, so that when a 
death occurs, the entire family system must go through reorganization. 
In contrast to individual symptoms of grief, family grief symptoms 
include noticeable changes in communication, such as an increase or 
decrease in family communication, topic avoidance, and who talks to 
whom. The family may experience hierarchal confusion, role confusion, 
and acting out by members (Moos, 2001). Individual grievers 
reorganize through a process of activities centered on loss-avoidance or 
restoration, while the family process includes acknowledgement of the 
death and realignment of intrafamilial roles. Moos noted that families 
that are less-differentiated, or more dependent on one another, are more 
emotionally invested in the family system and, therefore may be more 
emotionally reactive following the death of a family member. In a 
severe pandemic, where the potential exists for multiple deaths within 
a family, communities may face exceptional situations related to loss 
and reconstruction. The community as family, depending on its size 
and level of attachment among members, may face a similar process, 
including the realignment of intracommunity roles. 
In a severe pandemic, 
where the potential 
exists for multiple 
deaths within a family, 
communities may face 
exceptional situations 
related to loss. 
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The death of a child 
Children are not supposed to die . . . Parents expect to see their 
children grow and mature. Ultimately, parents expect to die and 
leave their children behind . . . The loss of a child is the loss of 
innocence, the death of the most vulnerable and dependent. 
The death of a child signifies the loss of the future, of hopes, and 
dreams, or new strength . . . (Arnold & Gemma, 1994). 
When a child dies, the natural order is turned upside down. Parents 
often work to make the life of their child, if only brief, meaningful. The 
grief experienced by parents who have lost a child changes them. In 
an influenza pandemic, where many parents may be experiencing the 
death of a child, it may be more difficult to make meaning out of their 
individual loss or they may find comfort in the shared grieving of other 
parents. Communication response officials must be aware of the special 
loss of children and create symbols and mourning ceremonies that mark 
the special loss of the youngest in the community due to the pandemic. 
Disenfranchised grief 
In most societies, those persons with an emotional or familial bond 
to the dead person are understood to be in mourning and are expected 
to participate in mourning rituals, such as wearing certain clothes or 
walking behind the coffin on its way to the burial ground. However, 
at the same time, most cultures do not embrace all deaths and do 
not acknowledge everyone who may be grieving the death of an 
individual. People who experience loss that is not socially recognized 
will experience disenfranchised grief, or grief that is not allowed to 
be expressed openly (Doka, 1996). The lack of social acceptance may 
be attributed to the definition of the relationship dyad, in the case of a 
gay couple or extramarital couple, or by the circumstances of death. 
In disenfranchised grief, neither the relationship, nor the loss, nor the 
griever is recognized. Persons experiencing disenfranchised grief, and 
therefore lack social support, may be more likely to seek professional 
counseling (Doka, 1996). 
In addition, during an influenza pandemic, the community may overlook 
the grief of persons who lost loved ones from medical or other causes 
besides influenza. In the early stages of the pandemic, family members 
who die of cancer, heart disease or other chronic illnesses, or accidents 
or suicides may feel slighted by the organized attention to those who 
died from pandemic influenza. Therefore, people must be careful 
not to assume that all deaths in the community occurred due to the 
pandemic and should continue to reach out to persons who are suffering 
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losses from other causes. Communication professionals may want to 
acknowledge the loss of persons from the pandemic and “all families 
who are experiencing a loss at this time.” 
Death acceptance or avoidance 
In the United States, the dominant culture behaves as if death is taboo 
(Prothero, 2001). Other cultures are more accepting of death and may 
often include references to one’s own death in day-to-day conversations. 
Those involved in acknowledging deaths from pandemic influenza 
should strive to understand grief, bereavement, and mourning among 
persons of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. They must also 
be prepared to approach grief within the context of acculturation, 
cultural norms, values, and beliefs. Those who identify more with 
the dominant culture may not observe some of the cultural rituals 
described so we must respect individual differences. Researchers have 
described myriad cultural contexts in which death and bereavement 
can be explored, including by religion, sex, age, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation. In a severe influenza pandemic if cultural bereavement 
rituals are not possible or can not be accommodated response officials 
should acknowledge the cultural breach and make every effort to fulfill 
these rituals to the extent possible. Social distancing requirements 
to prevent the spread of infection may restrict travel and the coming 
together of family and friends to mourn their loss. Communication 
professionals must make clear the need and value of social distancing if 
it is employed without insulting either the dead or accepted mourning 
rituals. They should emphasize the help to the living provided by 
forgoing mourning rituals at the time. 
Selected Cultural Contexts 
for Death and Bereavement 
The acceptability of the bereavement process depends on the culture 
in which one was raised and lives. For diverse persons in the United 
States, cultural traditions of bereavement may conflict with the 
dominant group expectations. In the United States, non-dominant 
groups may struggle with their and the dominant group’s opposing 
expectations around death. One’s ethnicity may touch on every aspect 
of dying and death, including how one handles the dead body, the 
disposal of the body, and the rituals to mark the loss. Following is a 
brief survey of bereavement rituals by culture. (Note: these are not 
further subdivided by religion; nonetheless, religious differences should 
be considered as they relate to bereavement and mourning rituals. See 
Box 2 for further discussion about religious differences.): 
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Generic characteristics of bereavement 
in the United States 
The Euro-American cultural orientation values youth, joy, and material 
accomplishments (Bolling, 1996). The dominant culture in the United 
States attempts to ignore death (Parkes, 1997), and most persons have 
little interaction with dying, death, and or the dead body (Prothero, 
2001). The funeral director typically takes on the primary role of 
collecting and preserving the body for viewing (depending on religious 
affiliation) and interment. At the funeral home or at a place of worship, 
prayers are said, hymns are sung, and a short, uplifting, homily is given. 
The body is then driven to the cemetery, followed by mourners in cars 
with their lights on. Another brief prayer is said at the gravesite, which 
is usually covered in green carpet to disguise the freshly dug ground. 
The family and other mourners leave before the casket is lowered and 
the grave is filled with dirt. Flower arrangements are sent by those who 
could not attend and, often, families ask for donations to meaningful 
causes in lieu of flowers. The care given to the dead, among the U.S. 
dominant group, typically ends the moment the body is committed 
to the earth (Prothero, 2001). Some may return to the grave to pray 
and display flowers or other symbols of love and remembrance. An 
important distinction between Western attitudes toward death and that 
of others is that most world cultures and religions allow for a transition 
period during which the dead intermingle with the living, who are 
expected to continue to interact with them. Death, for most cultures, 
is spread out in time (Bolling, 1996). In Western culture, death is an 
affront and a failure to scientific revolution, and to be avoided. Death 
is more abrupt, devoid of ritual, and, for many Euro-Americans, the 
mourning process is more compressed in time (Bolling, 1996). Even 
though on an individual level, Westerners may “feel the presence” of the 
dead person, they may rarely discuss it for fear of being thought odd. 
Secularism, and its attending beliefs, is fundamental to the way Euro-
Americans, even those who may follow a particular religion, approach 
death, grief, and bereavement, and death is profoundly affected by 
secular beliefs (Parkes, 1997). With important secular beliefs, reason 
takes precedence over tradition so that when head and heart are in 
conflict, the head wins. Strong emotions of any kind are contrary to 
reasoned living, the sacred is divided from the secular and treated with 
suspicion, and rituals are distrusted. Therefore, what may be logical 
among the dominant culture to prevent disease transmission during an 
influenza pandemic (not coming together for a funeral due to social 
distancing recommendations) may seem illogical to some non-dominant 
groups who may struggle to comply with such an expectation. 
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African-American traditions 
For African Americans, death is a rite of passage. Although there 
may be a wide range of views regarding death, African-Americans 
typically have a more accepting orientation toward death than does 
the U.S. dominant-culture (Barrett, 1996) and many believe in the 
soul’s continuity after death (Bolling, 1996). Metaphors such as “going 
home” and “passing” often describe this process. The continuity of 
birth and death and the funeral are highly invested in and have high 
social significance. African Americans, with the legacy of slavery and a 
continuing struggle against racism, choose their death rituals as a way to 
afford individuals high respect. 
For most African-Americans, emotional support comes from the 
place of worship, extended family, and the community. The external 
expression of mourning in most cultures is the funeral. Since death is a 
socially significant event in the African-American community, the social 
gathering after the funeral is a primary ritual, akin to a family reunion. 
Funerals among African-Americans may be held beyond the time frame 
of dominant-group custom in the United States, to allow for relatives 
travelling from distant locations to attend the funeral (Barrett, 1996). 
One’s presence at a funeral is looked upon almost as a duty, with much 
family and social pressure to appear (Perry, 1993).  
Although the family’s role is important, death in the community context 
allows for a cathartic release for the entire community (Bolling, 1996). 
During the funeral service, archetypal hymns, such as “Let the Circle Be 
Unbroken,” may be sung and members often openly express their grief. 
Today, if a funeral in the African-American community is not given 
prominence and sufficient time and accoutrements (e.g. an expensive 
casket) are not invested in, community members may comment, “‘That 
was a very White funeral’ or “‘There was no soul in the service’” 
(Bolling, 1996, p. 157). 
At the burial site, the family or friends may incorporate an African 
grave tradition by placing a glass of water (which symbolizes the 
African metaphorical description of death as going down to the river) 
at the grave, burning a white candle, or placing a white flower in a 
special place. The grave site ceremony usually ends with a prayer, 
and following the funeral, African-Americans may continue to visit 
the grave site, especially on important dates, such as the deceased’s 
birthday. 
Organized rituals, especially those that allow for expressions of 
violent grief, may be helpful in the grieving process and in beginning 
reorganization (Perry, 1993). African-American mourning rituals are 
The continuity of birth 
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very elaborate. When the community gets the news that someone has 
died, community members, usually women, prepare meals and assist 
the mourners, along with clergy, in working through their distress. 
However, these rituals are more common among African-Americans 
who attend evangelical-type churches (e.g., Pentecostal, Missionary 
Baptist, and Church of God). African-Americans who live in the North, 
who belong to more mainstream churches, and who have become more 
similar to the dominant-group are less likely to engage in such distinct 
rituals. 
Latino traditions 
Hispanic groups are not homogenous and variations exist regarding 
grief, mourning, and bereavement (Parkes, 1997). The traditional 
Mexican culture is more accepting toward death because, as Kubler-
Ross (1969) categorized, the population tends to be rural, poorer, 
and highly religious. The Mexican culture is rooted in both the 
ritualized human sacrifices of the Aztecs and the parading of statues 
of the crucified Christ down the street on holy days by the Spanish 
(Younoszai, 1993). Death is ever-present in Mexican culture, art, 
literature, and celebrations (e.g., Day of the Dead), and Roman Catholic 
religious traditions, such as praying to the saints: 
Death is seen as a companion, or sometimes as a lover. 
Sometimes death is viewed as a woman and sometimes as a man. 
. . Death is death. And it must always be included as a part of the 
Mexican reality (Younoszai, 1993, p. 76). 
Mourners who are Catholic bring candles to the church to light and 
Novenas (prayers) are said during the nine-day morning period after 
the death. While open expressions of grief and crying are acceptable 
for everyone (Van Barresen, 2002), during a wake, less emphasis is 
placed on grief and the deceased and more on the social aspects of 
the coming together of friends and family. Even as more and more 
Mexican-American mourning rituals and religious services resemble 
those of Euro-American Roman Catholic services (Younoszai, 1993), 
the participation of extended family members is still important and 
family are more likely to make the attempt to be at the funeral than 
Euro-Americans. 
Asian traditions 
Religious shrines and temples densely populate all parts of Asia, and 
Asians place great importance on religion. Family and family unity are 
very important in Asian cultures, and this importance continues into 
death. Ancestor worship is a strong tradition, undertaken to maintain 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 118 
Cultural Bereavement Rituals 
family cohesion by incorporating images of deceased kin as symbols of 
perpetual family memory (Parry & Ryan, 1996). Asian cultural beliefs 
and rituals surrounding death and dying do vary by region. 
Chinese-American traditions 
Chinese persons mix their religious belief systems and rituals from 
Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Chinese believe that the family, 
along with the physician, are responsible for the care of the dying and, 
less like the Euro-American tradition, the family should have a strong 
say in decisions about the individual family member’s care (Tanner, 
1996). Chinese have a strong belief in the afterlife. They believe that 
the soul has two forces, good and bad, or hot and cold. When a person 
dies, the soul separates from the body. However, if the funeral rites are 
not lavish enough or carried out correctly, the negative force of the soul 
will reenter the body and haunt the living relatives of the deceased. To 
what extent these beliefs perpetuate is not well known; however, lavish 
Chinese funeral rites continue in the United States (Tanner, 1996) where 
Chinese families use funeral homes that understand their cultural needs. 
There the family places blue and white flowers around the coffin before 
the funeral. This is the only time where it is acceptable for Chinese 
men to openly express their grief. During the funeral, the women wail 
and the men remain silent. Drums, music, and firecrackers make up 
the funeral procession. The length of the procession is indicative of the 
wealth and esteem of the family. Three days after the burial, the family 
picnics on the grave and leaves symbolic paper gifts, such as little 
houses. Ceremonies also occur on the 21st, 35th, and 49th day after the 
death. 
Korean-American traditions 
Koreans are highly spiritual. Although Korean-Americans in general 
may not be affiliated with any particular religious group, religion shapes 
their spiritual systems (Lee, 1996). Underlying all traditional 
Korean forms of religious practices is shamanism, which 
emphasizes the harmonious balance between all living things. 
Koreans place great value on modernization in all areas of 
their lives and have modified even death and funeral rituals. 
In an initial ceremony called Bok, the living call back the soul 
of the deceased in hopes that it will return, and wait for the 
soul for three to five days. A chief mourner and visitors gather 
around the family during this time and offer food and gifts of 
money for the funeral ceremony. Koreans practice ancestor 
worship with strong emphasis on filial piety. Annual holidays 
exist to honor and remember the dead. 
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American Indian traditions 
American Indians’ view of time is different from mainstream society. 
For American Indians, time is flowing, always with us, and relative 
(Sue, D.W., & Sue, D., 2003). This sense of time also influences 
American Indian beliefs regarding death. The American Indian 
medicine wheel is a representation of their circular view of life 
and death. Many American Indians believe that life after death is a 
continuation of life, that life continues in a new form, and death does 
not exist (Showalter, 1998). American Indians respect age and engage 
in important rituals around birth and death. In addition, reciprocity is 
important, with mutual giving and taking during the mourning process, 
especially of food and drink. As a collectivist society, group needs are 
more important than individual needs, as represented in death rituals 
illustrated in the following exchange: 
A non-Indian man asked an old Cherokee woman. “How long do 
you think it will take your loved one to eat those plates of food you 
set out every evening? The old woman . . . quietly replied, “Ah, 
I think it will take maybe the same time as it will for your aunt’s 
soul to smell those flowers you take to the grave on Sundays.” 
(Showalter, 1998, p. 76) 
American Indians do not freely discuss their pain, discomfort, or 
need for grief intervention (Brokenleg & Middleton, 1993). Rather, 
a common custom among many American Indian tribes is to cut 
one’s hair short following the loss of a loved one, as a ceremonious 
expression of grief. 
Communicating About Death 
one-on-one 
In a catastrophic event, as many people are ill, dying, or in need of 
treatment, it may be your job to talk to individuals about what is 
happening. There is a great body of work regarding expressing empathy 
and empowering decision-making between the medical professional 
and the patient in a medical care setting; however, most of this work 
assumes the luxury of time that is non-existent in an emergency 
situation. Some people, who may not have much experience in this 
patient-professional dialogue, may be recruited for the first time to 
educate patients or groups during a crisis. In addition, if an evolving 
disease outbreak in a community begins to effect members of your 
response teams or their families, supervisors and team leaders may find 
themselves in a supportive role. The following are some basic thoughts 
about communication styles in an intimate but highly emotional health 
emergency situation: 
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Empathize with the patient and family. Fast Facts 
•	 People only engage in serious, meaningful communication for 
short spans of time. 
•	 Small talk and chitchat can be a treasure trove of meaningful 
“hints” about what a person is worried about or may want to talk 
about. 
•	 Privacy is important. Assure that information shared will be kept 
private. 
•	 Allow communication free from interruptions (e.g., crying 
shouldn’t be interrupted). 
•	 Try not to answer questions outside your area of expertise. Get 
permission from the individual to refer him or her to an expert. 
Listen carefully. 
•	 Place the speaker’s needs above your own. 
•	 Use open and accepting body language (e.g., no crossed arms). 
•	 Always be honest in responding. 
•	 Try not to interrupt or give advice. 
•	 Accept moments of silence. 
•	 As much as 90% of all communication is nonverbal. Look for 
cues in body language. 
Be careful. 
•	 Try not to misinterpret the meaning of words and gestures. 
•	 Value judgments hinder communication. Validate what the 
person is saying but remain neutral in conversation. 
•	 Teasing belittles the individual. 
•	 Blame cuts off communication. 
•	 Use the person’s name in the conversation. 
•	 Ask a clarifying question: “Can you help me understand?” 
Our assumptions for a 
pandemic today are that: 
• Infected people will 
shed the virus and each 
infected person on 
average would infect two 
other people. 
• Absenteeism from work 
and school in such 
a community will be 
between 15% and 35% 
because of exposed or 
sick people, but also 
because people will need 
to take care of others. 
• Therefore, communities 
must prepare locally to 
respond to a pandemic. 
It is important for 
communities to work 
together in their planning. 
(www.pandemicflu.gov) 
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•	 Allow the conversation to evolve—don’t push it where you hope 
it will go. 
•	 Allow for silence. 
•	 Be sensitive to nationality, ethnicity, religion, age, and feelings. 
•	 When possible, use the same language (words) as the other 
person. 
•	 When responding to someone, say “you’re crying” instead of 
“you’re sad” to allow the person to express the feeling behind 
the action. 
•	 How something is said is often more important than what is said. 
When speaking to grieving family members: 
Your presence is more important than conversation. Family members 
may voice feelings with such strong emotion as “I don’t know how I’m 
going to live without my husband,” or “Why would God allow this to 
happen?” Short statements of condolence, such as “I’m so sorry,” “This 
is a sad time,” or “You’re in my prayers,” are enough of a response. If a 
person tenses at your touch, withdraw. 
Use “death” or “dying” not softer euphemisms. Many people feel 
patronized by words like “expired” or “received his heavenly reward.” 
Use the same words as the grieving person to respect cultural 
differences. 
Refrain from platitudes—“She lived a good life,” or “She is no longer 
suffering.” These statements can trivialize the family’s loss. 
Avoid sharing your personal experiences of death and grief so you can 
keep the focus on the family member. 
Avoid sending signals that you are distracted or need to do something 
else. Don’t glance at papers, your watch, the elevator, the clock, or 
others in a conversation. Focus on the person and speak gently and 
without haste. Take time cues from the other person. They will “tell” 
you when they have had enough. When in doubt, ask if they would like 
to be left alone. 
Offer support—don’t wait to be asked. 
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Conclusion

Every society has rituals and traditions associated with loss which 
serve valuable functions. For example bereavement rituals provide 
an established structure within which to act. The rituals provide 
structure and a known sequence of activities, at a time when a person 
is disorganized and distressed. The bereaved do not have to think, they 
can just go along. As a clinical affliction, bereavement lacks precise 
diagnosis and treatment criteria, although generally, mental health 
professionals agree that unhealthy grief can result in deviant behavior 
(Feifel, 1996, p. 40). A major concern for response and community 
leaders must be the needs of those bereaved. If ignored, “the total cost 
of these unmet needs from human suffering, chronic health problems, 
and economic losses are incalculable” (Muller & Thompson, 2003, p. 
199). There is no single formula for understanding any cultural group 
and, while generalizations can be helpful, they are not substitutes 
for individual consideration (DeSpelder, 1998). Displays of emotion 
such as crying, fear, and anger are nearly universally accepted in all 
societies among mourners, except Western society which is, in fact, 
highly deviant (Parkes, 1997). But among any population, losses 
can lead to mental and emotional problems if the grief process does 
not occur. Individuals from different ethnic groups or cultures may 
manifest symptoms of grief and undertake the grief process differently. 
Communication professionals should understand these differences and 
make allowances for them in messages related to death, grief, loss, and 
mourning. 
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Checklist: Planning a Community-Wide Memorial Service 
Community-wide memorial services are an outgrowth of shared misery and the need to reconnect with others. 
It’s also a time to reaffirm the goodness that exists in the community and to feel hope. (Hold them only when it 
is medically safe to do so.) 
The community-wide memorial service has two major components: mourning the dead and uplifting people so 
they can move forward. 
This is a community memorial event—smaller groups and places of worship will have other services that will 





o	 Select an event location that is religiously and politically neutral (e.g., a sports stadium, a convention center, 
and park). 
o	 Plan the event for a date and time when the most people can attend. 
o	 Plan the event for a date that is within a window of appropriate mourning but not so soon that it interferes 
with public health recommendations and personal funerals. 
o	 Engage health, safety and security people in the planning early. 
o	 Ensure that the location is easy to find, clearly marked, and has ample parking and access for people with 
disabilities. 
o	 Ensure that signers are available. 
o	 Discretely have available mental well-being counselors before, during, and after the event. 
o	 Have easily identified volunteers evenly spaced throughout the grounds and the building so that attendees 
can find help quickly. 
o	 Babies and children will be present—make it family friendly—have disposable diapers and diaper changing 
areas available and well marked. 
o	 Bathrooms should be ample—don’t make people wait in lines. 
o	 Provide water abundantly. 
o	 Provide facial tissues. 
o	 If outside, provide sunscreen and paper fans, or blankets if it is cold (people are sad, distracted, and caring 
less about their own well-being—do it for them in ways that you can). 
o	 The surroundings should be as devoid as possible of advertising messages and should balance between stark 
and festive. 
o	 Mourning colors are different by religious groups: for example, blue, white, and black are all colors of 
mourning in different religions. 
o	 Be sensitive to smells in the area (e.g., if flowers will be part of the décor then make sure they are not too 
fragrant, if candles are used then avoid scented ones). 
o	 Give all of the adults and most children a copy of the memorial program as they enter. 
o	 If logistically feasible, provide small stuffed animals or a plush toy to the children, ensuring it is safe and 
makes no noise (no advertising). 
o	 Ensure the sound system is checked, checked, and checked. 
o	 If the venue is large, use video screens to allow all participants to have a front-row seat. 
o	 Following the event, offer a flower or memento at exits to move guests in the right direction. 
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o	 Offer safe places for community members to cluster who are not ready to leave immediately. 
o	 After the event, have kiosks or people providing information on civic support services (e.g., depression or 
suicide toll-free numbers, domestic violence numbers, alcohol or drugs support groups, etc.) Make them 
discrete and specific for the event—personal. 
o	 Always keep the mourners and their mental and physical well-being in mind. Every step in planning and 
execution should be filtered through this question: “Will our community cohesion benefit from this step?” 
o	 Provide a designated site for the media and a secluded place for one-on-one media interviews. 
Event program 
o	 Inclusion is important: memorial services should not be devoid of religion, they should be representative of 
most all of the faiths in the community (all if possible). 
o	 Include enough secular moments to make it comfortable for persons who do not identify with a specific 
religious group. 
o	 Religious leaders are only one way to represent the faiths; there may be other creative ways (perhaps 
through dance or musical contributions—especially involving children). 
o	 Attempt equity in the sequencing of events (amount of time per religious group). If someone is known to 
be long winded, have a musical interlude scheduled that can begin softly while they are finishing up to 
transition them from the microphone 
o	 Have music playing as people arrive and before the start of the event—it should be soft and meaningful. 
o	 Keep the event at 2 hours or less—it should be long enough to make it worthwhile but not so long that 
people become restless and fatigued. 
o	 Vary the tempo of the event. End with something that is easy for everyone to participate in and that is 
uplifting and hopeful. 
o	 Political and civil leaders will expect a role. Decide before hand who, when, and how long. 
o	 If the community has designated someone before the service as their “mourner-in-chief” because of their 
role in the event or their empathetic nature throughout, let this person have a prominent role. 
o	 Some communities will have local or national stars—they can be included if they volunteer. Keep it 
appropriate to the moment. 
o	 Engage the attendees in meaningful ways—holding ribbons, or clapping to music, or singing (note: try to 
avoid using individual candles because of fire hazard). 
o	 If possible, remember generational differences and appeal to children, teens, adults and the elderly through 
visuals, messages, songs, and music. 
Communication 
o	 Use multiple channels to announce the service. 
o	 Announce it only a few days before it occurs. Too soon and people will forget or talk themselves out of it. 
Too late and people won’t have time to encourage each other to attend. 
o	 Use public buildings and any temporary display areas to announce the memorial service (e.g., library, 
schools, colleges/universities, health facilities, city municipal offices). 
o	 Publicize it so that people are aware it is a secular and religious event. 
o	 Use symbols that represent the community as a whole in materials—focus on community cohesion and 
coming together. 
o	 If pictures of the dead are used, ensure families agree. 
o	 Sometimes one person’s death becomes the symbol of all the deaths in the community—if that occurs, it’s 
appropriate for this person to be singled out. 
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o	 Communicate to neighborhoods and populations that are often left out in community gatherings. 
o	 Consider televising the event for those who can’t or won’t attend. (Ensure that mourners are not intruded 
on). 
o	 Ensure the media have all the information they need before hand regarding the event program and the level 
of access they will have during the event to program participants and the community. (Remember, the media 
are part of the community too—news anchors may be moderators for the event). 
Don’t 
o	 Don’t censor prayers, songs, or very brief sermons—keep them all short and in the spirit of respect for the 
dead and uplifting for the living. People know they are attending a memorial service. 
o	 Don’t let the death of one person in the community overshadow the others (e.g., a celebrity or powerful 
civic or business leader). 
o	 Don’t forget that people will have died during this timeframe unrelated to the  mass-community catastrophe, 
remember to acknowledge all losses in the community. 
o	 Most communities are heterogeneous—celebrate that if possible—but don’t let one group dominate and 
don’t make it an obvious laundry list. Combine ethnic groups/cultures in moments. 
o	 Don’t let technology intrude on this event—ensure that all the video and sound systems are flawlessly 
working and have backups. 
o	 Do not go “VIP” overboard—this is about a community in mourning, if it appears that certain people are 
“special” (beyond security concerns), this detracts from the spirit of community cohesion. (No “them” or 
“us”). 
o	 Don’t publicize the service as if it were a “celebrity-studded” concert—keep it simple. People should feel 
welcome to come not marketed to come. 
o	 Natural, spontaneous humor during a time of intense sadness and grief can be healing—any contrived or 
inappropriate humor will be devastating—it’s not funny. 
o	 Do not let media demands for coverage (e.g., order of events or camera angles) dictate the event—it is first 
and foremost for the community members attending in person. 
o	 Don’t allow the event to be hijacked for any political, religious, or business objective. 
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Box 1: Worst (in deaths) natural disaster events in recorded history 
2005 – South Asia 
An earthquake in Kashmir, Pakistan. The death toll is more than 73,000. 
2004 - South Asia 
An earthquake causes tsunamis that hit Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, Thailand and other South Asian 
nations. The death toll is more than 250,000. 
2003 - Iran 
A 6.3 quake devastated the Iranian city of Bam, killing more than 50,000 people. 
1999 - Venezuela 
The death toll is still unclear from the rain-caused landslides that hit Venezuela in mid-December 1999; 
official estimates are as high as 30,000 deaths. 
1998 - Central America 
Hurricane Mitch devastates much of Honduras and Nicaragua in Central America. More than 10,000 
people were killed and some 2 million left homeless as mudslides swept away whole villages. 
1991 - Bangladesh 
Bangladesh lost more than 130,000 people in April 1991 from cyclone-induced flooding. 
1990 - Iran 
An earthquake triggers a landslide, causing from 40,000 to 50,000 deaths in western Iran on June 20, 
1990. 
1988 - Armenia 
In 1988, an earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale devastates Armenia, killing over 100,000 
people. 
1985 - Colombia 
And a small eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz volcano in Colombia on November 13, 1985 leads to a 
massive mudflow that covers the city of Armero and kills more than 23,000 people. 
1983 - Thailand 
Monsoons kill 10,000 people in Thailand over the course of three months in 1983. Some 100,000 people 
contracted waterborne diseases as a result of the storm. 
1976 - China 
A deadly earthquake of a magnitude 8.0 strikes Tianjin, China, on July 27, 1976. The official casualty 
figure issued by the Chinese government was 255,000 people. 
1970 - Bangladesh 
Bangladesh loses more than 300,000 people in November 1970 from cyclone-induced flooding. 
1970 - Peru 
A magnitude 7.8 earthquake at Mount Huascaran, Peru, on May 21, 1970, causes a rock and snow 
avalanche that buries 2 towns, killing as many as 20,000 people. 
1959 - China 
In July 1959, massive floods in China kill at least 2 million people. 
1938 and 1939 - China 
Floods kill 1 million people in a two-year period in China. 
1931 - China 
The massive flooding of the Yangtze River in China in 1931 caused more than 3 million deaths from 
flooding and starvation. 
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Top Ten Organized Religions in the United States, 2001 (self-identification, ARIS) 
[Nonreligious, Atheist, Agnostic have been dropped from this list.] 
Religion 2001 Est. Adult Pop. 2004 Est. Total Pop. % of U.S. Pop., 2001 
Christianity 159,030,000 224,437,959 76.5% 
Judaism 2,831,000 3,995,371 1.3% 
Islam 1,104,000 1,558,068 0.5% 
Buddhism 1,082,000 1,527,019 0.5% 
Hinduism 766,000 1,081,051 0.5% 
Unitarian Universalist 629,000 887,703 0.3% 
Wiccan/Pagan/Druid 307,000 433,267 0.1% 
Spiritualist 116,000 163,710 0.05% 
Native American Religion 103,000 145,363 0.05% 
Baha’i 84,000 118,549 0.04% 
Retrieved July 28, 2006, from http://www.adherents.com/rel_USA.html#religions 
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Box 2: Religion Matters in Bereavement Rituals 
Unlike some countries, the United States does not include a question about religion in its census, and has 
not done so for over fifty years. Religious adherent statistics in the U.S. are obtained from surveys and 
organizational reporting. While most of the U.S. population is Christian (from 76% to 82%), other religions 
are also prominent in the United States. After Christianity, the three dominant religions in the United States 
are Judaism (1.3%), Hindu (.04 - .05%) and Islam (.05%). The religious customs for bereavement can differ 
markedly.  Each ritual has a religious meaning and a purpose in the grief process. Forgoing any of these steps 
because of the realities of pandemic mitigation measures could interfere with that grieving process. 
Judaism 
In the Jewish faith the funeral and burial rituals are very symbolic and important to the grieving process. By 
cutting keriah (the tearing of a black ribbon or garment before the funeral) mourners express their anguish as 
an outward sign of grief. At the gravesite, Kevurah is the ritual of shoveling of earth into the grave. It is often 
done with the back of the shovel to indicate a reluctance to perform this ritual and is a final physical act of 
acceptance that the loss is real. Jewish burials are usually held within 24 hours of death, but may be delayed 
if immediate family members have to travel long distances. Most Jews are buried in a cemetery and some 
communities consider cremation a desecration of the body. Many other rituals continue for days and weeks 
after the funeral. 
Hinduism 
For Hindus, death represents the transition of the soul from one embodiment to the next and is the means 
by which the spirit can ascend its journey towards Heaven or Nirvana. Hindus believe in reincarnation 
and a Hindu funeral is a celebration and remembrance service. Hindus cremate their dead and the burning 
of the dead body signifies the release of the spirit. The flames themselves are important as they represent 
the presence of the god Brahma, the creator. White is the traditional color and mourners will usually wear 
traditional Indian garments to the funeral. 
Islam 
Muslims practice funeral traditions that tend to have developed over the centuries, rather than being set out 
in the religion’s holy book. Muslims believe that the soul departs at the moment of death, and they will try to 
bury the body within 24 hours of death if possible. The deceased is buried with their head facing the Muslim 
holy city of Makkah. The body is wrapped in a shroud of usually simple, white material. Funerals are simple 
and cremation is forbidden. 
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H1N1 Comes to Cedar Rapids, Nebraska: 
The Langan Boys, 1918 
Cedar Rapids: Census 1910, town pop. 576, (1,885 in area); 
6 churches; and a flour mill 
In 1918, Thomas Langan, 25, was married to Carrie and had 
5 children. 
His brothers, William, 22, Edward, 20, and David, 16, lived 
at home. 
December 1918, all four boys fell ill with influenza: 
December 16, Edward died at the age of 20 
December 19, William died at the age of 22 
December 20, David died at the age of 16 
Thomas Langan survived the 1918 pandemic and fathered 
four more children. Thomas lived to be 75 years old, when 
he died in 1966. 
Photos courtesy Kim, Village of Cedar Rapids 
and the Langan family 
1955 - Thomas, who survived the 1918 pandemic, and Carrie Langan 
with their 9 children 
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˘in•for•ma•tion (in´f r-ma´sh n) 
n. 
1. Knowledge derived from study, experience, or instruction. 
2. Knowledge of specific events or situations that has been gathered or received by communication; 
intelligence or news. 
Severe Pandemic: What is different? 
•	 With the advent of increasingly advanced information and 
communication technologies the transfer of information through 
official and unofficial channels is instantaneous, horizontal, and 
decentralized. 
•	 Due to the uncertainty surrounding the next influenza pandemic, 
opportunities abound for the public to find and receive mixed-
or erroneous messages (via electronic channels) that could 
significantly impact their health and well-being. 
Communication in the Broadband Age 
Search for the phrase “Pandemic Influenza” on the top three online 
search engines and Google will return 1.9 million results in 0.30 
seconds, Yahoo 1.2 million results in 0.12 seconds, and Ask.com 
(formerly AskJeeves.com) 79,000 results (search time not given). 
While best practices have been established in communicating crisis and 
emergency risk to the public (Reynolds, 2002; Seeger, 2006; Sandman, 
2003; Covello, 2003), research studies and the guidelines they inform 
typically either address communication via “traditional” channels, i.e. 
television, radio, and newspapers, or electronic and alternate channels 
in a non-emergency period.  Public health agencies and organizations 
characteristically offer information via their websites (i.e. the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Georgia Department of Public 
Health), in addition to providing print materials. However, some of 
that information may be inaccessible to the general public, due to the 
highly technical aspect of scientific recommendations (infection control 
guidelines not including hand-hygiene or cough etiquette) or absent, due 
to either ongoing material development (as agencies work to develop 
more extensive pandemic flu guidance) or conflicting debate within 
Objectives:

•	 Recognize the 
multitudes of [traditional 
and] non-traditional 
ways the public can and 
will access information, 





•	 Construct a plan 
to reach out to 
non-traditional 
communication 
channels to help 
disseminate accurate, 
consistent, timely 
information to large 
numbers of people. 
•	 Evaluate message 
and rumor monitoring 
methods to include 
new technologies and 
the ability to counteract 
any false information 
that may become 
widespread. 
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the field (mask use recommendations). The purpose of this module 
is to discuss the use and barriers of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) when communicating with the public in a pandemic 
emergency. This chapter will focus specifically on the various ways of 
communicating via the internet. There has been some consideration of 
other technologies (such as text messaging, the use of personal data 
assistants, etc.) for use in mass communication, but this has occurred 
primarily in the private sector (Stuver, Keene, and Carlisle, 2004; 
VeriSign, 2005) and with a dearth of research support. 
People are ever expanding their use of electronic communication 
channels. In the workplace, regardless of industry, email is a ubiquitous 
way of communicating with coworkers, supervisors, customers, 
vendors, and internal and external contacts. Two-thirds (68%) of 
Americans use the Internet (Fox, 2005). Approximately the same 
number own cell phones (Ives, 2004) and of these, 7-9% do not 
subscribe to land-based phone services (Pew Research Center Press 
Release, May 2006). According to a December 2005 survey by the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project, the percentage of Americans who 
say that the Internet has greatly improved their shopping opportunities 
doubled 16 to 32% from March 2001 to December 2005. The 
percentage of Americans who say the internet has greatly improved their 
pursuit of hobbies and interests likewise grew from 20 to 33% from 
March 2001 to December 2005 (Madden and Fox, 2006). In a health-
related vein, the same survey respondents were also asked whether they 
had helped someone deal with a major illness or health condition within 
the past two years and, if they had, whether the internet played a crucial 
role, an important one, a minor role, or no role at all in this event. Of the 
respondents who found the internet to be crucial or important during a 
loved one’s recent health crisis, 36% said the internet helped them find 
advice or support from other people, 34% said the internet helped them 
find professional or expert services, and 26% said the internet helped 
them find information or compare options (Madden and Fox, 2006). 
Internet access and the digital divide 
Communicating with the public via the internet necessarily requires 
communications officials to consider many of the same issues that 
apply to overall communications, especially crisis and emergency 
risk communication, in that different communications needs exist for 
different racial, ethnic, age, and gender characteristics of users. The 
percentage of Americans who report no internet use at all has remained 
stable for several years, but for those who do use the internet, there 
are gaps in access in segments of the population. Of the percentage of 
Americans who do go online: 
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•	 Only 26% of persons age 65 and older go online, compared with 
67% of those age 50-64, 80% of those 30-49, and 84% of those 
18-29. 
•	 Only 57% of African-Americans go online, compared with 70% 
of whites. 
•	 Only 29% of those who have not graduated from high school use 
the internet, compared with 61% of high school graduates and 
89% of college graduates. 
•	 60% of adults who do not have a child living at home go online, 
compared with 83% of parents of minor children (Fox, 2005). 
The way in which people are connecting is also changing. Whereas 
the number of years one has been using the internet (see below) used 
to be a predictor of the frequency of internet use and types of online 
activities, broadband access is becoming a stronger predictor of online 
behavior (Fox, 2005). Given some of the technological and economic 
requirements of broadband access, this may serve to widen the so-called 
digital divide. However, while older adults, African-Americans, and 
those with less education lag behind the rest of American internet users, 
internet use has steadily increased in all demographic and age groups and 
in both genders from the year 2000 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Internet access by demographic, 2000-2005 
Source: Fox, S (2005). Digital divisions. Pew Internet & American Life Project Report. 
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The number of “veteran” 
users, those who have 
been using online 
services for three or 
more years continues to 
grow 
The internet as a communication channel 
in an emergency 
While individuals may not forsake television, newspaper, and radio as 
primary sources of information during an emergency, they often look 
to the internet to validate information obtained from other sources. 
(Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 2003; Kittler et 
al., 2004). In one particular study on internet use after the anthrax 
attacks of October 2001, 58% of respondents reported handling mail 
differently and 65% reported more frequent hand-washing as a result 
of information they received from the internet (Kittler et al, 2004). In 
another survey from late 2001, 34% of respondents reported obtaining 
information from internet health and news sites in a crisis, behind 
television, local or state health department, or their own physician 
(Pollard, 2003). Likewise, the percentage of respondents who reported 
using the internet as an information source grew from 66 to 74% in the 
two weeks after September 11th (Hobbs et al., 2004). 
Even as CERC guidelines encourage and suggest communications 
response staff to address uncertainty (Reynolds et al., 2002), very 
few official websites widely advertise “not knowing” answers to 
public inquiries. This is all the more relevant in the case of pandemic 
influenza, due to the amount of uncertainty surrounding the next flu 
pandemic, from which strain of the influenza A virus will mutate, to 
the timeliness of vaccine production and distribution to recommended 
groups, to estimates of personal risk and potential mitigation efforts. On 
many websites, if the answer is not available the subject matter is not 
even presented to the end-user. 
In addition to the sheer number of individuals who obtain information 
from the Internet, the number of “veteran” users, those who have 
been using online services for three or more years continues to grow 
(Horrigan and Rainey, 2002). These users, new internet users, and non-
internet users largely expect to be able to find important information 
online (97% of all internet users and, interestingly, 64% of non-users) 
(Horrigan and Rainey, 2002) and more experienced users will undertake 
more extensive searches. Web-savvy individuals, especially those who 
have a higher distrust of government sources or who are not satisfied 
with the information they find on these sites, may lack the tools to 
evaluate non-government websites for validity and accuracy. If the 
information does not come from a credible source, individuals will find 
information elsewhere, potentially to the detriment of their health and 
contrary to official guidelines. Communications response officials can 
help the public build these skills by disseminating evaluation criteria for 
website content. 
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Although the shortcomings of the communications response during the 
anthrax attacks of late 2001 have been well documented (GAO, 2004; 
Gursky et al.; 2003, Thomas, 2003), they do illustrate the public’s 
desire for any available information, official and accurate or otherwise, 
the prevalence of erroneous resources available electronically, and the 
willingness of the public to “buy in” to panic-bating and concomitant 
unnecessary stockpiling. In October of 2001 surges of ciproflaxin and 
gas mask purchases were reported in New York, Washington, DC, and 
nationwide on the internet (Hensley, 2001; Oldenburg, 2001; Tsai et 
al., 2002). Currently, even as the first several pages of the “pandemic 
influenza” Google search contain reliable, credible results from local, 
state, federal, hospital, and academic websites, the “sponsored links” 
section of the page advertises bird flu and disaster planning kits 
containing N95 respirators, antivirals, and the like that “meet[s] U.S 
government guidelines for flu protection” (LifeSecure Emergency 
Solutions, accessed July 25, 2006 at https://www.commercecorner. 
com/lifesecure/productlistLS.aspx?catid=493). (N95 respirators are not 
currently indicated for non-healthcare workers outside of the clinical 
environment. See the CDC’s Interim Guidance for the Use of Masks to 
Control Influenza Transmission at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/ 
infectioncontrol/maskguidance.htm.) In early 2006, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) issued warning letters to nine companies 
marketing bogus flu products, claiming their products (of which 
eight purported to be dietary supplements) could be effective against 
preventing avian flu or other forms of influenza and prevent detrimental 
health outcomes. There are currently initiatives in place to deter 
counterfeiters and sellers of fraudulent or phony products that claim 
to prevent or treat avian flu. Communications staff could potentially 
counter available false information by using the same technologies that 
these companies are using to advertise their “products” . 
The White House and the Department of Health and Human Services 
have emphasized that they will not be providing targeted help at the 
local level (Dateline MSNBC interview with Secretary Leavitt, April 
23, 2006, accessed at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12451621/ 
page/6/) and urge local, county, and state agencies to fully undertake 
preparedness efforts at their level. However, where communication 
and health education is concerned, federal government agencies prefer 
that local-level agencies adapt federal recommendations and public 
health guidelines for their use. But while the government website, 
PandemicFlu.gov, provides pandemic influenza health education 
guidelines, information and situation updates, and preparedness 
checklists, it is not intended to capture local-level communication 
needs and much of the guidance is, at the time of this writing, in the 
development process (i.e. home health guidelines). Information and 
communication technologies may serve to more easily involve the 
There are currently 
initiatives in place to 
deter counterfeiters and 
sellers of fraudulent or 
phony products that 
claim to prevent or treat 
avian flu 
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Examples for eHealth Solutions offered during the SARS crisis 
•	 Healthcarelink (http://www.healthcarelink.md) has developed a monitoring program that claims to 
detect severe acute respiratory syndrome before symptoms occur and which — by aggregating data 
from a large number of patients — also promises to detect bioterror outbreaks. Patients take their 
temperature daily in the morning and report the results by phone, fax, or Internet. The company 
publishes the graphs on the Internet for patients and physicians to review. The data, along with 
information on a person’s travel history, can alert health workers to potential SARS patients and 
bioterrorist attacks. One of the open questions is, of course, how to motivate a large number of 
people to measure their temperature daily and to voluntarily enter this information into a Web form. 
•	 Sunday Communications, a Hong Kong mobile phone operator, launched a mobile phone service 
that promised to alert subscribers if they are near infected buildings. Those opting for the service 
had their phones tracked, and would be warned by SMS (short message service) whenever they 
strayed within a kilometer of a building where there had been instances of SARS infections. It is 
unknown whether this system prevented a single new SARS case (Figure 2). 
•	 In Singapore, health officials tested electronic tracking systems that monitor the movements of 
every person who enters a public hospital. Staff and visitors wear credit card-sized RFID (radio 
frequency identification) tags around their neck to communicate their location to sensors hidden in 
the hospital ceilings, thereby enabling officials to track all encounters with other persons. Hospitals 
will save movement records for 20 days — twice the incubation period for SARS. If one person turns 
out to be infected, the database allows rapid identification of all encounters — health officials say it 
is 10 times faster than traditional methods of asking infected people whom they had contact with. 
Source: Eysenbach, G (2003). SARS and population health technology. Journal of Medical Internet Research 5(2): e14. 
Figure 2. Advertisements of Sunday communications in Hong Kong 
Source: Eysenbach, G (2003). SARS and population health technology. Journal of 
Medical Internet Research 5(2): e14. 
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public as a capable partner in local-level pandemic preparedness 
and response efforts by the sheer speed with which messages can 
be disseminated, but the uncertainty surrounding an impending flu 
pandemic makes communicating efficiently, effectively, accurately, 
consistently, and in a timely fashion in the pre-event period more 
difficult. Additionally, increased public suspicion of scientists and 
governments due to access to more sources of conflicting information 
and challenges to the accuracy of research studies, a reduction in the 
use of scientific reasoning in decision making, and political infighting 
(Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997; Seeger et al., 2003; Tomes, 2000) 
all but ensures that there are plenty of people willing to step in and try 
their hand at offering solutions, with wireless technology offering the 
perfect forum. 
The Blogosphere as community 
The weblog is continuous—not a revolutionary break—with five 
hundred years of print culture. It is the printed page, modernized, 
interconnected, made two-way, but still powered by movable type 
(Rosen, 2003). 
Weblogs, or blogs, are typically described as websites that contain 
users’ thoughts, feeling, and opinions on any and every subject available 
for exploration and discussion, with links to other sites, other blogs, 
news, and reader comments. The distinguishing feature of blogs is that 
they are displayed in reverse chronology, with the latest entry first, 
providing the reader with insight into the most recent interests of the 
blogger (Gurak et al., n.d.). A blog can be either a diary/journal website 
full of personal musings and individualized entries, or a web journal 
that primarily comments on the news (or it could be a combination 
of both). Blogs first came to the attention of the larger media after 
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent Iraq War, when individuals 
sat down to their computers to relay their personal thoughts, feelings, 
experiences, and reactions to the widespread human suffering and 
tragedy. While the format was not new in any sense (the first blogs were 
launched sometime between 1994 and 1998), these blogs underscored 
the potential of public commentary to pull power away from 
“traditional” one-way formal communication to a more decentralized 
sphere in which information is produced, circulated, consumed, and 
reproduced by a shared community not dependent on marketing (Gurak 
et al., n.d.; Lampa, 2004). 
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[T]he power of blogs to forego the institutionalization of 
communicative practices and offer spaces for writing that are more 
collaboratively constructed than other online spaces, as bloggers 
freely link to, comment on, and augment each other’s content. 
In this way, blogs allow for the possibility of developing new 
cultural practices of online communication in relation to previously 
established modes of ownership, authorship, and legitimacy of 
content and access to information. 
A 2004 Pew Internet & American Life Project survey found that 7% 
of Internet users had created a blog (Rainie, 2005). This number (and 
the relatively small number of bloggers who actually update their 
blogs regularly) would seem insignificant if not for the fact that the 
number of internet users who read blogs had jumped from 11 to 39% 
from a Spring 2003 Pew telephone survey to Pew telephone surveys 
conducted between July 2005 and February 2006 (Lenhart and Fox, 
2006). (The number of people who report creating a blog remained 
essentially stable.) 37% of bloggers write about their personal lives and 
their experiences, with 11% writing about politics and government, 
and 5% blogging about general news and current events (Lenhart and 
Fox, 2006). Bloggers are also a fairly diverse group, with a little more 
than half (54%) under the age of 30 but evenly split between men and 
women. Bloggers are also less likely than overall internet users to be 
white (60% of bloggers compared to 74% of internet users). 11% of 
bloggers are African American, 19% are English-speaking Hispanic 
and 10% identify as some other race (Lenhart and Fox, 2006). Blogs, 
as an interactive medium, allow for the diversification of voices in 
public dialogue and can serve to fill the gaps that are not addressed, 
or are underrepresented, by traditional channels of communication 
and information, in a real-time feedback loop (Gallo, n.d.). Content 
management tools and blog websites served to lower barriers to entry to 
web publishing; individuals are no longer required to have mastery over 
programming languages and software such as HTML and JavaScript to 
post a blog (Gurak et al., n.d.). Blogging today is as easy as sending an 
email. 
Critics of blogs (including portions of the journalism community) list 
several reasons why they (blogs) should be considered a less credible 
source of information than traditional media: 
•	 Anyone can create a blog and post information. 
•	 Bloggers are not bound by ethical and professional standards of 
traditional journalism (or public service agencies). 
•	 Bloggers are not required to remain objective - most have strong 
views that they express openly and fervently. 
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•	 Many bloggers use pseudonyms, making it difficult to judge the 
credibility of the information on the site (Johnson and Kaye, 
2004). 
However, blogs do rely on peer review of sorts, by allowing comments 
from readers, to point out mistakes that can be easily corrected, which 
they are, usually in a prominent fashion. Bloggers and their readers 
are likely to consider blogs a highly credible source of information 
(Johnson and Kaye, 2004), perhaps partially because they are 
independent rather than controlled by corporate or government interests. 
Bloggers have the ability to discuss sensitive information or issues from 
which governments and traditional media may shy away, without fear of 
reprisal. Blogs often contain thorough and thoughtful analyses of news 
missing from mainstream media. But rather than focusing on what is 
absent and ignoring the rest, bloggers rely heavily on traditional sources 
of web information and often provide links to traditional sites on their 
blogs in an effort to lend authority to their postings (Johnson and Kaye, 
2004). 
“Why do you become a critic of media?” asks InstaPundit’s [Glenn] 
Reynolds. “At least in some sense, it’s because you like it. If you 
don’t read the paper, you don’t get mad at the paper.” Or the 11 
o’clock news….[a] favorite…(and one of more than 200 inspired by 
InstaPundit.com to create their own blogs after September 11) is 
Sgt. Stryker, a pseudonymous U.S. Air Force mechanic who began 
Sgtstryker.com after his wife got sick of hearing him yell at the TV. 
–American Journalism Review “Online Uprising,” July 2002 
Journalists likewise increasingly rely on blogs for information and 
stories from all over the world. Those individuals who may not have 
a blog, read others’ blogs, or access the internet frequently, may still 
receive information from these alternative channels simply by tuning 
in to the local or cable news. Many journalists and news organizations 
(MSNBC, CNN) also host their own blogs, and blogs have become 
more and more popular in business, especially in the technology, 
marketing, media and law sectors, with industry professionals using 
them to connect with suppliers, customers, and employees (Easen, 
2004). 
In a severe influenza pandemic, with its attendant high rates of illness 
and death, potential disruption of critical infrastructures, and limited 
or no social contact for optimal prevention of illness, blogging may 
serve as an appealing way for individuals and communities to share 
their personal experiences and ask for, receive, or offer support in 
coping with crisis or in the face of the illness or death of a loved one. 
[The possibility of disruption in electric, cable, and other services in 
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Blogging is also a way 
of connecting individuals 
domestically and 
internationally. 
a pandemic exists, thereby affecting the ability of individuals to gain 
access to electronic news and health information and/or establish or 
update blogs. However, this possibility is most likely relatively small 
for an illness pandemic. Even in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, disruptions in Internet and other communications 
networks were limited to New York City but were remedied either 
through automatic rerouting at the physical or network levels or with 
new equipment or reconfiguration of the system within hours or days of 
the attacks (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 2003).] 
Blogging is also a way of connecting individuals domestically and 
internationally. In the more than two weeks since the Israel-Lebanon 
conflict began (at the time of this writing), bloggers in Lebanon writing 
about the fighting report that not only have their blogs helped them to 
reach out to the Lebanese community but have also provided a forum 
for dialogue with Israelis on the other side of the war zone, even as 
a holdover law from the Syrian occupation forbids contact between 
Lebanese and Israelis for reasons of national security (Farivar, 2006). 
The blogosphere provides a way around that, to allow these disparate 
groups of people forge connections with supposed “enemies”. 
Wiki-mania 
A wiki is a type of website that allows users to easily add, remove, 
or otherwise edit and change most available content, sometimes 
without the need for registration. This ease of interaction and 
operation makes a wiki an effective tool for collaborative writing. 
The term wiki can also refer to the collaborative software itself 
(wiki engine) that facilitates the operation of such a website, or to 
certain specific wiki sites, including the computer science site (and 
original wiki), WikiWikiWeb, and the online encyclopedias such as 
Wikipedia. The first wiki, WikiWikiWeb, is named after the “Wiki 
Wiki” line of…buses in Honolulu International Airport, Hawaii… 
.”Wiki-wiki” means “hurry quick” in Hawaiian. 
—From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki) 
Wikis, like blogs, are web pages, however, they are unique in that they 
offer editing capabilities to all users and previous versions of pages can 
be viewed at any time (Wagner, 2004). Wikis typically link to numerous 
other websites in their quest to provide thorough information, and may 
also include tools that allow users to easily monitor information and 
provide a space in which to resolve disputes, namely regarding content 
(Wikipedia, 2006). Wikis provide a way of organizing and managing the 
conversational knowledge and online communities that grow beyond 
the technological boundaries of listservs and online discussion forums 
(Wagner, 2004). Wiki pages, like blogs, do not require knowledge 
of programming languages, and can be easily created and updated 
in real-time, which can lead to the posting of erroneous information. 
However, “wikis are generally designed with the philosophy of making 
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it easy to correct mistakes, rather than making it difficult to make them” 
(Wikipedia, 2006). They provide a way to verify the accuracy of recent 
additions to a page primarily through a specific list of recent edits or a 
list of edits made within a given timeframe. Some wikis, like Wikipedia, 
also provide a list of information sources at the end of the entry, much 
like the modules in this training guide provide a list of scholarly 
resources by which the included information is supported. 
Perhaps the most familiar wiki to most communications staff involved 
in influenza pandemic preparedness is FluWiki, originally published 
in June 2005 by Melanie Mattson, who “makes her living as a risk 
communicator” (FluWiki, 2005). FluWiki is monitored and edited by 
Melanie and her staff of three, in addition to any number of site visitors 
who feel the need to contribute to either the information contained 
therein or to the discussion forums accompanying the site. FluWiki 
states: 
The purpose of the Flu Wiki is to help local communities prepare 
for and perhaps cope with a possible influenza pandemic. This is 
a task previously ceded to local, state and national governmental 
public health agencies. Our goal is to be: 
•	 a reliable source of information, as neutral as possible, about 
important facts useful for a public health approach to pandemic 
influenza 
•	 a venue for anticipating the vast range of problems that may 
arise if a pandemic does occur 




No one, in any health department or government agency, knows 
all the things needed to cope with an influenza pandemic. But it is 
likely someone knows something about some aspect of each of 
them and if we can pool and share our knowledge we can advance 
preparation for and the ability to cope with events. This is not meant 
to be a substitute for planning, preparation and implementation by 
civil authorities, but a parallel effort that complements, supports and 
extends those efforts. 
—From Flu Wiki Main Page, last modified July 26, 2006 
At a glance, Flu Wiki appears to provide a great deal of thorough 
information and links, including the WHO’s avian and pandemic 
pages, the CDC’s avian flu page, Peter Sandman’s risk communication 
website, the Public Health Agency of Canada, the Singaporean Ministry 
of Health, and others. But, there are also links to other, more unfamiliar, 
websites, such as DiseaseFree.Com and Brinkster.Com. There is also no 
mention of the PandemicFlu.Gov website to be found in the “Pandemic 
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A defining feature of the 
SARS response was 
the rumor monitoring 
undertaken by the World 
Health Organization. 
Preparedness” section, even under “personal and family preparedness,” 
where it might be reasonable to link to the checklists that HHS has 
developed for a pandemic emergency. One can link, however, to the 
National Chicken Council website. One of the challenges to this site 
and in this manner in general, is that to cycle through the information 
presented seems a rather daunting task. The division of subtopics is 
helpful, as is the search function (a key feature of wikis in general), 
which enabled this author to locate the link to PandemicFlu.Gov. 
The website does link to blogs, and does point out that certain sites 
may be suspect, although they leave the evaluation of those sites to 
the reader. However, the sheer amount of information and the large 
volume of outside links contained within the website make it difficult 
to evaluate both the wiki content and the external sites for accuracy and 
consistency, or even to keep track of pages and sites already visited. 
Media and Rumor Monitoring 
Local, state, and federal public health departments and agencies, as well 
as response officials from the public and private sectors, must address 
not only the uncertainties inherent in a forthcoming flu pandemic but 
also the sheer amount of information available to the public through the 
internet and its various information and communication technologies. 
Most agencies involved in communications response efforts, whether 
they are work in or liaise with an emergency operations center (EOC), 
perform media and rumor monitoring to some extent. A defining 
feature of the SARS response was the rumor monitoring undertaken 
by the World Health Organization, which enabled the agency to 
effectively assess and address, in real-time, the concerns of the public 
in the regions affected by the crisis, by surveying traditional and 
non-traditional sources of information (World Health Organization, 
2003). Joint Information Center integration into the National Incident 
Management System’s Incident Command Structure takes care to 
include rumor monitoring as one of the seven essential JIC operational 
criteria (National Response Team, 2000). The how of media and rumor 
monitoring of these technological channels, however, is left to the 
communications staff involved in the response. 
Public communications officials can expand their existing monitoring 
mechanisms to incorporate evaluation of blogs and wikis in several 
ways. The website Technorati (http://technorati.com/), for example, 
currently tracks approximately 50 million blogs, in addition to video 
blogs (vlogs), podcasts, and amateur videos and movies. The website 
contains ranked lists of top blog posts, top term searches, and top 
“tags,” (topics about which bloggers are writing). They also feature 
member blogs and the top “favorited” blogs, or blogs that other bloggers 
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have declared their favorites and linked to in their pages. At the time 
of this writing, the top search term listed by Technorati is “Israel,” 
followed by “Lebanon,” “WordPress” (a blog-editing software), and 
“[George] Bush” (http://technorati.com/pop/); two-thirds of the top 
15 search terms have to do with either war or the Middle East. Public 
communications officials could reasonably expect search terms and 
blog posts related to illness to appear on these lists in the event of an 
influenza pandemic and monitor accordingly. They might also establish 
their own blogs, like MSNBC or CNN did, and they could also monitor 
wikis for pandemic influenza information and edit as appropriate. Most 
local, city, or state health organizations have websites and could address 
rumors on their sites and attempt to provide accurate and consistent 
information by (as many of these sites already do) either advertising 
other agency sites, like PandemicFlu.Gov, linking directly to those sites, 
or posting health information directly. Public health agencies can also 
provide the public with information on evaluation criteria for assessing 
websites that individuals may find during their own internet searches. 
Local-level organizations, with their significant understanding of both 
the demographic makeup of their populations and their information 
needs, are the best source for advising the public on where and how to 
find the best information to suit those needs. 
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Evaluating Health Information on the Web 
By the Medical Library Association (http://www.mlanet.org/resources/userguide.html#3) 
Content Evaluation Guidelines 
Sponsorship 
Can you easily identify the site sponsor? Sponsorship is important because it helps establish the site as respected 
and dependable. Does the site list advisory board members or consultants? This may give you further insights on the 
credibility of information published on the site. 
•	 A government agency has .gov in the address. 
•	 An educational institution is indicated by .edu in the address. 
•	 A professional organization such as a scientific or research society will be identified as .org. For example, the 
American Cancer Society’s Website is http://www.cancer.org/. 
•	 Commercial sites identified by .com will most often identify the sponsor as a company, for example Merck & Co., 
the pharmaceutical firm. 
•	 What should you know about .com health sites? Commercial sites may represent a specific company or be 
sponsored by a company using the Web for commercial reasons—to sell products. At the same time, many 
commercial Websites have valuable and credible information. Many hospitals have .com in their address. The 
site should fully disclose the sponsor of the site, including the identities of commercial and noncommercial 
organizations that have contributed funding, services, or material to the site. 
Currency 
•	 The site should be updated frequently. Health information changes constantly as new information is learned 
about diseases and treatments through research and patient care. Websites should reflect the most up-to-date 
information. 
•	 The Website should be consistently available, with the date of the latest revision clearly posted. This usually 
appears at the bottom of the page. 
Factual information 
•	 Information should be presented in a clear manner. It should be factual (not opinion) and capable of being verified 
from a primary information source such as the professional literature, abstracts, or links to other Web pages. 
•	 Information represented as an opinion should be clearly stated and the source should be identified as a 
qualified professional or organization. 
Audience 
•	 The Website should clearly state whether the information is intended for the consumer or the health professional. 
•	 Many health information Websites have two different areas - one for consumers, one for professionals. The design 
of the site should make selection of one area over the other clear to the user. 
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Additional Help

The Health on the Internet Foundation Code of Conduct (HONcode) for medical and health Websites (http:// 
www.hon.ch/HONcode/) specifies eight principles intended to hold Web site developers to basic ethical 
standards and to make sure consumers always know the source and purpose of the data they are reading. 
Participation is voluntary throughout the world, but sites displaying the foundation’s symbol are generally 
considered credible sources of information. Unfortunately, the number of sites participating is small. 
Much of the health-related information that you find may seem to be written in a foreign language because 
of the highly technical terminology used in the health professions. To help you use and understand medical 
terminology on the Web, the Medical Library Association has published a brochure called “Deciphering 
Medspeak” which is available without charge in individual copies from MLA by sending an email to info@ 
mlahq.org. 
Health sciences librarians at hospitals and academic medical centers throughout America stand ready to help 
consumers with do-it-yourself search assistance or will assist by performing professional searches of the Web 
for consumer and professional medical literature. If you don’t know whether your community has a health 
sciences library, you can find out by calling the MLA at (312) 419-9094. 
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Ten Things Radical about the Weblog Form in Journalism 
Jay Rosen, PressThink, October 16, 2003 
Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2003/10/16/radical_ten.html. 
1.	 The weblog comes out of the gift economy, whereas most (not all) of today’s journalism comes out of the 
market economy. 
2.	 Journalism had become the domain of professionals, and amateurs were sometimes welcomed into it— as 
with the op ed page. Whereas the weblog is the domain of amateurs and professionals are the ones being 
welcomed to it, as with this page. 
3.	 In journalism since the mid-nineteenth century, barriers to entry have been high. With the weblog, barriers 
to entry are low: a computer, a Net connection, and a software program like Blogger or Movable Type gets 
you there. Most of the capital costs required for the weblog to “work” have been sunk into the Internet 
itself, the largest machine in the world (with the possible exception of the international phone system). 
4.	 In the weblog world every reader is actually a writer, and you write not so much for “the reader” but for 
other writers. So every reader is a writer, yes, but every writer is also a reader of other weblog writers—or 
better be. 
5.	 Whereas an item of news in a newspaper or broadcast seeks to add itself to the public record, an entry 
posted in a weblog engages the public record, because it pulls bits and pieces from it through the device 
of linking. In journalism the regular way, we imagine the public record accumulating with each day’s 
news— becoming longer. In journalism the weblog way, we imagine the public record “tightening,” its 
web becoming stronger, as links promotes linking, which produces more links. 
6.	 A weblog can “work” journalistically—it can be sustainable, enjoyable, meaningful, valuable, worth 
doing, and worth it to other people —if it reaches 50 or 100 or 160 souls who like it, use it, and 
communicate through it. Whereas in journalism the traditional way, such a small response would be seen 
as a failure, in journalism the weblog way the intensity of a small response can spell success. 
7.	 A weblog is like a column in a newspaper or magazine, sort of, but whereas a column written by twelve 
people makes little sense and wouldn’t work, a weblog written by twelve people makes perfect sense and 
does work. 
8.	 In journalism prior to the weblog, the journalist had an editor and the editor represented the reader. In 
journalism after the weblog, the journalists has (sic) (writerly) readers, and the readers represent an editor. 
9.	 In journalism classically understood, information flows from the press to the public. In the weblog world 
as it is coming to be understood, information flows from the public to the press. 
10.	  Journalism traditionally assumes that democracy is what we have, information is what we seek. Whereas 
in the weblog world, information is what we have—it’s all around us—and democracy is what we seek. 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 148 
The Role of Information Technology 
Ten Things Conservative About the Weblog Form in Journalism. 
Jay Rosen, PressThink, October 17, 2003 
Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2003/10/17/conserv_ten.html. 
By “conservative” I do not mean “affiliated with the GOP,” or “listener to Rush Limbaugh,” or coming from 
the right wing. To ask what’s conservative about weblogs as a form for journalism is to ask: what’s “old” about 
the new? Which known truths (about media, journalism, truthtelling, life) tend to be verified by the weblog 
form— even with its radically different and transforming features? “Conservative” here says the old rules still 
apply, ancient wisdom is indeed wise, the authority of the ages holds— and that sort of thing. So in that sense, 
and only that sense, here are: 
1.	 Weblogs deal in the golden rule, modified to read: link unto others as you would have them link unto you. 
2.	 As an entrant in the marketplace of ideas, the weblog obeys—and does not repeal—the ancient laws of 
supply and demand. The “news” from some sites will be in demand more than the stuff from others. Just as 
most new businesses fail, most new weblogs fail. That’s the marketplace. 
3.	 In the weblog world, charity—giving it away—leads to heaven. 
4.	 Age has advantages over youth. People who have been at this a while know a lot, (so do their weblogs.) 
A wise move for newcomers is to learn from what’s been done, honoring those who have come before— 
your elders in Net time. 
5.	 A weblog in revolt against journalistic authority will discover that it needs itself some kind of authority, 
(even if it’s among like-minded rebels) and thus the revolt is always a limited and partial one. 
6.	 The quality of any weblog in journalism depends greatly on its fidelity to age old newsroom 
commandments (virtues) like check facts, check links, spell things correctly, be accurate, be timely, quote 
fairly. And as Roy Peter Clark says, if you’re telling a story and there’s a dog, get the name of the dog. 
7.	 People still want to know: how do you know this? What expertise, body of knowledge, authority, or direct 
experience lies behind a weblog’s statements about the world? 
8.	 As with all journalism, being first counts. Good weblogs break news, even if it’s just news of another good 
weblog born or a nugget of information newly available. 
9.	 The weblog is continuous—not a revolutionary break—with five hundred years of print culture. It is the 
printed page, modernized, interconnected, made two-way, but still… “powered by movable type.” 
10.	 Without faith in a higher power (some call it the blogosphere), an individual life of weblog freedom is 
impoverished. 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 149 
The Role of Information Technology 
References 
Benigeri, M., Pluye, P. (2003). Shortcomings of health information on the Internet. Health Promotion International 18(4), 
381-6. 
Brodie, M., Flournoy, R.E., Altman, D.E., Blendon, R.J., Benson, J.M., Rosenbaum, M.D. (2000). Health information, the 
Internet, and the digital divide. Health Affairs 19(6), 255-265. 
Carroll, B. Culture clash: Journalism and the communal ethos of the blogosphere. In L.J. Gurak, S. Antonijevic, L. 
Johnson, C. Ratliff, & J. Reyman (Eds.), Into the blogosphere: Rhetoric, community, and culture of weblogs. 
Retrieved July 24, 2006 from http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/culture_clash_journalism_and_the_communal_ 
ethos_of_the_blogosphere.html. 
Cline, R.J.W., Haynes, K.M. (2001). Consumer health information seeking on the Internet: The state of the art. Health 
Education Research 16(6), 671-692. 
Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (2003). The Internet under Crisis 
Conditions: Learning from the Impact of September 11. Washington, DC: National Academies of Science. 
Covello, V. (2003). Best practices in public health risk and crisis communication. Journal of Health Communication 
8(Supp 1), 5-8. 
Easen, N. (2004). The budding blogs of business. CNN World News, February 25. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/11/12/globaloffice.blogs/. 
Eysenbach, G. (2003). SARS and population health technology. Journal of Medical Internet Research 5(2), e14. 
Farivar, C. (2006). Blogging from the belly of Beirut. Wired News, July 21. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://www. 
wired.com/news/technology/internet/0,71421-0.html?tw=wn_politics_3. 
--. Flu Wiki. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://www.fluwikie.com/pmwiki.php?n=Main.HomePage. 
Fox, S. (2005). Digital divisions. Pew Internet & American Life Project Report. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://www. 
pewinternet.org/PPF/r/165/report_display.asp. 
Government Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office, GAO, 2003). Bioterrorism: Public health 
response to anthrax incidents of 2001. Retrieved July 24, 2006 from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04152.pdf. 
Gurak, L., Antonijevic, S., Johnson, L., Ratliff, C., Reyman, J. (no date). Introduction: Weblogs, rhetoric, community, and 
culture. Into the Blogosphere: Rhetoric, community, and the culture of weblogs (University of Minnesota). Retrieved 
July 29, 2006 from http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/introduction.html. 
Gursky, E., Inglesby, T.V., O’Toole, T. (2003). Anthrax 2001: Observations on the medical and public health response. 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 1(2), 97-110. 
Hensley, S. (2001). Health system on alert: Antibiotic purchases jump in New York – Anxiety over bioterrorism stokes 
sales of Cipro; Doctors warn of risks. New York Times, October 9, p. A6. 
Hiler, J. (2002). Blogosphere: The emerging media ecosystem. Microcontent News: The Online Magazine for Weblogs, 
Webzines, and Personal Publishing, May 28, 2002. Retrieved July 21, 2006 from http://www.microcontentnews. 
com/articles/blogosphere.htm. 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 150 
The Role of Information Technology 
Hobbs, J., Kittler, A., Fox, S., Middleton, B., Bates, D. (2004). Communicating health information to an alarmed public 
facing a threat such as a bioterrorist attack. Journal of Health Communication 9(1), 67-75. 
Horrigan, J.B., Rainie, L. Counting on the Internet. Pew Internet and American Life Project. Retrieved July 21, 2006 from 
http://www.pewinternet.org/p. 
Ives, N. “Marketing for the Third Screen.” New York Times, November 8, 2004 (Advertising Section). Retrieved July 21, 
2006 from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/08/business/08adcol.html?ei=5070&en=939137f5f54a979d&ex=11536 
27200&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1153512695-i0kxDqRpjgJK1J+8TaPEvg). 
Kerbel, M.R. (2005). Blog for America and civic engagement. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 10(4), 3-
27. 
Kittler, A., Hobbs, J., Volk, L.A., Kreps, G.L., Bates, D.W. (2004). The internet as a vehicle to communicate health 
information during a public health emergency: A survey analysis involving the anthrax scare of 2001. Journal of 
Medical Internet Research 9(1):e8. 
Lampa, G. (2004). Imagining the blogosphere: An introduction to the imagined community of instant publishing. In L.J. 
Gurak, S. Antonijevic, L. Johnson, C. Ratliff, & J. Reyman (Eds.), Into the blogosphere: Rhetoric, community, and 
culture of weblogs. Retrieved July 24, 2006 from http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/imagining_the_blogosphere. 
html. 
Lenhart, A., Fox, S. (2006). Bloggers: A portrait of the internet’s new storytellers. Pew Internet & American Life Project. 
Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/186/report_display.asp. 
Madden, M., Fox, S. (2006). Finding answers online in sickness and health. Pew Internet and American Life Project 
Report. Retrieved July 21, 2006 from http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/183/rport_display.asp. 
Oldenburg, D. (2001). Stocking u in hopes of breathing easier: Gas masks may not offer protection. Washington Post, 
October 10, p. C1. 
Peters, R.G., Covello, V.T., & McCallum, D.B. (1997). The determinants of trust and credibility in environmental risk 
communication: An empirical study. Risk Analysis, 17(1), 43-54. 
Rainie, L. (2005). Data memorandum: The state of blogging. Pew Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved July 29, 
2006 from http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_blogging_data.pdf. 
Reynolds, B., Galdo, J., Sokler, L. (2002). Crisis and emergency risk communication. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. 
Rosen, J. (2003). What’s conservative about the weblog form in journalism: Pressthink: Ghost of Democracy in the Media 
Machine. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from Http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2003/10/17/conserv_ 
ten.html. 
Sandman, P. and Lanard, J. (2003). Risk communication recommendations for infectious disease outbreaks. World Health 
Organization SARS Scientific Research Advisory Committee. Available at http://www.psandman.com/articles/who-
srac.htm. 
Seeger, M. (2006). Best practices in crisis communication: An expert panel process.  Journal of Applied Communication 
Research, 34(4), 232-244. 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 151 
The Role of Information Technology 
Seeger, M.W., Sellnow, T.L., & Ulmer, R.R. (2003). Communication and organizational crisis. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
The Cell Phone Challenge to Survey Research: National Polls Not Undermined by Growing Cell-Only Population. Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, May 15, 2006 press release. 
Thomas, P. (2003). The anthrax attacks. The Century Foundation’s Homeland Security Project Working Group on the 
Public’s Need to Know. Retrieved July 24, 2006 from http://www.911investigations.net/IMG/pdf/doc-1387.pdf. 
Tomes, N. (2000). The making of a germ panic, then and now. American Journal of Public Health, 90(2), 191-198. 
Tsai, A.C., Lurie, P., Sehgal, A.R. (2002). An outbreak of web sites selling ciproflaxin following an outbreak of anthrax by 
mail. The American Journal of Medicine, 113, 424-427. 
United States National Response Team (2000). Joint Information Center Model: Collaborative communications 
during emergency response. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/ 
AllAttachmentsByTitle/A-55JIC/$File/JIC.pdf?OpenElement. 
Wagner, C. (2004). Wiki: A technology for conversational knowledge management and group collaboration. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 13, 265-289. 
--. “Wiki.” Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wiki. 
World Health Organization Western Pacific Regional Office (2003). Interim guidelines for national SARS preparedness. 
Retrieved July 29, 2006 from http://www.wpro.who.int/sars/docs/interimguidelines/interim_guidelines_26May. pdf. 
CDC • Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 152 


Understanding the NIMS/ICS Structure 
Pandemic Influenza: 

Understanding the NIMS/ICS structure and the role of

communications in Pandemic Response Efforts

˘struc•ture (struk´ch r) 
n. 
1. Something made up of a number of parts that are held or put together in a prticular way: hierarchical 
social structure. 
2. The way i which parts are arranged or put together to form a whole; makeup: triangular in structure 
Severe Pandemic: What is different? 
•	 Uncertainty during planning efforts due to potential universal 
susceptibility to a virus with unknown characteristics. 
•	 The federal government has adopted the NIMS/ICS structure 
for effective management of emergency events; this will be the 
organizing principle in a national influenza pandemic response. 
It is mid-December, 2006. Avian influenza (H5N1) disease in humans 
has been monitored on the ground in Indonesia during the past 
several months. DHHS/CDC has posted surveillance and laboratory 
experts there, so that the Indonesian government and WHO can 
recognize as early as possible when/if disease spreads efficiently 
among humans in a sustained manner, that is, easy, on-going 
spread from person-to-person, without halting. Four weeks ago a 
child with flu-like symptoms that progressed rapidly to respiratory 
failure died quickly; she was buried without any official laboratory-
based diagnosis of illness. Within days, two of her immediate family 
members became ill with similar symptoms and one person died. 
Laboratory isolates from these two cases tentatively identified, and 
later confirmed, the disease as avian influenza (H5N1). Follow-
up genetic analysis indicated a minor modification of the organism 
from that identified in other ill patients during the past six months in 
that country.  Five other persons in the village, representing three 
families, have become ill, and three have died. WHO has increased 
its pandemic threat level from III to IV, indicating small clusters 
of disease, without sustained transmission. Additional laboratory 
Objectives:

•	 To provide public 
communications 
officials an overview of 




(ICS) structure and 
how it will function 
in the case of an 
influenza pandemic. 
•	 To clarify how the 
role of the public 
communications 
team and the 
communications 
response effort fit in to 
the overall ICS. 
•	 To provide an overview 
of the Joint Information 
Center (JIC). 
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support was recently sent from DHHS/CDC to Jakarta, including 
trained personnel and equipment. Reports of disease among 
families, affecting a total of 15 people with 10 deaths, have been 
received in the capital and field teams have been dispatched to 
determine whether or not H5N1 avian influenza is the cause. 
Late last week, an American trade representative to Asia was 
admitted to a Los Angeles hospital with symptoms of flu and 
respiratory failure requiring mechanical ventilation. Seasonal flu 
has already begun in California, but this is the first case noted 
by the LA County Department of Public Health this year that has 
resulted in hospitalization of a young adult, and the progression 
of disease appears to be more rapid than in those with strains of 
this season’s routine influenza. The man returned from a trip to 
Indonesia the week before, during which time he spent most of 
his time in offices in Jakarta, although he did note that he visited a 
“wet” market on at least one occasion. In October he received his 
annual seasonal influenza vaccination. 
Two days ago, a nurse and a sanitation worker in the same LA 
hospital, each known to have visited the patient’s room, became 
ill with flu-like symptoms. They stayed at home, but were each 
recently seen in the hospital emergency department; one was 
admitted for pneumonia requiring oxygen support. One other family 
member in the nurse’s home has become ill with symptoms of flu. 
Laboratory samples from all patients and their household contacts 
have been obtained to identify the causative agent. 
The following agencies and organizations have been actively 
monitoring the situation and have been busy internally developing 
their response plans. 
1. LA County Department of Public Health 
The health department has a traditional role in isolating cases of 
contagious disease and preventing its spread to other community 
members. In doing so, it has assigned an epidemiologist from 
its Acute Communicable Disease Control/Influenza division 
and a senior laboratorian/administrator from its Public Health 
Laboratory/Virology division to evaluate the problem and report 
back daily to the Director.  Thus far, this is known: (1) the first 
patient has had influenza A identified, with PCR confirmation 
of H5N1 strain; (2) isolates from that patient have been shipped 
under careful protective measures to CDC/Atlanta for viral 
culture; and (3) other laboratory samples from the nurse and 
sanitation worker and their families are being tested for H5N1 
today (by PCR), with tentative (unconfirmed) results available 
by COB today. 
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2.	 City of Los Angeles, Office of the Mayor (Antonio R. 
Villaraigosa) 
The Director of Public Health notified the Mayor several days 
ago of the potential for a serious public health threat; the mayor 
assigned one of his medium-level staff members to assist in any 
way needed. A briefing is scheduled for 11 am today between 
the two offices. 
3.	 California Health and Human Services Agency, Office of the 
Secretary (Kim Belshé) 
This California agency was notified through informal networks 
of the potential problem in Southern California. The Director, 
Division of Communicable Disease Control, is anticipating 
a phone call from the Mayor’s office following their briefing 
today. 
4.	 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta), Dept 
of Health and Human Services 
HHS/CDC is aware of the hospitalized case and potential other 
cases in detail through its Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer 
posted in the LA County Department of Health, as well as 
through the laboratory services of its Influenza Division. HHS/ 
CDC has offered its services to Los Angeles County and the 
State of California, as needed. A daily update is being provided 
to the agency director, who is determining on a day-by-day basis 
what resources are needed locally and nationally, as well as 
whether the Emergency Operations Center should be activated.  
All-department briefings have moved from weekly to daily (15 
min) to keep Washington up-to-date. 
Is this a public health emergency? 
At this point, the above scenario is not a public health emergency. Only 
three people are ill, and there is no large group of “walking wounded,” 
nor seriously ill people requiring hospitalization, nor “worried well” 
seeking emergency department care for minor respiratory symptoms. 
However, the potential exists that a major contagious disease with 
high mortality will occur.  Therefore, prophylactic measures should be 
aggressively put into place. Decisions concerning antiviral treatment 
and/or quarantine of non-ill exposed persons, explanations and 
reassurances to the media, and enhanced surveillance by the medical 
community, among other things, will need to be made. 
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What is the most appropriate organizational 
structure to use if this is a public health 
emergency? 
NIMS/ICS (See below) 
At what level (local, state, national) does ultimate authority belong? 
To be determined by the Incident Commander in charge of all 
operations (below). 
If the outbreak spreads, how would this change the nature or con-
tent of the organizational structure?  
Fortunately ICS is readily expandable to manage increases in scope 
or breadth of response activities. A multidisciplinary team is needed 
to address these disparate issues. Decisions will need to be made at 
the hospital and public health department levels. A command-and-
control structure is preferable to an organic (homegrown) one, since 
the media and the public will hold the public health department, elected 
public officials, and bureaucrats highly accountable for any missteps 
or inactions, as they did with Hurricane Katrina. Such a structure is 
already available through the National Incident Management System. If 
the disease spreads to the point where an epidemic is declared, a system 
is needed that can be enlarged in a manner that incorporates more 
resources efficiently without changing its fundamental basic command-
and-control nature. 
If the outbreaks spread, how would the structure of communica-
tions change? 
The present communications needs are the passing of frank information 
from the hospital to the health department and media without violating 
issues of confidentiality, and on-going assessment of the possibility 
of a broad-scale pandemic occurring in Los Angeles or within the 
continental U.S. Future communication needs hinge on whether or 
not open, collaborative communication engages the public in efforts 
to contain the disease through individual and family actions. These 
messages should be, at least in part, pre-scripted and, if possible, 
pre-tested on a pilot audience. If the disease spreads, the existing 
communications team should be subsumed into a larger group that 
understands the communications issues. 
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If the outbreaks spread, how can regional or federal resources be 
put to best use to help manage the patient surge? 
If the disease spreads within Los Angeles or to another locale, a number 
of public health disciplines will need to be locally augmented. A plan 
is needed that can accommodate changes on an on-going, daily basis. 
The Incident Command System of the National Incident Management 
System is designed to satisfy that requirement. 
The National Incident Management System 
The United States Government has adopted the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) to achieve unified, single- and inter-
agency management of emergency responses (information on NIMS/ 
ICS can be found at the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
NIMS Homepage, see references for website address). A separate 
federal entity, the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2006), provides professional 
personnel such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists and others to help local 
jurisdictions in time of need. 
Under NIMS, the principal framework of operations is the Incident 
Command System (ICS). The central purpose of ICS, and hence its 
value, is to ensure a comprehensive national framework designed to 
efficiently support incident management, regardless of the size, nature, 
or complexity of the event. ICS defines a clear chain-of-command 
using an organizational framework that can expand or contract to meet 
existing and changing needs. ICS is a framework, rather than a plan, 
that incorporates the concept of a daily (or more frequently, if needed) 
Incident Action Plan defining the actions to be carried out “by whom, 
what, when, where, and how.” 
Although emergency response is now a defined role for United States 
public health agencies, these agencies, even during disaster events, must 
still maintain essential, non-emergency public health services for the 
communities they serve, to avoid both neglecting consumers unaffected 
by the event and aggravating the effects of the disaster or outcome 
of the response. The NIMS/ICS structure recognizes this duality and 
often, for organizational purposes, incorporates essential public health 
services into the ICS as a separate module, lest they be forgotten or their 
importance under-recognized. 
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ICS Structure 
The main components of the ICS are the command staff and the general 
staff or functional sections (FEMA, 2006).  The ICS may exist in its 
full form or in a truncated form, for more minor events in which certain 
pieces of the structure are not necessary.  In the full form, the ICS 
command staff is composed of the Incident Commander and special 
staff positions. The Incident Commander (IC, or Agency Incident 
Commander, if the disaster involves several agencies working together) 
is in charge of the incident. He/she is responsible for the development 
of an Incident Action Plan, allocation of resources, and assuring that the 
necessary sections operating under it are activated (and subsequently 
deactivated at the end of the crisis). The IC is responsible for 
development of the mission and goals, and synchronization with other 
responding agencies and jurisdictions. This person has the authority to 
make decisions and ultimately execute the incident action plan. 
The Liaison Officer is responsible for coordinating all activities with 
other agencies and groups involved in the response. The Safety Officer 
is responsible for scene safety, availability and appropriate use of 
personal protective equipment, and basic human needs (rest, nutrition, 
and hydration). The Public Information Officer (PIO) is responsible for 
assuring that appropriate information is provided to the public, as well 
as to government officials and collaborating agencies. This information 
must be accurate, timely, and internally/externally consistent across 
agencies. All information provided to the public during an emergency 
is to be cleared through the Public Information Officer.  The 
Documentation Officer is responsible for recording all activity that 
occurs in the agency Emergency Operations Center (EOC), particularly 
meetings, phone calls, and other logistic matters. 
There are four operations sections residing at the single level below 
the command structure—planning/intelligence, operations, logistics, 
and finance/administration. Each may have its own Section Action 
Plan based on the overarching Incident Action Plan.  Each section is 
headed by a section chief, who often works with a deputy, and assists 
the Incident Commander with the Incident Action Plan. The Planning 
and Intelligence Section is responsible for collecting and organizing 
data, making projections and forecasts about the event, and reporting 
these to the Incident Commander. The Operations Section is responsible 
for carrying out the specific tasks and objectives of the local public 
health agency. It provides the day-to-day services outlined in the 
Incident Action Plan, i.e., those principally related to clinical care, 
epidemiology, and maintenance of environmental health. There is 
typically a Public Health Emergency Response Branch and a separate 
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Essential Services Branch under the jurisdiction of the section, the latter 
of which maintains the public health of the community on other fronts. 
The Logistics Section is responsible for supporting the other sections. 
Logistics is responsible for acquiring space, supplies, and equipment, 
which may include rental space for a vaccination clinic, delivery of 
vaccine and syringes, and essential supplies for a shelter.  The Finance/ 
Administration Section is responsible for contracts and procurements, 
interpreting human resource policies in the emergency setting, tracking 
of goods, and in some cases, assurance of availability of resources to 
address the physiological and psychological needs of agency personnel 
and volunteers. 
As the work of a section increases in complexity, branches and units are 
added sequentially.  For example, in the Operations Section, there may 
be three branches, namely, the Emergency Public Health Operations 
Branch, the Medical Operations Branch, and the Continuity of Public 
Health Operations Branch. The first branch may include the Community 
Health and Outreach Unit, the Epidemiology/Surveillance Unit, the 
Public Health Laboratory Unit, the Vital Records Unit, the Shelter 
Operations Unit, and others. The second branch may include an EMS 
unit and a Clinics and Hospitals unit. In this manner, the ICS is readily 
expandable and contractible. 
The ICS, with its command positions, sections with section chiefs and 
deputies, branches, and units provides some standardization in a difficult 
and sometimes chaotic field environment. With the ICS structure and 
the daily (or more often) Incident Action Plan, each member of the team 
has a clear understanding of his/her role and limitations, the reporting 
structure, and the expectations of each other section. Personnel 
assignments are better understood, the possibility of “mission creep” 
is minimized, and feedback/evaluation is built into the development 
of the next day’s Incident Action Plan.  The standardization of [names 
and definitions of] sections, units, and roles of ICS structural elements 
across emergencies assures that, as other agency command structures 
dispatch personnel to the field, their roles are automatically understood 
by their predetermined position in the organizational chart, and that 
correct command-and-control is established within and across agency 
deployments. Note that these descriptors for personnel are specific to 
ICS and emergency functions, and are not related to the nature of a 
person’s previous everyday job title. This is done purposely to ensure 
that personnel are assigned to positions in which they will be most 
effective, and to avoid confusing the present emergency situation with 
aspects of competency, appropriateness, or assumptions of seniority in 
their everyday job. 
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Emergency medical, nursing, and veterinary 
services 
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a federally 
coordinated system operating under the National Response Plan and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2006)). NDMS provides 
supplemental emergency care to designated domestic disaster sites in 
need of medical, nursing, and/or veterinary professionals to manage 
patient and community care during an acute crisis. NDMS assets 
may be dispatched during a variety of emergencies including, natural 
disasters, technological disasters, major transportation accidents, or acts 
of terrorism. 
Under this system, Disaster Management Assistance Teams (DMAT) 
consisting of medical and para-professional medical personnel use their 
experience, equipment, and supplies in the field to triage casualties, 
provide medical care in adverse environments, prepare patients for 
evacuation, and/or provide or augment local primary care in established 
medical care centers when emergency needs overwhelm hospital 
resources. About 100 national DMAT teams are available on a 14-day 
rotating basis, and carry supplies sufficient for a 72-hour period. 
Several other types of teams may be dispatched as needed, including 
Disaster Mortuary Operations Teams to provide mortuary services, 
Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs) to provide veterinary 
services, and National Nursing Response Teams (NNRTs) for situations 
that require clinical assistance but not necessarily full DMATs. 
Situations calling for the assistance of these teams might include 
assisting with mass chemoprophylaxis (a mass vaccination program), or 
a response to a weapon of mass destruction event that overwhelms the 
nation’s supply of nurses. Additionally, National Pharmacy Response 
Teams (NPRTs) are used in situations such as those described for the 
NNRTs but where pharmacists, not nurses or DMATs, are needed, and 
National Medical Response Teams (NMRTs) are equipped and trained 
to provide medical care for potentially contaminated victims of weapons 
of mass destruction. For each of these five types of teams, multiple units 
of each type may be needed simultaneously, or in tandem to relieve each 
other on a two-week rotating basis. 
Communications 
How does the ICS incorporate communications? The Public 
Information Officer (PIO) as a command position, rather than a section 
or general staff position, reports directly to the Incident Commander. 
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The PIO is also responsible for working within the framework of the 
Joint Information System (JIS). This system includes plans, protocols, 
and structures for providing information to the public through the use 
of a Joint Information Center or JIC, which enhances the likelihood 
that information released to the public will be accurate and coordinated 
across agencies. The JIC, a physical site located in the EOC prepares, 
and releases information as needed. One or more JICs may be 
operating under the JIS, and may be large or small and may not house 
all communications staff. The base of operations for a JIC may be 
federal, state, or local, and its resources may flow from any of these 
sources. As with the ICS, the JIC may be scaled to fit the situation by 
enlarging or contracting its services and resources. A large JIC may 
have a research and media team as well as a logistics team. The former 
would include a spokesperson, hospital liaisons, media monitor, State 
PIO, and State Medical Advisor, all working under the ICS-PIO. Under 
its logistics team, a large JIC may include audiovisual and production 
support, web management, briefing room staff, and others. As with 
all disaster planning, communications services personnel are advised 
to practice protocols in advance through tabletop exercises specific to 
communications issues. 
Integration of concepts 
At the beginning of this chapter, a realistic scenario was established 
for Los Angeles based on what is known of avian influenza (H5N1) as 
of July 2006. Any state or local entity conducting a tabletop exercise 
based on this proposed situation will recognize that the issues described 
below commonly arise and can be addressed by a system established 
to manage the emergency. Please take the time to review the questions 
below related to the impending Los Angeles outbreak and provide 
responses. In many cases, alternative answers, all appropriate, can be 
proposed; please indicate such alternatives as well. 
Issues to be considered: 
1. If you are the selected Public Information Officer of the ICS 
and main JIC, what structures would you need to put into place 
immediately? Within a week? 
2.	 Where would you find a set of questions the media commonly 
ask in emergencies? How would you proceed to prepare your 
spokesperson (which may be yourself) for such questions? 
3.	 What media outlets would make the best sense to use during the 
initial period (first few days) of the crisis? What media outlets 
would be more appropriate for use later in the crisis? 
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4.	 What do you want the public to know at this point? What should 
they do with this information? 
5.	 How would you handle differences in messages provided to the 
public by multiple (well-meaning) sources? 
Conclusion 
NIMS and the ICS structure were developed by experts in emergency 
fieldwork because the usual type of superviser-employee relationship 
did not provide the immediate command-and-control and feedback 
that a busy and rapidly changing environment required. As it develops 
further through use in public health emergencies, modifications will 
be needed, and these are welcome at both the level of the public health 
worker as well as the public health administrations, local and federal. It 
is anticipated that, by having all emergency workers use one structure 
(the ICS), we will have established the basis of accurate communication 
of needs and work done by the appropriate people, that support of the 
field workers will be considered up-front and continually, and that plans 
for the next immediate period of time will be transparent to all. 
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